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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Operations management is concerned with the production of goods and services in organizations.
Behind every production activity workers are involved. Workers transform goods, handle goods,
service clients, operate and maintain equipment. They perform all these activities so that in
the end a good or a service can be offered to a customer. Without workers, offering such goods
and services would be impossible. The involvement of workers in the production of goods and
services forces a direct relationship between worker performance and system productivity.
At the same time, the workers’ performance and satisfaction with their job can, in turn, be
influenced by operations management decisions. How schedules are assigned to workers, which
production goals are assigned to workers and where products are located in a warehouse are
all examples of such decisions. Operations management decisions can make work more (or less)
demanding, challenging, easier to execute, motivating, comfortable and fatiguing. By altering
these attributes, both, individual performance and the workers’ satisfaction are affected. The
workers’ job satisfaction is then ultimately linked to the workers’ well-being. In a context where
firms consider not only the maximization of shareholder value, but also the well-being of all their
stakeholders (Dahlsrud, 2008), the well-being of workers should be included as an objective in
the firm’s operations.
Operations management decision models, using operations research techniques, seek maxi-
mal improvement of one or more operations management objectives through the definition of
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optimal levels of a number of decision variables. This thesis addresses how to enhance operations
management decision models by considering the impact of these decisions on the workers’ in-
dividual performance (and subsequent system performance) as well as the workers’ satisfaction
with the job. By so doing, this thesis also addresses the concern that human considerations
should be examined to enrich the operations management field; a concern repeatedly raised in
recent years by operations management scientists (see Boudreau et al. (2003), Bendoly et al.
(2006) and Gino and Pisano (2008)). In sum, we agree with the recommendation for the field
of operations management made by Powell and Johnson (1980):
“If the worker has one iota of discretion he must be considered a determinant of the produc-
tive outcome.”
Despite remaining largely unaddressed throughout the history of the Operations Manage-
ment field, this concern for human considerations is not new. Already, in 1914, L.M. Gilbreth
made an attempt to include knowledge of psychology in the field of scientific management, which
at that time was largely devoted to operations management issues. In particular, Gilbreth (1914)
reported studies regarding work place variables like the measurement of work, balancing indi-
vidual welfare and productivity as well as the use of incentives, among others. Similarly, Taylor
(1911), also closely studied the behavior of workers in the workplace, even if his efforts were
limited and made unrealistic a priori assumptions about the workers’ behavior.
Even in the current state of the art of the operations management field, questions remain
regarding the involvement of workers in operations. How to best design incentive schemes for
boosting performance and how to balance individual welfare and system performance objectives
in a production system, are just a few of the questions that remain unanswered. A better under-
standing of the mechanisms governing how workers perform their job and are affected by their
productive context provides an untapped opportunity for better operations management design
decisions. Better decisions may lead to not only more cost-effective, responsive and reliable
productive systems, but also to productive systems that accommodate their workers better. A
common thread throughout this work is to take a dual approach. First, gain understanding
about the worker-productive system interaction; and second, use this understanding to inform
operations management decision models.
1.2 Research Methodology 3
1.2 Research Methodology
As the subject of this thesis is inherently multidisciplinary, this dissertation makes use of different
bodies of knowledge in both research and methodology. In particular, this thesis makes use of
knowledge from psychology, ergonomics and operations management. From psychology, the field
that studies human mental functions and behavior, this thesis draws from relevant theories of
motivation and factors that affect motivation, effort regulation and work evaluation. Next, from
the field of ergonomics, a field concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans
and other elements of a system (IEA, 2000), this thesis draws from results of physical and mental
capabilities of humans. Lastly, from the field of operations management, this thesis draws upon
existing knowledge regarding performance metrics and operations decisions, in particular, in the
context of warehouse operations. It is in the context of warehouse operations that most of the
studies in this dissertation are directly applied. This dissertation thus lies at the intersection of
three fields and uses the knowledge in these fields to generate hypotheses regarding the impact
of operations management variables on individual welfare and performance.
These hypotheses are then tested using empirical research methods. The value of empirical
research methods for building and testing theory in operations management were highlighted
by Roth (2007). This dissertation uses two empirical research methods. First, we make use
of experimental methods to manipulate goal levels and study their effects in performance and
work pace regulation. Experimental methods have recently been recognized as a new tool for
furthering the knowledge of operations management by Croson and Donohue (2002). Second,
we make use of a field study to identify and quantify the influence of location factors in the
productivity and perceived discomfort of real workers. The hypothesized relationships are then
tested on the collected data via a number of statistical procedures. Furthermore, because precise
mathematical relationships are needed for operations management models, we make use of a
family of linear regression methodologies to characterize, specify and formulate empirical models
of the proposed relationships.
These empirical models are then used as an input for analytical operations decision models.
In particular, based on empirical models of cycle time and discomfort in an order picking task,
we formulate a bi-objective assignment model to decide on the locations of products within a
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warehouse in order to make order picking activities more efficient and worker-friendly. It is
also worth noting here that we make use of analytical modeling in an unconventional manner:
To derive hypotheses regarding how workers regulate their effort to achieve goals, we model
the workers’ choice of how much effort to exert over time to derive hypotheses regarding how
workers regulate their effort to achieve goals.
1.3 Contribution and thesis outline
The main contribution of this thesis is to incorporate results of the behavior and ergonomic
sciences in operations management decisions. To achieve this contribution, this thesis addresses
two main challenges. First, the challenge of identifying results of behavior and ergonomic sci-
ences and validate these for specific operations management contexts. Second, the challenge of
describing the validated results in a mathematical format adequate for modeling decisions in
operations management.
By addressing these challenges, we are able to develop new operations management models
that take into account worker related factors that are relevant because they either affect the
objective or the feasibility of the decision models. In a way, this dissertation can be seen as
a response to the call for operations management models that incorporate insights from the
behavioral and ergonomic sciences (Boudreau et al., 2003).
The studies within this dissertation all follow a common sequence. First, for theory building,
hypotheses are generated based on existing bodies of knowledge and theoretical decision models.
Second, for theory testing, the hypotheses are tested using either a field study or a laboratory
experiment. Using regression techniques, empirical models of the effects of operational variables
on performance and job satisfaction metrics are constructed and tested. Third, the results of
these empirical models are used for gaining insights for operations management. These insights
are either gained through a discussion of its application or by using the models to formulate
analytical operations management decision models that are applicable for specific contexts.
Figure 1.1 shows an overview of how this dissertation is organized by using this three step
approach throughout its chapters. We detail the contribution of each chapter as follows.
1.3 Contribution and thesis outline 5
Behavioral operations for workers: Challenges and opportunities.
Chapter 2 introduces modeling and empirical considerations for the inclusion of worker spe-
cific factors in operations management decision models. Centered on operations management
decisions, our goal is to provide a review of relationships found in the literature that link worker
specific factors, worker performance, and job satisfaction to operations management decision
variables. We contribute to the interface of operations management and behavioral sciences by
evaluating whether the relationships documented in the literature are undisputed and whether
these are characterized in a way that allows for mathematical description. In addition, we
propose frameworks integrating a number of worker related factors that can be influenced by
operations management decisions and affect operations management objectives. Based on the
evaluations and frameworks proposed, we provide recommendations explaining how to incorpo-
rate such relationships into current operations management models. Moreover, the chapter is
also of interest for empirical scientists as we identify current limitations on the knowledge of hu-
man factors and its interactions that are critical for advancing current operations management
decision models.
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1.3 Contribution and thesis outline 7
How do workers regulate their effort when goals are assigned? A theoretical ap-
proach.
Operations management models of work flow typically assume that workers are unaffected
by external factors. This assumption is contradicted by a major theory within Organizational
Behavior, referred as Goal Setting Theory. This theory posits that setting challenging goals
enhances performance. In Chapter 3, we introduce the concept of setting goals for enhancing
worker performance. We review the existing literature on how to set goals (i.e. goal setting)
from the field of industrial psychology and identify two main questions that remain unanswered
in operations management contexts. The first question is how workers perform given increasing
levels of difficulty for the goals assigned to them. The second question is how workers regulate
their work pace when a goal and a deadline are assigned to them. Two decision making models
are proposed based on alternative views from behavioral economics; one that assumes myopic
behavior of workers and another that assumes planning behavior. Thus, we obtain alternative
propositions regarding the relationship between the goal difficulty and work pace regulation of
workers. We then contribute by developing a theory of goal setting for operations management
contexts where regulation of effort over time is the critical factor.
How do workers regulate their effort when goals are assigned? An empirical inquiry.
Chapter 4 continues the theoretical investigation of Chapter 3 by testing it empirically. As
no theory is available for predicting a priori which behavior is dominant for workers (whether
a worker exhibits myopic or planning behavior), we conduct a lab experiment in which we
observe worker performance under a variety of conditions. Unlike previous experiments in goal
setting theory, the experiment performed incorporates the assignment of goals and deadlines
at the same time and tracks the evolution of the participants’ work pace over time. From the
experiment, we find general support for the planning model. We confirm a strictly increasing
relationship between goal difficulty and performance as well as differences in goal sensitivity
across individuals with different skill levels. More importantly, by investigating work pace
regulation, we find previously unknown advantages of setting challenging goals. Specifically, we
find that assigning challenging goals induce workers to work at a stationary work-pace and in
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more predictable patterns. We discuss possible explanations for these findings as well as their
implications for operations management.
Enhanced storage slotting decisions: considering the human element.
Chapter 5 recognizes that there is a tendency in both, practice and academia, to emphasize
operational performance in warehouse design decisions without considering the impact these
decisions have on the workers’ well-being. Humans, however, are often at the heart of crucial
processes such as order picking. We contribute to the literature and practice of warehouse
design by considering both, an economic and a well-being goal, in storage slotting decisions.
The traditional economic goal is that of minimizing cycle time, whereas the human well-being
goal is that of minimizing workers’ discomfort. Our approach is data driven, since little of the
needed information is readily available. We first build empirical models for estimating cycle times
and discomfort in order picking operations. These empirical models are then used to formulate
a bi-objective assignment model where products are assigned to specific locations. The results
and subsequent analysis show moderate trade-offs and considerable alignment between both
goals. We also provide practical recommendations based on these results for storage assignment
decisions.
Chapter 2
Behavioral operations for workers:
Challenges and opportunities
2.1 Introduction
Since the early days of the operations management field, the challenge of incorporating relevant
aspects of worker behavior in Operations Management (OM) decision models has been persistent.
Already in 1955, Hayes noted the difficulty of including the effect of decisions on the firms’
personnel within mathematical models. More than fifty years later, Gino and Pisano (2008)
observed that “the behavioral perspective has largely been absent in the field of operations”
and, by extension, in models of operations management. The emerging research stream of
Behavioral Operations attempts to address this challenge by studying the impact of operational
decisions on people. However, this field also studies cognitive limitations and biases of decision
makers in the operations function. In fact, more studies focus on the behavioral aspects of
managers’ and planners’ decisions than that of workers. An emerging question is then, if the
general call for incorporating behavioral insights into operations management decision models
(e.g. see Bendoly et al., 2006 and Gino and Pisano, 2008) should also include a specific focus on
the behavioral insights of workers.
We reason that the answer to this question is affirmative and that there are two worker-
related cases for which incorporating such insights may be important. In the first case, perfor-
mance of a productive system is affected indirectly by operational policies as a result of changes
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in the behavior and performance of individual workers. If, for example, a shift schedule is too
demanding on the workers, it may generate fatigue and decrease individual motivation to per-
form, as well as the capacity to perform itself. Thus, a schedule that is too demanding will
compromise the original objective of cost effectiveness. This example illustrates the approach
taken in this thesis. Specifically, we take a general view of human behavior, including mental
and physical aspects (such as fatigue) that drive individuals’ actions.
In the second case, operational policies influence worker satisfaction with their jobs. Al-
though the traditional objectives in operations management models (e.g. minimization of op-
erational costs, response times, and quality errors) stem from the classic profit maximization
directive of the firm (Friedman, 1962), we argue that objectives concerning the maximization
of the workers’ job satisfaction should also be included. Workers are important stakeholders
in the firm: contributing with their work to the firms’ profitability, spending a considerable
amount of their time at the job and depending on their job for sustaining themselves and their
families (Pfeffer, 2009). Hence, for firms that view their goal as not only creating value for their
shareholders, but also satisfying all their stake-holders (Dahlsrud, 2008), it logically follows to
incorporate worker satisfaction as an operational objective. In addition, including job satis-
faction in a firm’s objective also yields other benefits that make job satisfaction an even more
desirable objective for a firm. These benefits include, among others, the improvement of worker
performance, economic savings in lower accident and absenteeism (Daley et al., 2009) rates, as
well as lower worker turnover (Porter and Steers, 1973).
In both cases, the failure to include ways by which operational decisions influence workers
may result in operational decisions that are either sub-optimal, infeasible or simply not aligned
with the objective of stakeholder satisfaction. In order to correct such flawed decisions, we call,
in this chapter, for a worker specific focus of operations management decisions.
In this chapter, our goal is to review the existing knowledge that links operations manage-
ment decisions with worker performance and worker job satisfaction. We, in turn, explore ways
to incorporate these insights in existing and potential operations management decision models.
Note that these operations management decision models are normative, in the sense that seek
to optimize for an operationalized objective.
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This chapter is relevant for both, operations management modelers and empirical researchers.
For modelers dealing with operations involving workers in key roles, our review may enable them
to obtain the required information to describe worker-related human factors relationships in a
mathematical format for incorporation into decision making models. For empirical researchers
that wish to contribute to operations management decision models, this chapter may guide their
research efforts by detailing what knowledge is still unknown and is still required for effectively
incorporating relevant worker-related human factors in operations management models.
This chapter contributes to the operations management field by integrating dispersed knowl-
edge of worker related factors into a framework that can be used to incorporate these factors
within operations decision models. Our framework is decision-making driven, focusing on the
proven relationships, from literature, between operations decisions and worker-specific factors
that may affect the optimality and feasibility of such decisions. In this way, we reduce the scope
of the worker related factors to those that are directly relevant to operations management de-
cisions. The advantage of a decision-making driven approach to review the existing knowledge,
as compared to a theoretical based (see Boudreau et al., 2003, Gino and Pisano, 2008 as well
as Bendoly et al., 2010), assumption based (Bendoly and Prietula, 2008) or case intervention
based (Neumann and Dul, 2010) approach is that it enables a discussion centered on the ad-
equacy and limitations of the mathematical description of such relationships. Based on the
discussion of such limitations, we are able to provide recommendations for modelers seeking to
incorporate current knowledge of worker specific factors. Similarly, we are also able to provide
recommendations for empirical researchers to address the limitations of current knowledge that
impede further incorporation of worker related factors into operations decision models. The
combination of both, axiomatic decision modeling and empirical research has been singled as a
fruitful approach to advance Operations Management theory (for a discussion see Bertrand and
Fransoo (2002) and Roth (2007)).
To achieve our goal, we address four questions in this chapter: 1) What are the relationships
that link operational decisions and individual work performance? 2) What are the limitations
of the description of such relationships in terms of mathematical characterization? 3) What are
the dimensions or facets of job satisfaction and which of them can be influenced by operations
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management variables? 4) What are common decision variables in operations management
models that may influence either individual work performance or individual job satisfaction?
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we propose a general framework for in-
corporating worker specific factors inoperations management models. In Section 2.3, we provide
a detailed account of worker specific factors with individual performance and evaluate how to
incorporate these in operations decision models. Similarly, in Section 2.4, we review existing
literature on factors contributing to job satisfaction and evaluate which of these can be in-
corporated into operations management decision models. Section 2.5, illustrates how common
decision variables in operations management models may affect the previously identified worker-
related human factors. We conclude in Section 2.6 with a brief summary of our approach and
main lessons learned. Throughout the sections, recommendations for furthering modeling and
empirical based research are given.
2.2 Modeling framework
To incorporate worker-related human aspects into operations management decision models, we
propose a general framework as depicted in Figure 2.1. The framework first identifies two levels
of analysis, a productive system level, which could refer to any system that adds value (e.g.
a production line, a packaging system, a call center), and an individual level which models
the worker and his personal exposure to environmental conditions that the productive system
defines. Most analytical models in operations management operate only at the productive system
level by modeling how decision variables in operations directly impact operational performance
(arrow 1 in Figure 2.1). We propose two alternative indirect paths for modeling in operational
models. One concerns the path by which operations management variables affect individual
performance and the other concerns the path by which operations management variables affect
the job satisfaction of individuals in a productive system.
In the proposed framework, we refer to individual performance specifically for operational
contexts. Hence, performance refers to classic objectives within the operations management
function, including productivity, quality and the ability to meet deadlines. However, given that
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the majority of the literature addresses determinants of worker performance in terms of the
specific dimension of productivity, in this chapter, we refer to productivity measured as tasks
processed per unit of time, unless stated otherwise.
For the concept of job satisfaction, we use the definition of Weiss (2002) that defines job
satisfaction as a “positive (or negative) evaluative judgment one makes about one’s job or job
situation”. In this way, job satisfaction is defined as an attitude towards the job where an
attitude is defined as a “summary evaluations of an object (e.g. oneself, other people, issues)
along a dimension ranging from positive to negative” (Petty et al., 2002). We also acknowledge
that other definitions of job satisfaction exist. For example, Smith et al. (1969), Locke (1976)
and Cranny et al. (1992), propose that job satisfaction is an affective or emotional response
to the job. However, we do not use any of these other definitions because these definitions
differ with the way how job satisfaction is most commonly operationalized an measured. Most
commonly, for measuring job satisfaction, respondents are asked to evaluate on a scale (negative
to positive) one aspect of, or the totality of, the job (Weiss, 2002). Hence, the definition provided
by Weiss (2002) is most consistent with how job satisfaction is measured in practice.
The path to influence individual performance and job satisfaction starts with a transforma-
tion of the operations management decision variables into individual exposure variables mea-
suring the extent to which an individual is subject to given stimuli (e.g. hours of work, queue
length, observed work pace of peers). To illustrate this, consider the case of constructing a shift
schedule that minimizes staffing costs. Suppose workers may be assigned either to morning or
night shifts and to shifts that are either 8 or 10 hours in duration. One decision variable may
be the assignment of an individual from the pool of workers to a given shift (i.e. an individual
employee-shift pair). Given this example, an exposure variable, that provides an indication of
the extent to which a worker is exposed to a strainful shift may be the individual’s average
number of hours between two consecutive shifts.
The next step is then to link the exposure variable to individual performance and/or sat-
isfaction of an individual with the job. Although this step can be done in a direct way, in the
framework, intermediate variables are used so that these variables can be referenced and identi-
fied from the existing literature as reviewed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. These variables are referred
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Figure 2.1: Framework for modeling worker-specific factors for operations management
to in the framework (Figure 2.1) as worker specific variables (or factors) and include variables
internal to the worker such as fatigue, discomfort, the level of skill and cognitive demands that
affect either individual performance or job satisfaction (depicted in Figure 2.1 by arrows 4 and
5). Continuing with the previous example, the exposure variable of average number of hours
between schedules may then be related to an intermediate variable such as fatigue measured
subjectively, through self-perception (Beurskens et al., 2003). Fatigue, in turn, may then be
linked with a decrease in performance and possibly also with a decrease in job satisfaction if
fatigue becomes chronic. In Section 2.3, we review existing relationships in the literature that
link exposure variables with worker specific variables and individual performance (depicted in
Figure 2.1 by arrows 3 and 4 respectively). Similarly, in Section 2.4, we review existing rela-
tionships in the literature that link exposure variables with worker specific variables and job
satisfaction (depicted in Figure 2.1 by arrows 3 and 5 respectively). We also note that certain
worker specific variables exist that contribute to both, a worker’s individual performance as well
as job satisfaction. These work specific variables contributing to both individual performance
and job satisfaction, include fatigue, feedback provided, frequency of interaction with peers. It
is these variables that generally affect the intrinsic desirability of the job.
2.3 Individual performance 15
It is also worth noting that an aggregation procedure is required to model the impact of
individual performance (depicted in Figure 2.1 by arrow 6). This procedure depends largely on
the objective of the operations management decision model. For example, if minimization of the
makespan or tardiness is considered the main objective in a productive system, then the effect
of increasing individual productivity on the desired objective may be non-trivial and may even
be dependent on specific problem instances (i.e. release dates, duration of jobs and deadlines of
jobs). By contrast, if, in a parallel productive system, the desired objective is a maximization
of throughput then, the aggregation is straightforward.
Finally, in order to aggregate individual job satisfaction levels at the production level, a
manager is forced to make a choice regarding the aggregation procedure (depicted in Figure
2.1 by arrow 7). For example, the decision maker should ask himself whether he should opti-
mize for the average, the lower quartile, or the minimum job satisfaction related metric of the
workers involved in the production system. The decision maker may, in fact, choose to design a
productive system for a worst-case scenario in terms of job satisfaction. This procedure will be
illustrated in Section 5 through the use of explicit examples.
However, as job satisfaction objectives can usually coexist with classical operations man-
agement model objectives, multi-objective optimization may be required (Ehrgott, 2000). In
this case two types of analysis are possible: 1) A general trade-off analysis between satisfac-
tion related objectives and performance. This allows one to establish the costs of additional
operational performance in terms of an improved level of job satisfaction. 2) An analysis of all
available non-dominated solutions.
2.3 Individual performance
To integrate the different mechanisms by which operations management decision variables may
affect individual performance, we propose an integrated framework (Figure 2.1). The advantage
of an integrated framework is that it allows one to account for the effects of multiple operational
variables that may simultaneously affect more than one individual performance factor.
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When modeling production decisions, the framework for modeling individual performance
can be used in two ways. One way is by directly relating decision variables to individual per-
formance and another way is by relating decision variables to individual performance through
intermediate factors. The latter approach is more suitable when there is more than one opera-
tional variable and more than one individual performance factor at play.
Several human factors influence employees’ productivity. One of the earliest models of em-
ployee productivity is that of Vroom (1964) where he proposes that individual productivity is
a function of ability and the individual’s motivation to achieve one’s goal. Other authors such
as Locke et al. (1978) and Seijts et al. (2005) propose the same. We include in our framework
both motivation and ability (i.e. skill level) as the antecedents of workers’ performance.
Turning our focus to motivation, we must first recognize that there are several definitions
of this concept. For example, motivation is defined by Vroom (1964) as “a process of governing
choice made by persons”, while Atkinson (1964) defines it as “the contemporary influence on
direction, vigor and persistence of action”. These, and other definitions, according to Steers et
al. (2004), have the common notion that motivation is concerned with factors that energize,
channel and sustain human behavior over time. Hence, by definition, a link between a worker’s
motivation and the worker’s action exists, whereby motivation is a necessary pre-condition for
work.
By conceptualizing motivation as a decision process Vrooms’ definition (1964) lends itself to
modeling where specific outcomes are ranked in terms of preference and actions are selected to
obtain the most preferred outcomes. By considering motivation as a decision process, choosing
among a range of possible effort levels may be modeled, just as it is done in the field of economics
(Mueller, 2004). In this way, a direct implication of Vroom’s definition is that motivation can
be modeled as a decision process and thus defines an appropriate platform for modeling in
operations management contexts (see for example the modeling choice framework proposed by
McFadden (2001)). Considering this definition of motivation, we may conclude and recommend
the following in modeling motivation factors:
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Modeling research recommendation 1 Given that motivation is an antecedent for productiv-
ity and that it governs the choice of effort by workers, it should be modeled if different operational
policies produce a differentiated impact on motivation.
At the same time, several theories are available for modeling motivation. These theories
range from need theory (Maslow, 1954 and Alderfer, 1972),through expectancy theory (Vroom,
1964), to goal setting theory (Locke and Latham, 1990) and self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1997).
Indeed, there is a call for integrating these motivation theories in the behavioral sciences (Locke
and Latham, 2004) as these are considered as superabundant (Steel and Ko¨nig, 2006). For a
review of all these theories, their advantages and drawbacks, we refer the reader to Latham
(2007).
A few of these motivational theories often address one particular motivational theory. For
example equity theory (Adams, 1965) studies fairness considerations in motivation and de-
motivation and goal setting theory addresses the motivational implications of assigning goals
(Locke and Latham, 1990). Specialized theories of motivation can then be used to describe and
model a particular motivational driver. For example, equity theory may be best used to explain
and model the effects of fast workers slowing down to match the work pace of their peers (Schultz
et al., 2010). This leads to the following recommendation:
Modeling research recommendation 2 In modeling an specific motivational driver of an
operations management model, it is important to consider the use of specialized theories of
motivation that may directly address an specific motivational driver. For example, the use of
equity theory to model interaction between workers within a production line.
Nonetheless, when more than one motivational drivers interact, a general framework is
needed to integrate more than one motivational source. For this reason, we propose using
Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory as a platform for our integrated framework of individual
performance. Expectancy theory describes the process of selecting a course of action where
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alternative courses of action are evaluated similarly to rational gambling choices: 1) what is
the probability a given action results in a number of outcomes (E) and 2) what is the value
of such outcomes (Vroom, 1964), (V ). By multiplying both probability and value of outcomes
and summing up all the possible outcomes, the subjective expected value of a given course of
action is derived. Thus, this theory is similar to rational expectancy theory used in economic
modeling. Although rational expectancy theory has been criticized for diverging from the ac-
tual non-rational decisions found in practice (Albanese, 1987), this criticism can be mitigated
by modifying the theory accordingly. One such modification is the incorporation of deviations
for rationality as proposed by Akerlof (1991) and Steel and Koning (2006). Hence, the use of
Vroom’s (1964) theory allows us to characterize the relationships that link decisions to individual
performance that can, at a later stage be incorporated in operations management models.
In this way, our framework depicted in Figure 2.1 starts with the relationship between effort
exerted by the worker and individual performance (depicted by arrow 1 in Figure 2.1). While
we can operationalize individual performance as productivity, we can operationalize effort as
metabolic energy spent and cognitive load. The relationship depends on the characteristics of
the task and the ability of the worker to transform effort into work (Paas et al., 2003). In
highly repetitive, routine work, such a relationship is strictly increasing and relatively certain.
If this is the case as it is in the majority of “blue collar” work in production and service
systems, the modeling of the effects of operations management variables in individual behavior
is largely simplified. For this reason, in the next sections, we assume work environments where
the relationship between the individual effort and performance is quite certain and predictable.
2.3 Individual performance 19
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However, for cases where the relationship between effort and individual performance is un-
certain or even ambiguous (i.e. individual performance is difficult to measure), the evaluations
of how perceived uncertainty and ambiguity play a role in the worker’s decision to select his level
of effort as well as strategies to perform his work. The literature on judgment under uncertainty
(see Kahneman et al., 1982) has documented many departures of how uncertainty is evaluated
by humans as opposed with the “rational” axiomatic approach found in most economic and
operations research models of uncertainty. Moreover, for more complex work, complex cognitive
decision making is required and thus falls off the scope of this chapter.
Consistent with expectancy theory, our framework conceptualizes a level of effort as a de-
liberate choice by the workers. Such a choice is the result of selecting the level of effort that
maximizes a desirability measure (depicted by arrow 2 in Figure 2.2) or put in economic terms,
the utility derived from working at a given effort level. In this framework, the use of expectancy
theory is advantageous as it allows one to describe the desirability for a range of possible effort
levels rather than just having a simplistic model in which more motivation equals more perfor-
mance. Such utility is in turn derived from two different types of motivational sources, namely
intrinsic and extrinsic sources (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrows 4 and 5 respectively). This
distinction of motivational sources is used widely in motivation theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000)
and was first made by Vroom (1964).
Intrinsic motivation factors are factors inherent to the task itself while extrinsic motivation
factors lead to separable, instrumental consequences in achieving the task at hand such as
incentives or goals (Vroom, 1964). Following the expectancy theory approach, we conceptualize
that for intrinsic and extrinsic motivation factors, functions exist that relate a set of alternative
levels of effort and a desirability measure (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrows 5 and 6 respectively).
In Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we discuss intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors that can
be influenced by operations management variables and that moderate the relationships between
possible effort levels and their desirability. For modeling purposes, we note that these factors
may be modeled directly by linking them to individual performance without establishing an
internal decision making process indicating which effort level to select. However, as will be
described in detail, when these factors interact with each other, a utilitarian approach may be
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Desirability
Effort level
Most desirable effort level
Capacity: Maximum achievable effort level
+
-
Figure 2.3: Inverted U relationship between effort and utility
the best for making predictions. We also consider, in our framework for modeling individual
performance, the role of feedback regarding past performance. This feedback is likely to change
the existing relationships between possible effort levels and desirability levels as depicted by
arrows 7 and 8 in Figure 2.2.
2.3.1 Intrinsic motivational factors
The evaluation of intrinsic motivational factors relates a level of effort (e.g. work pace) with
a utility measure (or effort desirability) indicating the intrinsic preference for such a level. To
characterize this function, we may use a non-monotonic function where a most desirable level
of effort exists forming an inverted U relationship (see Figure 2.3). The inverted U shape is
justified by the combination of two effects. The first effect is the stimulation that a higher effort
level provides — avoiding boredom and monotony. The second effect is the cost of a higher
level of effort — including discomfort and fatigue. These costs dramatically increase as the
worker exerts effort to the limit of his capacity. The combination of positive and negative effects
associated with increasing the effort in a task allows for the identification of a most desirable
level of effort as depicted in Figure 2.3.
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The inverted U relationship can be found in the literature, beginning with a similar proposal
known as the Yerkes and Dodson Law (1908) where a given level of a stressor is related to a
performance level. Note the similarity between both concepts. The stressor level is similar to
the effort exerted, whereas motivation is closely linked to performance, being the antecedent of
performance itself. The inverted U relationship between stressor and performance has also been
reported in the literature of ergonomics (Hancock, 1986), operations management (Bendoly and
Prietula, 2008) and marketing (Singh, 1998).
Next, we identify skill levels (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrow 9), fatigue and discomfort (de-
picted in Figure 2.2 by arrow 10) as contributing factors to intrinsic motivation that a manager
can influence. Actions such as selection of personnel, training and task rotation may influence
the skill level of a worker. Other actions, like resting or changing the layout may impact fatigue
and discomfort. Task variety as well as task significance (as perceived by the worker and/or
others) may also influence the inherent desirability of a task and thus the intrinsic motivation of
the task (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrow 11). These task and contextual factors also influence
the workers’ satisfaction with the job and thus will be described in Section 2.4.
Skill level
Although the term skill level or ability level may have different meanings, for the purpose of
this chapter and thesis, we define skill level as the maximum productive capacity of an individual
for a given task that can be sustained for a given period. Thus, by definition as in the case of
motivation, skill level has the potential to affect worker productivity as it has been documented
by Locke at al. (1978). Given this definition, the skill level is task dependent and is a reflection
of the mental and physiological capabilities of a worker as applied in executing a task. Different
jobs put different demands on the mental and physiological capabilities of the worker. Thus, skill
level is defined as a composite maximum capacity to perform the job. For productive systems
this capacity can be operationalized as the maximum attainable number of jobs processed per
hour assuming a constant and sufficient quality level.
Nonetheless, a higher skill level may not necessarily translate into a higher productivity level
(Bendoly and Prietula, 2008). Workers may be not be motivated enough to exert effort to the
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limits of their ability. This motivation is needed as working close to the skill level may be not
be desirable in the absence of external motivators. Skill level does however, affect productivity
in two ways: one by defining a boundary condition on the maximum performance possible, thus
moderating the relationship between effort levels and actual performance (depicted in Figure 2
by arrow 12) and two by moderating the relationship between intrinsic motivation factors and
effort level (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrow 9). Using the inverted U relationship, skill levels
may be modeled as moderating this relationship by shifting the most desirable effort level to
higher effort levels as documented by Bendoly and Prietula (2008). In other words, if the skill
level is increased (decreased) the most desirable effort level increases (decreases). Hence, we
recommend:
Modeling research recommendation 3 In modeling conditions where varying skill levels and
external motivational forces (e.g. work pressure, assigned goals) exist, skill levels should not be
assumed to automatically result in increased performance, but rather to moderate the inverted U
shape relationship between the level of effort and effort desirability (i.e. the intrinsic motivation
relationship). In addition, the skill level sets the maximum performance attainable as a boundary
condition.
The main levers that an operations manager has at his disposable to directly influence
the skill level of its workforce are learning and forgetting processes (Nembhard and Uzumeri,
2000). These are arguably (particularly the former) the most studied and modeled human-
factor processes in operations management. While Yelle (1979) and Belkaoui (1989) provide
an overview of different alternatives in modeling learning processes, Argote (1996) provides an
overview on modeling forgetting processes. Given the wealth of alternative learning curves,
Nembhard and Uzumeri (2000) recommend the use of a hyperbolic model of learning because it
performs best under two criteria. First, it fits individual empirical data best. Second, it contains
interpretable parameters. While the traditional log-linear model also provided reasonable fits, it
only fits a more narrow range of empirical learners. In Shafer et al. (2001), the hyperbolic model
was extended to accommodate forgetting processes as well, fitting empirical data adequately.
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In all of the learning models the key variable that may be influenced by different operations
management policies is cumulative output (or time spent at the task), i.e. “learning by doing”,
whereas for forgetting models it is the time elapsed since the last item was produced. This
dynamic dependency is depicted in our framework by arrow 18 in Figure 2.2.
In addition to operations management variables influencing the time available for learning
and forgetting processes, operations management variables may also influence learning and for-
getting rates. While Adler and Clark (1991) have studied the effects of training programs and
engineering interventions (e.g. technological, equipment and process interventions) in learning
rates, Nembhard (2000) studied the effect of task complexity as a determinant of learning and
forgetting rates. These are examples of drivers of learning and forgetting rates that may be in-
fluenced by operations management decision variables, however the current list is not exhaustive
and the study of other factors of learning and forgetting rates (e.g. learning from the experience
of others, available feedback, use of learning goals) is an opportunity for further research.
Another aspect that needs to be acknowledged in modeling the effects of workers’ skill levels
is the heterogeneity of skill levels. In the operations management literature, it has been recog-
nized that individual variation in work rates can have an important impact on the productivity
of a productive system (see Juran and Shruben (2004) and Doerr and Arreola-Risa (2000)).
Furthermore, Shafer et al. (2001) also provide evidence that heterogeneity in learning rates
can have an important impact on system productivity. In particular, the average production
with learning heterogeneity is greater than the production of an average learner, given that the
production rate is increasing and concave. Operations managers may influence heterogeneity of
skills and learning rates indirectly by the selection of personnel.
Summarizing, we recommend the following in modeling skill levels in operations management
decision models:
Modeling research recommendation 4 The following aspects need to be considered when
incorporating skill level in operations management decision models: 1) Learning and forgetting
processes that are mathematically described in the literature; 2) Factors that affect learning
and skill rates (besides experience) that can be influenced by operational variables such as task
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complexity and periods of training; 3) Variability of skill levels as well as learning and forgetting
rates due to heterogeneity in the population.
Further empirical research may also enrich current models of learning and forgetting in
operations management. Thus, we recommend the following:
Empirical research recommendation 1 The study of other OM controllable factors of learn-
ing and forgetting processes is an opportunity for further research. In particular, learning from
others, learning given different types of feedback and the use of setting goals for learning require
still further exploration and description to be included in existing OM models.
Fatigue and discomfort
“Fatigue” is generally defined as a “reduction of the functional capacity of an organ or
an organism as a result of an action”, Rohmert (1973). Hence, by definition, fatigue further
limits, albeit temporarily, the maximum productive capacity of individuals in a manner similar
to forgetting processes by reducing the skill level. As with skill levels, this moderates the
relationships of effort levels and performance (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrow 13). Nonetheless,
fatigue also has a second effect on performance via motivation (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrow
10) as it has been found to lessen the “will to work” (Das, 1990, Taris and Schreurs, 2009
and Van Yperen and Hagedoorn, 2003). Simultaneously, fatigue is built up over time due to
past exposure to effort (Bechtold and Sumners, 1998). Our framework captures this dynamic
dependency with arrow 19 in Figure 2.2.
Empirically, the relationship between fatigue and productivity is complex. Fatigue has been
modeled in operations management by assuming a linear decay throughout the day (Bechtold
et al., 1984). Such an assumption based on the empirical work by Janaro (1982) where subjects
are asked to accomplish an exhausting ergometer task and the working rate is shown to decrease
linearly. In a similar vein, Paarsch and Sheaer (1997) find a linear decay in performance in a
physically exhausting tree-planting task, however we note that this linear decay is only observed
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across working days at a rate of 3-5% productivity per day, but not within days. However, in
Okogbaa (1983), an exponential decay in productivity was found. Furthermore, interventions,
such as changing work-rest schedule, show that fatigue may be reduced with simultaneous im-
provements in productivity as found in visual-display work (Kopardekar and Mital, 1994) and
typing work (Balci and Aghazadeh, 2003).
Also important to modeling the effects of fatigue in productivity is a task-specific approach
in order to identify the limiting factor affecting performance or exposing workers to unacceptable
health risks. Fatigue can take several forms as detailed in Price (1990) where the following cat-
egories are suggested: general metabolic fatigue, muscular fatigue and mental fatigue. General
metabolic fatigue refers to a reduced capacity of the body’s aerobic system, producing tiredness
(Murrell, 1965). Muscular fatigue, on the other hand is when a group of muscles has been exces-
sively exerted with loads and experiences a reduction in functional capacity (Rohmert, 1973).
Mental fatigue can take many forms; but, in general, it is translated into a decrease in the oper-
ational performance of the mind, including attention and problem-solving capacity (Schmidtke,
1976). Any of these dimensions of fatigue may affect fatigue in general; that is, a reduction in
the “functional capacity of an organ or an organism” and thus a temporal reduction of “skill
level”.
The works of Konz (1998), Mital et al. (1991) and Price (1990) all provide mathematical
descriptions of how to determine rest allowances by modeling the accumulation of fatigue while
taking into account the avoidance of health problems and significant decrements in performance.
Interestingly, whereas metabolic fatigue is modeled to accumulate linearly, local muscle and
mental fatigue are assumed to grow exponentially (Mital et al., 1998). Although these models of
fatigue build-up are available, a clear description of the determinants of fatigue rates depending
of the type of fatigue (mental, localized for an specific muscle group) is still incomplete, including
work intensity, the influence of durations of resting periods and types of rests (e.g. sitting,
standing), the addition of micro-rests and thus we recommend the following:
Empirical research recommendation 2 For including fatigue in operational models more
explicitly, it is important to have a more clear understanding of how fatigue builds up for spe-
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cific types of fatigue and how other factors may influence such build-up process (including work
intensity, the duration of resting periods, type of rests and micro-rests).
Across days, circadian rhythms (i.e. the fluctuation of physiological conditions governed by
the Earth’s day-night cycle, Wickens et al., 2004) become important. In particular, empirical
studies have linked common shift-work decision variables with several physiological measures
related to fatigue (Czeisler et al., 1982; Knauth, 1996; Kostreva at al., 2002; Hsie et al., 2009).
Among the shift/work decision variables studied, shift duration, starting time, direction of shift
rotation, days/night shift and distribution of days-off appear to be most important in influencing
fatigue and circadian disruption. Moreover, a meta-analysis exists (Spencer et al., 2006) in which
fatigue and related risk indexes are derived comparing the incidence of accidents and fatigue
measures (measured as micro-sleep periods) given a number of shift scheduling variables.
Summarizing, when considering fatigue as a factor in a decision making model, it is important
to take a context-specific approach to determine which aspects of worker well-being are affected
by fatigue.
Modeling research recommendation 5 In incorporating fatigue effects in operations man-
agement models the following effects may be incorporated : 1) Performance deterioration modeled
through a temporary decrease of “skill levels”; 2) Fatigue accumulation (measure of well-being);
3) Risk of accidents.
In addition to fatigue, a related, but distinct concept that can potentially affect the costs
of performing a job at a given effort level is discomfort. Discomfort is in fact a physiological
measure of how an individual perceives their exertion and was first introduced by Borg (1982).
Similar to fatigue, discomfort may increase over time. The advantage of such a measure is that
instead of providing an objective physiological measurement such as the “maximum voluntary
contraction” of a muscle, the subjective discomfort measurement already incorporates an inte-
grated judgment of all such objective conditions and thus indicates the individual’s evaluation
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of the adequacy of a current physical situation (Dul et al., 1994). Hence, as with the case of
fatigue, discomfort influences the perceived desirability of a given effort level and thus possibly
individual performance. Nonetheless, the nature of such a relationship is not yet well under-
stood. What is known however, is that discomfort is a predictor for future long-term muscular
pain (van Reenen et al., 2008) as well as occupational disorders, such as the so-called Low Back
Disorders (LBDs). Thus, discomfort is valuable in itself by being a current physical situation
and because its associated benefits for health. However, the link with performance remains to
be clearly established and thus we recommend the following:
Empirical research recommendation 3 For including discomfort in operational models more
explicitly, it is important to study the role of discomfort as a factor that affects motivation and,
in turn, performance. A clear description of such a mechanism is not available and needs to be
revised for different types of tasks, work intensity and work-rest periods.
2.3.2 Extrinsic motivational factors
Unlike intrinsic motivational factors, the evaluation of extrinsic motivational factors may take
different forms given the wide range of factors at play. Hence, the approach to model them
may not be unique. Nonetheless, all of these extrinsic motivators have in common that they
increase the perceived benefits (i.e. rewards) or lack of benefits (i.e. punishments) associated
with performing a job by altering the consequences of performing that job. In the literature
relevant for operations management, there is evidence for both, motivational interventions and
de-motivational interventions with significant effects of up to 50% as noted by Bendoly and
Prietula (2008). In this sub-section, we review a few of the motivators that may be used directly
by operational managers to enhance individual performance. In particular, we review assigned
goals, incentives, job arrival rate and peers’ influence (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrows 14, 15,
16 and 17 respectively).
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Assigned goals
The assignment of specific, usually quantitative goals has been the prime subject of goal
setting theory (Locke and Latham, 2002a) which has been widely studied and validated in
the field and in laboratory studies. The type of goals studied include productivity, quality
and learning goals (Locke and Latham, 1990). The basic tenant of goal-setting theory is that
challenging goals improve performance thereby proving to be an effective contributor to extrinsic
motivation (depicted by arrow 14 in Figure 2.2). A meta-analysis shows strong effects compared
to telling individuals to “do their best” (Locke and Latham, 1990). The reported effect sizes,
i.e. the ratio between the mean increase of performance (i.e. Δx¯) and standard deviation (i.e.
s) of the data in the study (i.e. d = Δx¯/s) ranged from d = .42 to .80.
The four mechanisms by which goals have been found to affect performance (Locke and
Latham, 1990) are: 1) Goals direct attention and effort toward goal-relevant activities and away
from goal-irrelevant activities; 2) Higher goals lead to greater effort than low goals; 3) Goals
affect persistence; 4) Goals affect action indirectly by leading to the arousal, discovery, and/or
use of task-relevant knowledge and strategies.
As long as there is commitment towards the goal (i.e. “one’s attachment to or determination
to reach a goal, regardless of the goal’s origin”, Locke et al., 1988), the relationship between
goal difficulty, measured as percentage of the population that are not able to attain the goal,
and performance is non-decreasing, leveling-off at the limits of ability (i.e. skill level) (Locke and
Latham, 1990). When commitment to the goal fails due to unrealistic goals, performance drops
with greater goal difficulty (Erez and Zidon, 1984).
In production system contexts, goals have been translated in terms of “number of jobs to be
completed per unit of time” (Doerr et al., 1996) or “number of jobs to be completed before a
deadline” (Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). Doerr’s (1996) study analyzed a production line and
found that in such a line, group goals enhanced performance more than individual goals. The
empirical study presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis confirms that performance increases with
an increasing goal, leveling-off when the skill level of an individual is achieved. Furthermore,
the study in Chapter 4, finds that challenging goals induce workers to perform at steady speeds
at the best of their ability.
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Modeling research recommendation 6 When varying goal levels are used as a decision
variable in an operations management model and when it is assumed that workers are committed
towards the goal, then a strictly non-decreasing function, where performance levels-off at the limit
of ability should be used to model individual performance.
Further investigation of a mathematical description for goal setting has shown that goals may
be taken as a reference point to evaluate other levels of performance. In particular, a study by
Heath et al. (1999) and another described in Chapter 4 of this thesis shows that the evaluation
of goals can be modeled using the “S”–shaped evaluation function of Kahneman & Tversky’s
Prospect Theory (1979). This function exhibits the following properties (see Figure 2.4): 1)
Goals are used as reference points to evaluate personal performance; 2) Evaluation of perfor-
mance is most sensitive around the goal; 3) Underachieving the goal (a “loss” in Prospect Theory
language) looms larger than over-achieving the goal (a “gain” in Prospect Theory language).
Desirability 
Performance 
Goal as reference point+
-
Loss aversion
Figure 2.4: Evaluation of performance under the influence of goals function
It is also important to remark here that the effect of productivity goals on quality remains
to be investigated in operational contexts. This is particularly important when considering
reports that productivity goals tend to attract attention at the expense of achievements along
other lines and in contexts where no goals have been set (Locke and Bryan, 1969). In this
respect, a study in the operations management literature (Philipoom and Fry, 1999) illustrates
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that goals on selective performance criteria may be affected by a “cherry picking” phenomenon
where workers select the orders that maximize their individual performance at the expense of
system-wide performance.
In addition, the interaction of assigning goals specific attributes that are pervasive to opera-
tional contexts should be studied. One of the main attributes of work in operational contexts is
whether the work is performed in an individual setting or, most commonly in a group setting.
The studies of individual versus group goals in Doerr (1996) require further exploration, beyond
the result that group goals are more effective in task-dependent production lines than individual
goals. Research is needed to address the issues of feedback from other individuals at the pro-
duction line for achieving the goal and convenience of setting goals given constrained resources.
Already, a study by Vijfeijken et al. (2002) emphasizes the need of designing multiple goals
and rewards that mimic the interdependence found in productive environments so as to boost
system performance by providing incentives for individual performance and group performance.
Another important attribute of operational contexts is the fact that people tend to work
for weeks, months even years at similar jobs. If different goals are repeatedly set over time,
accounting for variability in the demand, it is important to be able to characterize goal adap-
tation processes. In these contexts, experience of previous performance with goals may affect
future performance under goals. It is already known that self-set goals are adjusted by previous
performance (see Lant, 1992 and Mezias et al., 2002), however it remains unknown as to how
performance is affected if the goals are assigned by managers and vary over time. Hence, for
empirical researchers, we recommend the following:
Empirical research recommendation 4 A research agenda on goal setting already exists (see
Latham and Locke (2007)), however such a research agenda should be adapted to the needs of
operations management contexts, where interdependencies between workers and the repetition of
goals are important.
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Incentives
The literature on the effects of performance with both monetary and non-monetary incentives
(in the form of prizes, public recognition) for motivating performance is extensive, however their
effects on performance are disputed. For this reason, it is useful to make use of meta-analysis
studies. We refer the reader to two of them, that of Jenkins et al. (1998) and that of Condly
et al. (2003) which find an overall average effect of a 22% increase in performance over control
groups. Further, the latter meta-analysis study finds a number of factors that may enhance
the positive effect of incentives. In particular, Condly et al. (2003) find that: 1) Monetary
incentives have a significantly larger effect than non-monetary ones; 2) Team rewards seem to
yield higher results than individual rewards; 3) Incentives for manual work have a larger impact
on performance than incentives for cognitive work; 4) Incentives have a larger effect on inducing
increased cognitive and physical effort than on encouraging people to start a new job.
Despite the fact that there is a positive (and differentiated) effect of the aforementioned
factors, the functional relationship between incentives and performance remains unknown and
proves to be complex. Although there are econometric studies of field data that show a positive
impact on performance with piece-rate incentives (see Paarsch and Shaerer (1999) and Lazear
(2000)) as well as experimental evidence for this (see Campbell (1984) and Huber (1985)), it is
first necessary to verify how much the monetary incentives are really worth for the participants
involved. This question arises as the result of a few studies reporting that monetary incentive
schemes have no-effect, presumably because such rewards were considered as insufficient or even
unfair (Condly et al., 2003).
Another complexity of the use of incentives are the interaction effects obtained when used
with goals. In this way, there is evidence that monetary incentives can increase goal commitment,
but at the same time inhibit the attainment of complementary goals which are not compensated,
such as helping their peers at the workplace (Wright et al., 1993). Note that goal commitment
implies a decision of whether or not to attempt goal attainment, thereby influencing performance,
but not the goal set. This clearly contrasts with the piece-rate reward system that is independent
of the goal set and which rewards a partial accomplishment of the goal (Locke et al., 1988).
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The complexities described of the effects of monetary incentives imply that given the current
knowledge, it is easier to incorporate the effects of goal assignment into a model than it is to
incorporate (non-) monetary incentives. Thus, we observe the following:
Empirical research recommendation 5 Incentives, as extrinsic motivation factors, have
complex relationships with motivation and performance. Moreover, such relationships may be
context dependent and thus prior empirical work may be required before modeling the effect on
performance of specific incentives in specific contexts.
Job arrival rate
The job arrival rate is an operationalization of work pressure; workers are expected to cope
with the job arrival rate. In a sense, setting higher quantitative production goals can also be
operationalized as work pressure. However, production goals are distinct in nature because
they are meant for “challenging workers” rather than a metric for the workload assigned to
workers. In this respect, Bendoly and Prietula (2008) find an increasing and then decreasing
relationship between work pressure and performance. Moreover, Bendoly and Prietula (2008)
find also an increasing and then decreasing relationship between work pressure and motivation.
Their empirical results support previous studies that also find an increasing and then decreasing
relationship between work pressure and performance (Leibenstein, 1984 and Suri and De Treville,
1986). Hence, the following recommendation may be made for modeling the effect of different
job arrival rates on performance:
Modeling research recommendation 7In OM models, the arrival rate–performance relation-
ship should be modeled as increasing and then decreasing given the empirical evidence available.
However, such relationships are in the end a composite effect of two forces as explained by
Bendoly and Prietula (2008). The first one is the evaluation of the intrinsic benefits of the
task and the second one is the evaluation of the extrinsic benefits of the job. While for the
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first one we may apply the inverted U relationship of Yerkes’ and Dobnson’s Law (1908), as
previously discussed, the second one is more unclear. For sure, the maximum attainable result
is a matching of the job arrival rate with the job processing rate, meaning that a non-decreasing
function linking effort level and (extrinsic) desirability is in order for this kind of work pressure.
What remains unknown, is if such a job arrival rate acts as a reference point in the same manner
as with goal setting. One may hypothesize that it does and that hence, the desirability (and
motivational) gain of closely matching the job arrival rate is greater the closer the job arrival
rate is to the current job processing rate.
It should be noted that unlike goals for which performance is evaluated at the end of an
assigned period, the objective linked with varying job arrival rates is the clearance of the queue
— thus performance is continuously monitored. If, for example, a worker can not match the
job arrival rate within a small margin, the queue will increase indefinitely. Even temporary,
mismatches in the job arrival rate may increase the variability of queue lengths which accumulate
over time (Kleinrock, 1975). As a result of large queues, workers may be less committed to match
the job arrival rate and settle for lower job processing rates. This hypothesis should be verified
empirically. Hence, opportunities for future research exist in comparing the effects on individual
performance with work pressure and with specific goals and deadlines in comparable conditions.
Empirical research recommendation 6 The comparison of performance and satisfaction of
workers under work pressure and goal setting provides an opportunity for research that could
be incorporated into models for selecting an appropriate extrinsic motivation strategy under a
number of conditions (e.g. dependency between workers, acceptable makespan times).
Peer pressure
The effects of peers were a main concern in early modern work regarding the interface of
operations management decisions and individual performance (Boudreau et al., 2003). The work
of Schultz et al. (1998) found, for example, how workers in a flow line attempted to avoid their
upstream colleagues becoming idle due to blockage in the production line by accelerating their
work pace. This implied a new advantage of low inventory systems (i.e. Just In Time systems)
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over high inventory systems, as in the former, blockage occurs more often, and thus, workers
may tend to produce at higher production rates.
Further investigation has been made regarding how “fast workers” tend to slow down in the
presence of “slow workers” and vice-versa. Schultz et al. (2010) argue that this is consistent with
equity theory which predicts a regression toward the mean of performance as workers attempt to
match their peers’ performance (Adams, 1965). Also disparity in personalities has been found to
have an effect in work sharing environments such that more dominant personalities tend to use
shared resources more often than their dominated counterpart (Juran, 1997). Hence, difference
of personalities may moderate the peer induced motivational drive. Given the current knowledge,
the following recommendation may be useful in accounting for peer induced motivation:
Modeling research recommendation 8 Equity theory, modeled as a regression towards the
mean of performance by workers, can be used to model serial productive systems by taking pairs
of upstream–downstream workers.
In addition, when teams are to be formed, it appears that perceived similarity among workers
is desirable for enhancing team cohesion and also performance (Knippenberg et al., 2004). This
is significant for operational contexts where the interdependency among workers is high and
constantly changing over time, as is the case, for example, in cell manufacturing environments.
In fact, Schultz et al. (1999) found that in low inventory systems where the interdependence of
individuals is greater, cohesiveness is more significant. Thus, in the assignment of workers to
available working teams, social aspects ought to be considered. However, these social interaction
aspects need to be considered for specific production contexts, where design aspects of such
production contexts (e.g. layout, work sharing rules, worker-station assignments) may affect
how the interaction between individuals occurs. Hence, we recommend the following for model-
oriented empirical research on the influence of peers’ in the workplace:
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Empirical research recommendation 7 More research is required regarding complex social
interactions between workers for specific production system contexts. Helping among workers,
learning from others, and work sharing are all subjects that need further research for incorpora-
tion into existing operations management models.
2.3.3 Feedback
Individual performance feedback in production systems may take several forms. It may be given
as an accurate measurement of the performance metric used for the worker’s job appraisal or
as a proxy of such (e.g. queue length in front of the individual server). The feedback provides
information of past individual performance, this is depicted in our framework with arrow 11 in
Figure 2.2. Feedback is essential for informing both, the evaluation of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation factors (depicted in Figure 2.2 by arrows 7 and 8). In addition, feedback is important
for devising a strategy of work to reach the personal desired performance.
The importance of feedback design is highlighted as it has been recognized as a necessary
condition for goals to affect performance (Erez, 1977). In fact, in Schultz et al.’s (1998) study
of low inventory serial lines and Bendoly and Prietula’s study of work load (2008), feedback
in terms of job arrival rate and queue length provided the experiment participants with the
necessary information to adjust their workload accordingly. Moreover, Schultz et al. (2003)
find a positive effect on performance when enhancing feedback in work sharing environments:
workers tend to be more motivated by their peers when they perceive that their own performance
is more visible.
Feedback design has been analyzed in the ergonomic literature (see Karwowsky (2006) for
a compilation of articles in the subject). For production system contexts however, questions
remain as to how to design feedback in terms of frequency, metrics (a proxy of a real operational
performance measure) and framing (e.g. 20% of time remaining to deadline vs. 80% of time
has elapsed), particularly in conjunction with other operations management variables already
addressed (i.e. goal, job arrival rate). Of interest is the study of Amir and Ariely (2008) which
finds that it is not necessarily the case that continuous feedback and the addition of progress
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indicators (i.e. milestones in the form: “you reached x% of the goal”) enhance performance.
Amir and Ariely (2008) argue that a possible reason for this is the deceleration that often occurs
after a milestone is achieved. Hence, given the scarce information on how to design feedback
for productive systems, we find it a relevant to topic to be researched for the advancement of
operations management theory.
Empirical research recommendation 8 More empirical studies are required on incorporating
feedback design variables (e.g. information presented, frequency, framing) in operations manage-
ment decision models.
Having surveyed worker specific factors that operations managers may influence to enhance
performance, we know consider in the next section those factors that the manager has influence
to enhance the job satisfaction of a worker.
2.4 Job satisfaction
In this section, we use Weiss’ (2002) definition of job satisfaction as a “positive (or negative)
evaluative judgment one makes about one’s job or job situation”. In the literature on job
satisfaction measurement, a debate exists as to whether job satisfaction should be measured
as a single measurement or as an aggregation of several aspects of the job called facets of job
satisfaction (see Weiss, 2002 and Scarpello and Campbell, 1983). It remains unknown whether
all the facets of satisfaction have been identified in the literature and how to integrate them.
In fact, the integration of job satisfaction facets may be context dependent. A physical job
such as lifting boxes may have different facets that are considered important as compared to a
job that stresses fine coordination like an assembly job. Therefore, the state of the art in job
satisfaction is limited to measuring the impact of job satisfaction aspects as an overall measure
of job satisfaction. At the same time, operational decisions, usually only have an impact on a
limited number of job satisfaction aspects. Hence, we recommend the following in formulating
the objectives of operations management:
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Modeling research recommendation 9 In incorporating job satisfaction related objectives,
only a single (or very few) relevant facets of job satisfaction should be explicitly modeled as an
objective(s).
2.4.1 Conditions for selecting job satisfaction facets
For empirical researchers, a call exists to provide a clearer picture on how workers develop
positive and negative attitudes towards their job and how different facets of job satisfaction are
integrated. For our purposes, however, the concern is how to select the relevant job satisfaction
facets for operations decision models. To achieve this, we first identify relevant job satisfaction
facets that have been proven to be linked to overall job satisfaction and that can be influenced
by operations management decisions.
This definition of relevant job satisfaction facets implies, first, that the facet of job satisfac-
tion needs to be operationalized in a meaningful way. For example, a facet of job satisfaction
may be safety at work. This may then be operationalized as the probability of an accident
weighed by its probable severity (i.e. accidentability). The objective may be then to minimize
the accidentability of a job. Second, the definition implies that the model’s objective needs to
be linked to the decision variables of the model at hand. Differences in the levels of the decision
variables must be reflected in differences in the levels of the objective function.
Although this is an obvious point, and is valid for any model in operations management,
the implications are not trivial as it means that a relation must be established between both.
Take for example the case of the need for autonomy at the job. Certainly, subjective scales exist
for measuring autonomy at the job in terms of methods, schedule and decision making. The
difficulty is to link particular job satisfaction facets with operational variables. If, for example,
the decision variable is the assignment of workers to blocks of schedules with each block of
schedules containing schedule options that the workers can choose from. As a result, there is the
need for a linking operational variable to serve as a proxy for a job satisfaction facet. One such
linking variable for the case of worker’s autonomy with schedules may be the number of options
available within a block of schedules for the worker to select his working schedule. The challenge
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still remains in relating such linking variables with the job satisfaction facet. This linking process
is a challenge as the effects of a particular operational policy may only be possible to observe in
the long term. This challenge can be addressed by either using existing documented empirical
relationships or quite likely new empirical studies are required.
Summarizing, we conclude that the following are necessary conditions for including job
satisfaction related objectives in operations management decision models:
Modeling research recommendation 10 To include a facet of job satisfaction as an objec-
tive in operational models two conditions must be met: the facet needs to be operationalizable
and different levels of the operations management decisions must induce different levels of the
operationalized objective. To meet the latter condition, linking variables that serve as proxies
for job satisfaction facets may be needed. It may also be necessary to conduct further empirical
studies to link the proxy variable to the desired facet of job satisfaction.
Although we acknowledge that such conditions must hold for any operations management
objective in general, this recommendation is of particular significance for operations management
models which are often criticized for not incorporating several worker–specific factors, ignoring
the fact of whether it is feasible or relevant to incorporate them.
2.4.2 Identifying facets of job satisfaction
In addition to defining the conditions for including a job satisfaction facet as an objective in
an operations management decision model, it is important to identify properly documented job
satisfaction facets. A key question that then arises is which sources to use to identify a list of
relevant facets of job satisfaction. Our approach is to draw from the contributing factors of job
satisfaction identified by four representative and widely used models of job satisfaction.
In particular, we draw form the Job Characteristics Model (Hackman and Oldham, 1980),
the Theory of Work Adjustment (Dawis et al., 1968), the Work Compatibility Model (Genaidy
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and Karwowski, 2003) and Work Design Questionnaire (Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006) to
identify candidate facets of job satisfaction that are relevant for operations management. A
comprehensive list of the factors included in these models can be found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
As it can be observed from both tables, there are certain commonalities among the factors used,
but also differences. In all of these facets, the operationalization can be achieved by linking likert
scale responses to the statement: “I am satisfied with (e.g. the task variety) of my job” with
actual measurable levels of the facets (e.g. number of different tasks that a given job requires).
We proceed to briefly describe the main characteristics of these three models of job satisfaction
before integrating them into one for operations management modeling purposes.
Job Characteristics Model
The Job Characteristics Model focuses mainly on psychological facets of job satisfaction
(these are referred to as job characteristics), because these are derived from identifying three
psychological states that are considered key for job satisfaction. These psychological states
are: 1) The extent to which the job is meaningful for the worker; 2) The extent to which the
worker feels responsible for his work; 3) The extent to which the worker is knowledgeable of
his work performance (i.e. feedback is provided). The model is supported by more than 200
studies relating the psychological facets of job satisfaction and job satisfaction itself (Ambrose
and Kulik, 1999). The model is then operationalized and measured using the Job Diagnostic
Survey (Hackman and Oldham, 1975). The advantage of this model is the recognition of job
satisfaction as a psychological state influenced by three other psychological states. However,
the Job Characteristics Model has been found to consider only a narrow set of motivational job
characteristics (Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006), ignoring numerous other work characteristics
(Parker et al., 2001).
Theory of Work Adjustment
Next, the Theory of Work Adjustment is based on the basic tenant that the worker “seeks
to achieve and maintain correspondence with the (work) environment” where correspondence
means a “harmonious relationship between the individual and the environment” such that the
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“environment is suitable for the worker and the worker is suitable for the environment” (Dawis
et al., 1968). The theory includes 20 dimensions that were found to be related to an overall
assessment of job satisfaction. For evaluating the 20 facets of job satisfaction, the Minnesota
Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) was proposed (Weiss et al., 1967). The MSQ is widely used
in industry, however, as some categories are rather broad (e.g. “working conditions”), these
become for our purposes difficult to operationalize due to a lack of detail in the categories’
specification. Furthermore, the completeness of the 20 facets of job satisfaction has also been
questioned (Scarpello and Campbell, 1983).
Work Compatibility Model
A more precise and possibly more comprehensive list of job satisfaction facets is given in the
Work Compatibility Model (WCM) by Genaidy and Karwowsky (2003). As the model comes
from the ergonomic literature, it contains both physical and psychological factors. Although,
the WCM is not specifically designed as a model of job satisfaction, Genaidy et al. (2007) have
linked the model to individual well-fare (a more inclusive concept than job satisfaction) as well
as long-term worker productivity. Central to the WCM, is the concept of fit where workers are
set to match job demands and job energizers that are said to simultaneously decrease (increase)
the capacity and will to do the job. In this way, task variety for example, exerts demands due
to the number of skills required, while training energizes such demands by providing the means
to properly execute the variety of tasks to be performed. This framework also implies that the
most desirable level of a job satisfaction facet, such as task variety, may be contingent on other
factors, such as the training available to perform such a variety of tasks.
Work Design Questionnaire
The Work Design Questionnaire (WDQ) (Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006) is a tool that
measures job satisfaction facets with the specific purpose of aiding managers in the redesign of
their employees’ work. This objective is similar to our objective, with the difference that our
objective is more limited by a focus on operational decisions that can be included in decision
models. The WDQ was also specifically designed to address the lack of comprehensiveness in
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Table 2.1: Facets of job satisfaction according to different models (Part I)
Job Characteristics Model (A) MSQ Factors (B)
(Hackman and Oldman, 1980) (Dawis et al., 1968)
Experienced meaningfulness of the work - Ability utilization B1
- Skill variety A1 - Achievement B2
- Task identity A2 - Activity B3
- Task significance A3 - Advancement B4
Experienced responsibility of the work - Authority B5
- Autonomy A4 - Company policies & practices B6
Production feedback - Compensation B7
- Feedback from coworkers & supervisors A5 - Co-workers B8
- Work interdependence A6 - Creativity B9
- Independence B10
- Moral values B11
- Recognition B12
- Responsibility B13
- Security B14
- Social Service B15
- Social status B16
- Supervision: Human relations B17
- Supervision: technical B18
- Variety B19
- Working conditions B20
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Table 2.2: Facets of job satisfaction according to different models (Part II)
Work Compatibility Framework (C) Work Design Questionnaire (D)
(Genaidy and Karwowsky, 2003) (Morgeson and Humprey, 2006)
Organizational environment Task characteristics
- Time organization C1 - Work scheduling autonomy D1
- Work responsibility C2 - Decision-making autonomy D2
- Policies-procedures C3 - Work methods autonomy D3
- Task meaningfulness C4 - Task variety D4
- Autonomy C5 - Significance D5
Technological environment C6 - Task identity D6
Physical environment - Feedback from job D7
- Tools-Equipment C7 Knowledge characteristics
- Immediate hazards C8 - Job complexity D8
- Workplace layout C9 - Information processing D9
- Architectural design C10 - Problem solving D10
- Chemical environment C11 - Skill variety D11
- Biological environment C12 - Specialization D12
Economic growth environment C13 Social characteristics
Individual growth environment C14 - Social support D13
Social & communication environment - Initiated interdependence D14
- Conflict C15 - Received interdependence D15
- Support C16 - Interaction outside organization D16
- Openness C17 - Feedback from others D17
- Praise C18 Work context
- Feedback C19 - Ergonomics D18
- Knowledge of goals C20 - Physical demands D19
Mental task content - Work conditions D20
- Information processing C21 - Equipment use D21
- Memory C22
- Cognitive C23
Physical task content
- Sensory C24
- Strength C25
- Endurance C26
- Sudden handling C27
- Upper body posture C28
- Lower body posture C29
- Experienced domains C30
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previous job satisfaction measurement tools, and to update and integrate new findings related
to facets influencing job satisfaction (Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006). The WDQ categorizes
facets under four categories: 1) Task characteristics; 2) Knowledge characteristics; 3) Social
characteristics; and 4) Contextual characteristics. This characterization is suitable for operations
management contexts, as it acknowledges the domain of influence of operations management
decisions.
It must be noted however, that despite an increasing awareness of the WDQ in the literature
(e.g. Morgeson and Humphrey (2006) have been cited more than 50 times as of July, 2010), the
WDQ is still not widely used nor widely accepted in the job satisfaction literature.
Job Satisfaction Framework for Operations Management
We propose a job satisfaction facets framework for operations management that is based
mainly on the WDQ. However, we differ from previous frameworks of job satisfaction by selecting
only facets that are likely to be linked to existing or potential operations management decision
variables. For example, we exclude facets like whether the tasks provide opportunities for
problem solving (see facet D10 in Table 2.2) or the amount of interaction with individuals
outside the organization, as these are factors that do not pertain to the design of the task itself
(see facet D16 in Table 2.2), but are more often a “given” in operational settings irrespective of
operational decisions.
We classify job satisfaction facets according to the domain of operations management de-
cisions that may be affected (see Table 2.3). In this way, we derive three categories of job
satisfaction facets: 1) Facets related to the task(s) content of the job itself (including tasks to
be performed and skills required); 2) Facets related to the interactions between the worker with
his/her peers and supervisors; 3) Facets related to the organizational and physical environment
in which the task needs to be performed.
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the framework, with the facets classified per category
alongside their definitions. To operationalize each of the facets, Table 2.3 provides a list of
related job satisfaction facets as noted in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 where operationalizations of these
facets may be found. At times, the facets included in the proposed framework are more general,
Table 2.3: Facets of job satisfaction framework for Operations Management
Facet of job
satisfaction
Definition Operationalization
sources
Linking OM
operationalization variable
1. Task content related
1.1 Task variety The extent to which the job
requires workers to perform
a range of tasks on a job
Self-reported likert
scales, A2, B19, D4
Number of dissimilar tasks
1.2 Task identity The extent to which a job in-
volves a whole piece of work
that can be easily identified
Self-reported likert
scales, A2, D6
Proportion of occasions in which
order pickers are allowed to com-
plete a pick in a bucket brigade or
any other work sharing schemes
1.3 Autonomy The extent to which a job al-
lows freedom to workers on
how to execute their job -
method-, when to perform
each task -schedule- and re-
act to unexpected circum-
stances -decisions-)
Self-reported likert
scales, A4, B10, C5,
D1, D2, D3
Number of options a worker can
choose from in a schedule
1.4 Feedback from the
job
The worker is provided with
feedback related to his per-
formance at the job by auto-
matic means
Self-reported likert
scales, D7
Frequency of feedback provided
by automatic systems Variability
of upstream/downstream queues
1.5 Task meaningfulness
in relation to others
The perceived impact the
task has on their peer’s work
and customers
Self-reported likert
scales, A3, C4
Probability that downstream
worker colleague is starved of
work
2. Social interactions related
2.1 Opportunity for so-
cial interactions
The degree to which the
job offers opportunities for
workers to interact
Self-reported likert
scales, A6, C19, D17
Average percentage of time al-
lowed to interact with peers
2.2 Fairness in compen-
sation and work-load
distribution among
workers
The degree to which the
workers feel compensated for
their work and have equal
treatment
Self-reported likert
scales, B7, C13, D20
Standard deviation in work load
distribution among workers
2.3 Job appraisal and
feedback provided
The degree to which feed-
back is provided by the
workers’ peers and supervi-
sor
Self-reported likert
scales, A5, B8, B12,
B17, B18, C18, C19,
C20
Frequency of feedback provided
by super
3. Physical and organizational environment related
3.1 Exposure to fatigue,
discomfort and health
risks caused by the phys-
ical environment
The extent to which individ-
uals are subject to fatigue,
health risks due to plant and
work station layout
Fatigue measured by
oxygen volume intake
or maximum holding
time
Discomfort measured
in Borg’s (1981) scale
Percentage of time workers are
in awkward/stressful positions,
weighed by severity
3.2 Exposure to fatigue,
discomfort and health
risks caused by the orga-
nizational environment
The extent to which individ-
uals are subject to fatigue,
health risks due to schedules
and work intensity
Health risks mea-
sured as expected
number of days
due to temporal
incapacitation per
man-year
Self-reported likert
scales, B6, B20, C1,
C9, C24, C25, C26,
C28, C29, D8, D18,
D19, D20
Time spent working continuously
Percentage of time allowed for
rest Number of cycles completed
per unit of time
3.3 Work/leisure balance The extent to which the job
provides free time, oppor-
tunities for leisure, beyond
the minimum requirements
by law
Self-reported likert
scales, B6, C1, C14
Quality weighed number of con-
tinuously hours/days available
for leisure
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than the facets included in previous frameworks. This is the case, for example, with “Exposure
to fatigue, discomfort and health risks (organizational factors)” where all organizational factors
with an effect on fatigue, discomfort and health risks are included (see Table 2.3). In this
way, specific physical facets from the Work Compatibility Model are included (i.e. adequacy
of sensory design (C24), strength (C25), endurance (C26), upper and lower body posture(C28-
C29)). At the same time, given the need for a link with operations management variables, Table
2.3 also provides an example of a linking variable for each job satisfaction facet to operations
management decision variables. These linking variables are equivalent to the individual exposure
variables defined in our framework (see Figure 2.1).
Once a relevant facet of job satisfaction and an operations management linking variable are
identified, the modeler must consider how to include such linking variables in the objective of a
decision model. Take for example, the case of task variety as a facet of job satisfaction. It is not
necessarily true that designing a job with a large number of tasks will result in a higher level
of job satisfaction. Indeed, given the skill capacity of the worker and his own preferences, it is
possible that instead there is a specific and desired number of different tasks to aim for; implying
that there is a concave relationship between the linking variable and the worker’s job satisfaction
as observed within a particular facet. Hence, we recommend the following approach to formulate
the objective of an operations management decision model including job satisfaction facets:
Modeling recommendation 11 To include a linking variable as a proxy for a job satisfac-
tion facet in an operational model, one should first consider whether the desired objective is a
maximization of the facet or a minimization of the discrepancy between the job satisfaction facet
level and a desired level.
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2.5 Modeling human factors in operations manage-
ment
This section does not intend to provide a comprehensive overview of all operations management
decision models that may have an impact on either a workers’ individual performance or a par-
ticular facet of their job satisfaction. This section, instead, has the purpose of the applicability
of our performance and job satisfaction frameworks for modeling; providing directions on how
knowledge of worker behavior can be incorporated into operations management decision models.
We identify four categories of operations management decision models whose decisions are the
most likely to affect worker performance or job satisfaction: 1) Scheduling and timetabling; 2)
Workflow design models; 3) Job appraisal and incentive design models; 4) Layout design models.
Note that the third area is not a traditional operations management decision model area. This
area is more commonly associated with labor economics. However, in view of the important
operational impact and distinct influence of these decisions in specific operational settings, we
argue for its inclusion in our review of operations management models. Furthermore, note that
the first three decision models concern the organizational environment of a productive system,
whereas the last concerns the physical environment.
In Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 we illustrate how relevant operations management variables
in existing operations management decision models affect factors either driving individual per-
formance or contributing to job satisfaction. Moreover, we use these tables to identify research
opportunities stemming from existing work. Such research opportunities may include the need
for further modeling to incorporate human related aspects into existing models or for more em-
pirical work that can be used as a foundation for future operations models where worker–specific
factors are important.
2.5.1 Scheduling and timetabling
The literature on scheduling and timetabling is extensive (see (Pinedo, 2008) and Ernst et al.
(2004) for a comprehensive review on workforce scheduling). Scheduling and timetabling are
arguably the operations management decision processes with the most direct influence on worker’
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well-being and performance because the assignment of workers to shifts, tasks, work/rest and
vacation periods are explicit decision variables.
At the tactical planning level, the assignment of vacation periods and shifts to workers,
dependent on worker demands, are typically driven by minimum staffing levels, legal constraints
and firm policies. A few cases exist where worker related well-being measures have been explicitly
included in shift models. One such model is that of Kostreva et al. (2002) in which the quality
of a schedule in terms of endurance was measured as the deviance from naturally occurring
circadian rhythms. However, the drawback of such a model is that it considers circadian rhythms
as the only fatigue related factor. Broader approaches are also available, including that of Chen
and Yeung (1992). They developed a goal programming model for nurse scheduling that includes,
as objectives, the minimization of the number of rotations directed backwards (known to disrupt
circadian rhythms) and the minimization of the maximum consecutive work periods. These
additional objective terms serve as proxies for minimizing fatigue and impaired performance.
Similarly, Malladi and Min (2004) used Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to assign weights
in balancing economic and ergonomic cost objectives. However, all of these approaches rely on
integrating methods that are not based on actual empirical data and thus reflect the fragmented
literature on incorporating scheduling factors that relate to fatigue and risk for accidents.
Another approach for vacation assignment, attempted by Chong and Stervell (1985) has been
to allow workers the autonomy to bid on their vacation periods thus revealing their preferences.
However, this approach is cumbersome to implement, may not necessarily reveal the workers’
true preferences and may result in gaming behavior that leads to a misalignment with safety
goals or long term job satisfaction (e.g. some workers may be willing to temporarily experience
burn-out). Still, an opportunity exists for a more integrated approach by using meta-analytic
studies, such as the one by Spenser et al. (2006) that do quantify the relative impact on fatigue
and accidentability; these studies are described in Section 2.3.1.
It is important to note that more empirical work is required for quantifying the fatigue and
accidentability effects of shift scheduling. In particular, quantifying the differentiated value of
free days may be interesting as it is plausible to assume that days-off in summer periods or school
vacation periods may be socially more valuable for workers and thus should be weighted as more
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important in an objective to create value. Furthermore, it is important to note that effects of
different schedules on work performance still need to be addressed empirically. Specifically, the
fact that worker related effects occur over longer horizons of time implies challenges in data
collection and analysis of such empirical notes. Hence, we make the following recommendation
for empirical researchers:
Empirical recommendation 8 For empirical research, long-term (i.e. weeks and months)
longitudinal studies are required to establish long-term links between scheduling practices and
operational performance along with job satisfaction measures.
At the operational level, where workers may be assigned to multiple tasks (i.e. job rotation
models) or breaks are assigned, research opportunities also exist. An overview of such opportu-
nities is given in Lodree et al. (2009) along with a framework to incorporate them. In particular,
Lodree et al. (2009) propose the use of existing sequence-dependent task processing time models
that also allow for the modeling of improving processes, due to increased learning and motiva-
tion, and degrading processes, due to increased levels of fatigue and discomfort. Moreover, they
propose the use of rate modifying activities (i.e. activities that if introduced may enhance the
productivity of later activities) to model the effect of resting periods or periods in which a dif-
ferent task is performed (work rotation models) allowing the physical recovery of specific body
parts. The advantage of this approach is that the structure of the model is independent of the
exact functional form of performance improvement and deterioration. This certainly provides
a useful strategy for dealing with unconfirmed functional forms that relate fatigue, discomfort
and learning to individual performance:
Modeling recommendation 12 In modeling unconfirmed functional forms from the behav-
ioral/ergonomics literature, we recommend decoupling the structure of the model from specific
empirical functional forms so that new discoveries of these forms may be easily adopted.
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In addition, work-rest models may also make use of Bechtold et al.’s (1984) modeling ap-
proach. However, as noted earlier, the empirical basis needs to be further validated because
increased fatigue does not necessarily result in a decrease in performance. An alternative ap-
proach for work-rest models will be to use Konz’s (1998) guidelines where the emphasis is on
safety and avoidance of unduly fatigue instead of the effects on individual performance.
Table 2.4 provides an overview for of the opportunities due to the incorporation of worker-
specific factors in scheduling models.
2.5.2 Workflow design
Workflow design refers to operations management models that address the flow of work between
individual work places and may include queuing and simulation models. These models also
present an important opportunity for incorporating worker-related human factors. Given the
advances in empirical work describing the motivational effects on performance of productive sys-
tems, including the role of peer pressure, work pressure and goal setting in operational contexts
(as seen in Section 2.3.1), workflow design is a promising area for modeling operational decisions
that affect individual performance and productive system performance.
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Suri and Treville (1986) already made an attempt by modeling a simplified Just-In-Time
production line with two servers. They used a queuing model to incorporate acceleration effects
of a worker in order to avoid starvation and/or blockage of a server; thus, obtaining an optimal
level of Kanban cards or work-in-progress in the system. Based on empirical data from previous
experiments in Schultz et al. (1998) and Schultz et al. (1999), Powell and Schultz (2004) propose
Markov simulation models of a production system to show that workers who tend to speed up
or slow down may increase the overall efficiency of a production system in which feedback is
enhanced due to fixed buffer sizes. Moreover, contrary to state-independent worker behavior
where larger line lengths (i.e. a larger number of stations) decrease performance (Conway et al.,
1988), larger state-dependent production lines may actually increase efficiency. In this way, it is
shown that by incorporating realistic human behavior into production performance can actually
alter decisions to be made (in this case, line length). Finally, Schultz et al. (2010) provide
a quadratic programming model for assigning workers in a serial-line given the skill level of a
worker and his sensitivity to the work pace of his peers based on findings of a previous empirical
study with archived data.
Potential research questions remain, including how to set the batch sizes that maximize
throughput given that workers may be assigned goals to perform quickly while learning effects
may also be at play (Schultz et al., 2003). Other workflow design parameters may include job
rotation strategies within production lines for trading-off task variety (a facet of job satisfac-
tion) and flexibility with line throughput. Shared work stations can also be studied in specific
application areas such as in the case of “pick and pass” order picking systems in distribution
centers (Tompkins et al., 2003), where there may be more workers than stations and protocols
need to be devised to assign workers to work stations depending on their availability and ware-
house demand. In addition, self-organizing schemes, such as the one proposed by Bartholdi and
Eisenstein (1996), that are proven to balance themselves in the presence of disturbances, may be
analyzed in conjunction with regression towards the mean dynamics, in which workers attempt
to match the work pace of their peers (Schultz et al., 2010), to test if the rate of convergence to
balancing states increases.
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Moreover, we emphasize the need for more empirical investigations of long term effects of
social cohesiveness, work pressure (chronic fatigue) and job satisfaction effects in relation to
operational variables (e.g., low inventory, work-line assignment, manufacturing cell assignment
among others). This also prompts us to remark on possible research approaches in dealing with
these long term effects:
Modeling recommendation 13 In modeling long-term job satisfaction related effects, observ-
able proxies in the short-term such as discomfort ratings or social interaction frequency may
be included as objectives while a link between the short-term proxies, and the long-term desired
effects (facets) of job satisfaction and the overall impact on job satisfaction) may be found in
existing literature and are subject to further empirical work.
Perhaps a new dimension to be explored in human workflow design is the derivation of
dynamic control protocols of workflow. For instance, instead of constraining buffer sizes to fixed
values, allowing them to vary according to the individual responsiveness of a worker, may provide
the possibility of reaping additional motivation form the worker when it necessary to accelerate
production. It is important to note here that part of the research required to implement this
involves devising procedures for obtaining on-line characteristics for individual workers including
responsiveness to peers, learning rates and forgetting rates. Hence, for empirical researchers,
the following recommendation is made:
Empirical recommendation 9 Empirical research can be combined with modeling research to
test on-line, dynamic models of performance where operational variables that affect responsive-
ness to peers, learning and forgetting may be adjusted over time.
A promising tool for modeling all these complex interrelationships in work flow models is
that of systems dynamic models. Already, (Oliva and Sterman, 2001) has used this technique
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for illustrating trade-offs between work performance pressure and quality, validating this with
the use of field-data.
Table 2.5 provides an overview for opportunities to incorporate worker-specific factors in
work-flow models.
2.5.3 Goals, incentives and job appraisal design
Although not a classic area of operations management modeling, incentive and job appraisal
design are promising areas for future decision modeling. Although incentive design for workers
has usually been studied in the field of economics, incorporating the particular characteristics of
operational contexts may be useful. For example, Siemsen et al. (2007) develop a game theoret-
ical two-agent, two-task model, with supporting empirical evidence, that shows the added value
of distinguishing between different operations management (work-related) links when devising
optimal incentive schemes rewarding/penalizing individual or group performance. Specifically,
Siemsen et al. (2007) distinguish between 1) the production of one worker affecting that of
another worker, 2) the worker spending effort to help another worker and 3) workers sharing
job-related knowledge.
Research questions like whether to have rewards for group or individual outcomes, how
to set goals (individually and in a group), how frequent feedback should be given and how
to combine incentives and goals, still remain unresolved despite all the available interest in
this area from economics and the behavioral sciences. All of these research questions also
involve detecting behavioral patterns of workers to optimize individual goal levels, monetary
incentives and frequency of feedback. However, this personalized approach requires a balance
with goal alignment considerations (economic design) as well as long-term effects due to fairness
considerations and social cohesiveness (important facets of job satisfaction).
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Furthermore, all of these questions may be asked in combination with other decisions in-
cluding scheduling decisions and workflow decisions. For example, in scheduling with variable
demand, goals and incentives may aid as a temporary source of extra capacity without requiring
extra hours or extra personnel. Moreover, in production lines temporary motivational leverages,
in terms of goal setting or additional monetary incentives, may be used to solve issues with
bottleneck resources.
Table 2.6 provides an overview of the opportunities to incorporate worker-specific factors in
terms of incentives, goal-setting and job appraisal within operations management models.
2.5.4 Layout design
The literature on layout design for facilities is extensive, Meller and Gau (1996), and more
recently, Singh and Sharna (2006) provide an overview of the field. Although it is true that
layout models already incorporate human factors by considering area requirements for workers
to perform their work with a reasonable degree of comfort, there is space for more explicit worker-
related aspects in layout design. In designing the shape of a production line, feedback effects
may be a relevant factor. For example, U-shaped designs allow workers to have an overall view of
the operations and thus may anticipate high or low periods of workload. Furthermore, learning
rates may be enhanced by designing layouts that enable workers to observe their colleagues and
in particular “role” models (i.e. exemplary and experienced workers) that may act as “teachers”.
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Further, in warehouse layouts the arrangement of picking areas may also affect aspects of job
satisfaction. Although models exist for estimating congestion probabilities (two pickers meeting
in an aisle), which can lower picking throughput due to blockage, a low degree of congestion
may be beneficial as they may enhance a facet of job satisfaction: adequate interaction with
co-workers. Picking on large floor spaces with very few encounters may be undesirable from
a job satisfaction point of view as well as motivational point of view of performance (i.e. the
element of peer pressure is non-existent).
At a more detailed level, slotting decisions regarding where to locate products in warehouses
have received attention due to their impact on discomfort in scenario based studies (Saccomano,
1996 and Jones and Battieste, 2004 and Petersen et al., 2005). In Chapter 5, we use field data
that is able to trade-off an economic objective (i.e. throughput of a picking system) with a
proxy for a facet of job satisfaction (i.e. discomfort).
Table 2.7 provides an overview for opportunities to incorporate in operations management
models worker-specific factors related to layout design.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we showed that classical operations management objectives should be expanded
to include facets of job satisfaction as perceived by the workers involved in the operations.
By taking a decision driven perspective, we have shown that existing knowledge regarding the
behavior of workers may be useful when incorporated in operations management decision models.
The usefulness is specifically shown in cases where the influence of operational variables would
either affect operational performance or job satisfaction.
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Our objective was to integrate the diverse bodies of knowledge of worker related factors
to gain insights for operations management models that involve worker-specific factors. To
achieve this objective we first proposed the general framework depicted in Figure 2.1, then
a framework for linking worker related factors and individual performance in Figure 2.2, and
finally a framework detailing the relevant facets of job satisfaction for operations management
as shown in Table 2.3. Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 then illustrated the application of these
frameworks to current or potential operations management models.
Our decision-making approach provided a focus to our literature review of worker related
factors by limiting it to cases where operations management variables may induce an observable
change in human factors that affect individual performance or job satisfaction. This approach
was also useful for identifying the limitations of current knowledge. Based on the opportunities
and limitations, we provided recommendations for the operations modeler on how to include
specific worker relation factors in operations models. These limitations were also indicated as
opportunities for further empirical research to increase the understanding of how worker related
factors are linked to performance and job satisfaction.
In particular, we showed that certain worker–specific factors that affect performance, includ-
ing, learning, forgetting, goal setting and peer pressure have currently a thorough theoretical
underpinning and their link with performance can be described mathematically (albeit in a
limited way) for operations management modeling. Other worker-specific factors that affect
performance, including incentives, fatigue, feedback and effort evaluations by workers, have re-
lationships with performance that are less understood and that are not described to a sufficient
level of detail that grants a proper mathematical characterization of the relationships. In ad-
dition, we found that there is variety in the recognized facets of job satisfaction by different
models of job satisfaction. We found that the links of job satisfaction facets to operational
variables require more exploration. We also proposed the use of established short-term proxies
for long-term effects as a means to address limitations in linking specific job satisfaction facets
with performance. Importantly, we proposed work incentive and appraisal design as a new area
of research that not only belongs to the labour economic field, but should also be studied by
operations management scientists.
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In summary, for a future research agenda,we propose a two-fold approach: 1) Conduct
empirical work that may establish key links required for decision-making modeling purposes;
2) Develop models that are premised on solid empirical evidence. Performing both research
activities in parallel will enable the study of Behavioral Operations for Workers to grow within
the general area of Behavioral Operations and the larger field of Operations Management.

Chapter 3
Behavioral goal setting models for
operations management: A
theoretical approach
3.1 Introduction
Operations management models often assume implicitly that people are predictable, stationary
and emotionless, unaffected by external factors (Boudreau et al., 2003). These are assumptions
are justified if no interaction exists between the decision variables of the model and factors
that pertain to the workers’ performance. If goals are assigned in production contexts, and
an operations management model attempts to model the assignment of goals, then assuming
that workers are predictable, stationary and emotionless, unaffected by external factors may be
unjustified. Instead, an operations management model that attempts to model the assignment
of goals should draw from the theory that identifies and explains the effect of setting concrete,
specific goals on individuals and groups (Locke and Latham, 1990): Goal Setting Theory. The
main result of Goal Setting Theory is that setting sufficiently challenging and specific goals
boosts performance. In fact, a meta-analysis of 239 laboratory and 156 field studies demonstrates
that setting challenging and specific goals results in a significantly increased performance when
compared to “do your best strategies” with an increase of mean to standard deviation ratio
ranging between d = 0.48 and d = 0.80.
These findings imply that an external factor (i.e. the goal) has an effect on work perfor-
mance and work processing rates. Despite the potentially significant impact of these findings
on operations management, to the best of our knowledge, there are only few studies on goal
setting from the operations management point of view. This is study is done by Doerr (1996)
where the convenience of individual and group goals are studied in a production line setting.
Similarly, van Mierlo and Kleingeld (2010) analyzed the convenience of setting individual and
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cooperative goals in settings where interdependence among workers exist. Also in an operations
management context, a thesis by Vijfeijken (2004) looked at the problem of designing a goal
and reward system for work that is interdependent, however his work did not consider actual
workflow considerations. Furthermore, indirect references to goal setting theory appear in OM
studies that address the influence of workload on performance (Schultz et al.(1998), Gutierrez
and Kouvelis (1991) and Bendoly and Prietula (2008)). A study by Schultz et al. (2010) also
linked goal setting theory with the goal of avoiding starvation of co-workers in a production line.
Operations management, on the other hand, has a strong focus on the analysis of the time
dimension. Models concerned with throughput, response time and makespan are evidence of
this. In the field of OM not only is performance important but performance over time as work
requirements themselves vary over time. Quantitative production goals in operational settings
also include deadlines and variations in performance over time. This contrasts with Goal Setting
Theory, which has been criticized for being static (Latham, 2007). In Goal Setting Theory, total
performance at the end of a period is the main variable to be explained. Hence, for adapting
Goal Setting Theory to operations management, the time dimension remains to be explicitly
incorporated.
In this chapter, we review Goal Setting Theory’s main finding and extend it for use in
operational contexts such as manufacturing and distribution, where workers are assigned a
quantitative goal in terms of items or orders to be accomplished within a given time period.
The knowledge from goal setting articles is typically not available in a format that is sufficiently
mathematical to be used in quantitative OM models. This is actually a problem that arises for
many more situations in which one would like to include worker specific factors in OM models
(see Chapter 2) of this thesis and Boudreau, 2003).
Our study therefore starts by specifying the goal difficulty–performance relationship in math-
ematical language. However, our main contribution is to study the process that leads to such
performance that has not previously been studied. In particular, we ask: How do workers regu-
late their work pace under the influence of goals? Answering this question could be informative
for re-developing OM work flow models that typically assume stationary behavior and do not
include varying goals as an external variable. Additional insights may provide additional infor-
mation for OM models of productive systems such as queuing and simulation models. Moreover,
the identification of common patterns regarding how workers regulate their work pace can also
be used as a reference when monitoring the process followed by workers to achieve production
goals. Finally, if patterns are identified in work regulation given varying difficulty of goals as-
signed, such patterns may be helpful in assessing whether an assigned goal effectively increases
individual performance to the maximum.
This chapter takes the implementation of incorporating worker specific factors in OM models
further than Chapter 2 by formally characterizing the relationships involved in decision making
models. From the models, we derive alternative propositions and contrast these with the existing
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literature. This allows us to subsequently test these propositions empirically at a later stage in
an experimental study reported in Chapter 4. By doing so, we are then able to obtain insights
for operations management that are grounded in theory and buttressed by empirical evidence.
We model the worker as a decision maker who attempts to maximize his desirability (trans-
lated in economic terms to utility) for working at a certain work pace, acknowledging that
motivation is the antecedent of action. This approach is in-line with the tradition of Behavioral
Economics and more recently, Behavioral Operations (Gino and Pisano, 2008) where utility
models that are based on empirical findings are used for predicting actual choices. Note that
utility functions can be modified to reflect particular characteristics of the way individuals make
decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). We propose two alternative models, based on alterna-
tive views from the industrial psychology literature, that conjecture two different ways by which
workers maximize their satisfaction. In the first model we assume that the worker is myopic
considering only his satisfaction on the “spot”, while in the second model we assume the worker
is a planner who considers his satisfaction for the whole time period. These models are all based
on basic assumptions that are grounded in the literature.
Wu et al. (2004) also present a decision model that attempts to describe the effect of goals
on work pace. However, our work differs fundamentally from their model in our application
to OM contexts. Wu et al. (2004) consider individuals with the different decision problem of
persisting or not towards the goal. This is common in contexts like sports where sportsmen may
decide to continue or not executing an exercise such as push-ups. However, for regular routine
work where workers do their tasks for a pre-specified period (e.g. shifts or time blocks)the
situation is different. Instead of deciding whether to persist or not in executing the job, workers
decide on the amount of effort put in executing the job and thus the work pace at which they
execute it. That is, if the goal is production related. Our models then contribute by taking into
account time as a critical dimension in OM contexts, allowing the work pace to vary over time
in dynamic decision models. Moreover, we introduce the concept of combining intrinsic (normal
work pace rhythm driven) and extrinsic (goal oriented) motivational sources.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide a short literature
review on the goal difficulty-performance relation and what is known about work pace regulation
while identifying specific research questions that remain to be unanswered. Next, in Section 3.3,
we specify the scope and operational contexts where these research questions are applicable.
Section 3.4 presents the underlying assumptions of our models supported by findings in the
literature and proposes utility functions for modeling sources of motivation. In Section 3.5, we
develop a decision making model from a myopic model and from it derive testable hypotheses
for Chapter 4. Similarly, in Section 3.6, we develop a decision making model from a planner
model and from it derive testable hypotheses for Chapter 4. Finally, in Section 3.7, we provide
a general discussion of the hypotheses generated and some concluding remarks.
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3.2 Literature review and research questions
Originally, Goal Setting Theory posited a linear relationship between goal difficulty (or goal
level) and performance (Locke, 1968). However, this initial proposition has eveolved in time.
First, Locke and Latham (1982) report that the linear relationship tends to level off when workers
reach the limit of their ability. Second, Erez and Zidon (1984) report an increase in performance
followed by a drop in performance. The inflection point shown in their experiment is at the point
where approximately only 10% of the subjects are able to achieve the goal. Erez and Zidon (1984)
argue that this occurs because of a lack of goal commitment. An argument made by observing
a correlation between the lack of commitment and drop in performance. Nonetheless, See et
al. (2006), argue that even in the presence of goal commitment, performance may deteriorate
because exceedingly challenging goals are perceived as distant.
Besides differences in reports in the precise description of the difficulty–performance rela-
tionship, it must also be noted that most of these studies were applied in contexts different than
the operational contexts under analysis here (for a review see Locke and Latham (1990)). Goal
setting studies that analyzed the goal difficulty–performance relationship typically required sub-
jects to stop working once they reached the goal, not allowing for exceeding the goal (Locke and
Latham, 1990; See et al., 2006). However, in factories, service centers and distribution centers,
workers usually work for fixed time periods instead of variable periods depending on when an
assigned quantity of jobs has been processed. For this reason, it is still worth confirming the
existence of the linear goal difficulty-performance relationship for OM contexts. Hence, in this
chapter we ask:
Question 1 What are the effects on individual performance (i.e. cumulative performance of an
individual measured at the end of the assigned period) if the goal difficulty (level) increases?
Furthermore, Locke (1965) reports an interaction between ability and goal sensitivity, where
performance tends to level–off earlier for less skilled individuals and thus low-level individuals
tend to be less sensitive to goal difficulty. However, Crawford et al. (1983) find the opposite
result, where low performers improved more in their performance than high performers. Locke
and Latham (1990) argue that this apparent contradiction may be solved with the possibility
of a ceiling effect where high performers are already working to the best of their ability. At
the same time, in productive systems, workers with different skill levels (i.e. maximum level
of performance) exist, workers are not homogeneous in their skill levels. This means that for
contexts in operations management, it is important to study the effect of varying skills on total
performance, in conjunction with goals. Thus, we ask for main and interaction effects with goal
difficulty and varying skill levels on performance:
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Question 2 What are the effects on individual performance of increasing skill level under the
influence of a goal?
Question 3 What are the interaction effects of increasing goal difficulty (level) and skill level
on individual performance?
By contrast, in the literature, the effect of goals at the work pace regulation level has
received significantly less attention than the goal difficulty-performance relationship. In this
respect, the goal–gradient hypothesis (Hull, 1965) is one of the earliest propositions on how
individuals regulate their progress towards the goal. The goal–gradient hypothesis posits that
individuals tend to accelerate their progress the closer they are to attaining the goal. Recently,
the hypothesis has been replicated in the sports context with a running task (See et al., 2006)
and in the marketing context (Kivetz et al., 2006) where customers are observed to purchase
more frequently when they get closer to a certain consumption goal with a certain reward such
as a free cup of coffee.
The goal–gradient hypothesis appears to be related to the phenomenon of procrastination
that consists of individuals exerting more effort towards the deadline (Ariely and Weertenbroch,
2002). Several explanations have been given for this phenomenon including the discounting of
future benefits such as a narrow focus on the present (Buehler et al., 1994) and an underestima-
tion of past experiences in terms of task durations (Roy et al., 2005). However, in all of these
studies no distinction was made between the goal and the deadline as the goal was supposed to
be achieved at the deadline. This is unlike the operational context that we analyze here where
the goal can be achieved before the deadline and not later. Hence, it is not clear from all these
studies whether the acceleration was towards the assigned goal or towards the deadline, when
this distinction is relevant.
Question 4 How is the work pace regulated under the influence of a given goal and deadline?
In addition, there is a report from the literature that goals and deadlines (Bryan and Locke,
1967) affect an individual’s regulation of work pace such that they actively adjust their work
pace (by accelerating or decelerating) to achieve the assigned goal by the deadline. Bryan and
Locke (1967) argue that their observation is a generalization of Parkinson’s Law (1962) which
states that work tends to expand to fill the time available for its completion. The generalization
considers that work not only expands, but also contracts if it needed to fulfill the goal within the
assigned deadline. A similar idea is posited by Carver and Shreier (1998) who view the goal and
the deadline as inputs to set a reference value for work pace in a closed feedback loop system
whose purpose is to minimize the discrepancy between the actual work pace and the reference
work pace. Thus, for the case of work pace regulation, we study the effect of varying goals on
work pace regulation as follows:
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Question 5 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty (level) is increased?
Finally, just as skill levels may affect the goal difficulty–performance relationship, we also
study how it affects the work pace regulation of workers in conjunction with the influence of
goals. Therefore, we ask the following questions regarding main and interaction effects of skill
levels on work pace regulation:
Question 6 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the skill level is increased under the
influence of an assigned goal and deadline?
Question 7 What are the effects on work pace regulation when the skill level and assigned goal
interact?
3.3 Scope and approach
The goal-setting case which we address in this chapter involves an externally set deadline D ∈ R+
(fixed time horizon), as well as an externally set goal G ∈ R+ stated in terms of the number
of units processed in a production environment or the number of picks in a distribution envi-
ronment. We assume that it is understood in the firm, that the worker ought to achieve and,
if possible, over-achieve the goal set by the management. Despite the fact that we consider no
monetary rewards or punishments for over-achieving or underachieving the goal, the goal serves
as a way to evaluate the workers’ performance by the managers and by the workers themselves.
Furthermore, it is also implicitly assumed that work-related benefits may be obtained by re-
peatedly achieving or over-achieving the goals including promotions and salary increases. In
practice, it is important to note here that in the US, goals are often linked to increased pay
within piece-rate schemes; in the European Union, piece-rate schemes are not allowed and thus,
goals are more often related to long-term benefits.
We assume that the deadlines are short-term (e.g. within a 4 hour block of a working shift),
that the work is uninterrupted and that the cycle time for producing or processing each item
is short (say under 10 minutes). The job should be such that the worker can perceive a clear
deterministic-like relationship between his exerted effort and his work performance. Hence, we
limit the scope of this chapter to cases where variations in the cycle time are highly dependent
on the worker’s work pace and not on other factors such as equipment speed variability. This
typically implies a setting with highly repetitive, standardized jobs so that the worker is able
to accurately estimate how his effort and performance are positively related. Furthermore, we
consider only cases where the worker can perform his or her tasks without being “starved” by
assuming an infinite buffer of raw materials or picking orders waiting to be processed at the
worker’s station. Lastly, we assume that workers have experience with the tasks and receive
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continuous feedback regarding their progress towards the goal and the time deadline so that
they can continuously adjust their work pace to suit their needs. These assumptions can be
realistic for a large number of productive environments including order picking in warehouses,
assembly work and call centers for advertisements, among others.
Throughout the rest of this chapter we will use the following notation: s(t) and s˙(t) = ds/dt
are the cumulative work and work pace respectively, evaluated at time t such that t ∈ [0, D].
On occasion, we omit the time arguments when referring to the cumulative work and work pace
functions for enhanced readability.
3.4 Utility functions and assumptions
In formulating the decision making problem that the worker faces when selecting his work pace,
we need to review the sources of motivation a worker can have under the influence of goals.
Following Vroom’s (1964) widely used distinction (see Chapter 2) on sources of motivation,
we consider intrinsic and extrinsic sources of motivation. An intrinsic source of motivation
is inherent to the operational task itself and thus a given effort level has a certain intrinsic
desirability measure given. An extrinsic source of motivation is derived by using the goal assigned
externally as a reference point for comparing the individual’s own performance. In Sections 3.4.1
and 3.4.2 we show how to mathematically describe both types of motivation, providing stylized
utility (i.e. preference) functions for given levels of work pace and performance respectively. We
base our analysis on the desirable properties for such functions as found in the psychological
and ergonomics literature. To keep the mathematical descriptions of utility functions as general
as possible we also avoid any specific formulation of the utility functions making use of only
desirable properties formulated as assumptions. These assumptions are summarized in Table
3.1 at the end of the section.
In this chapter, we will not propose hypotheses for the questions referring to interaction
effects between different skill and goal levels (i.e. Questions 3 and 7) as these would require
additional formulations that would render the conclusions too specific. We will also address
these questions empirically in a laboratory study described in Chapter 4.
3.4.1 Utility rate - work pace function
Working at a certain speed involves physiological and psychological stress (Landy et al., 1994).
To our knowledge, there are few studies where the desirability of a given work pace by individuals
has been studied. However, general theories are available that can help shed light on this. The
person-environment fit theory (Pervin, 1968) posits that individuals who match the environment
on particular characteristics such as an assigned work pace will be the most satisfied. This implies
that individual preferences exist for a given work pace.
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To model these preferences, we define a function that assigns a given work pace with a given
level of desirability which we refer to as the utility rate:
Definition 1 R(s˙) : R+ −→ R is a continuous function that relates the possible work pace levels
s˙ ∈ [0, L), where L ∈ R+is the minimum unattainable work pace of an individual in a given
working context with a utility rate measure R(s˙) ∈ R.
We note that R(s˙) is defined as a utility rate measure, and not as a utility measure for unit
consistency when comparing the utility derived from a given amount of work accomplished, s(t).
We then consider that a worker derives utility (positive or negative) from working at given work
pace by working continuously for a given period. Thus, working for a period twice as long at the
same work pace yields twice the utility. The utility rate measure is still of a cardinal type such
that for any two work pace levels s˙1, s˙2 ∈ [0, L), R(s˙2) ≤ R(s˙1), if and only if s˙1 is preferred
over s˙2 (i.e. s˙2  s˙1).
To characterize the basic properties of a utility rate function of work pace, we draw from a
number of studies on job stressors noting that working at a given work pace is a job stressor
because the individual exerts demands on his own body by working at a certain work pace. We
draw first from Yerkes’ and Dobson’s Law (1908) where a given level of stressor is related to a
performance level in an inverted U-shape manner. Similarly, the inverted U relationship between
stressor and performance has also been reported in the literature on ergonomics (Hancock, 1986),
operations management (Bendoly and Prietula, 2008) and marketing (Singh, 1998). The inverted
U shape stems from the combination of two effects: the stimulation that a higher performance
provides (i.e. non-boring work referred to as hypostress by Hancock and Warm (1989)) and the
costs associated with higher levels of effort (and work pace), including discomfort and fatigue.
The inverted U shape is further supported by reports from the literature that workers com-
plain of a work pace being too slow or too fast when the work pace is externally controlled
(Gunnarsson and O. O¨stberg, 1977) as in belt conveyor production environments. The fact
that workers complain of a work pace being “too slow” or “too fast” suggests that there may
be an intermediate most preferred work pace. Furthermore, a study of Jansen and Kristof-
Brown (2005) shows that when the tendency of an individual is to work at a pace matching
his coworkers’ average pace, then the individual’s satisfaction is maximum, implying that the
worker is most satisfied and thus, a work pace with a maximum level of desirability (satisfaction)
exists. Following the above evidence, we formulate the following properties (assumptions) that
an intrinsically desired work pace function, R(s˙), should have:
Assumption 1 R(s˙) is concave.
Assumption 2 R(s˙) reaches a maximum at the natural work pace denoted by n ∈ R+. This
means that arg(maxs˙∈S R(s˙)) = n with R(s˙) > 0 if s˙ < n and R′(s˙) < 0 if s˙ > n.
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Nonetheless, to complete the description of an intrinsic desirability work pace function, R(s˙),
it is important to take into account the limits of ability or skill. In this respect, Hancock and
Warm (1989) define zones of instability where it is infeasible to sustain a certain stressor level
for long periods and the stressor level itself is highly undesirable. In the context of work, the
zones of instability define the zone adjacent to an absolute upper limit work pace L. This
implies that working close to the upper limit work pace L is extremely undesirable because of
the discomfort, fatigue and even pain that might be felt when working very close to the absolute
maximum capacity as evidenced by studies in fatigue (Konz, 1998) and discomfort (Dul et al.,
1994). Close to the natural work pace, however, the level of satisfaction is also close to the
maximum level of desirability. This would be referred by Hancock and Warm (1989) as the
stable region where R′(s˙) ≈ 0. Thus, we make a third assumption for R(s˙) and restrict the
domain of the function to [0, L):
Assumption 3 There is an L ∈ R+ such that a one sided limit exists when an increasing s˙
approaches L: lims˙↑L− R(s˙) = −∞.
This third assumption assures that no matter what measure of extrinsic motivation there
is, the work pace may not equal that of the limit of his ability, L. Although Hancock and
Warm (1989) also propose a lower limit of stressor level, this is not applicable for work pace as
a stressor. Instead, this is applicable to cases where low stressors are critical such as in the case
of low temperature or low humidity. A work pace lower than the natural work pace is bound to
cause boredom and is thus undesirable. The only lower limit of work pace is the one physically
possible: a null work pace. In any case, as in this paper we deal with goal setting for enhancing
performance, we do not force workers to work at a work pace lower than their natural work
pace and thus any further characterization of the R(s˙) for s˙ ∈ [0, n) is not needed. In Figure 3.1
we show a sketch of a characteristic R(s˙) function that incorporates all the formal assumptions
made.
For simplicity we assume that if the skill level L is increased by φ ≥ 0, a shift in the function
R(s˙) occurs such that the most comfortable work pace is now at n + φ. This assumption is
not only convenient but is supported in a recent study by Bendoly and Prietula (2008) where a
non-monotonic relationship between effort exerted (stressor) and motivation (desirability) levels
is shifted with an increase in skill level. We formalize this assumption as follows:
Assumption 4 Given two skill levels L2 and L1 such that L2 = L1 + φ and φ > 0, for any
s˙ ∈ [φ,L2) the corresponding utility rate–work pace functions for each skill level, RL2(s˙) and
RL1(s˙), are related as follows: RL2(s˙) = RL1(s˙− φ).
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Figure 3.1: Utility rate - work pace function
3.4.2 Utility - performance evaluation function
When an external goal is assigned, a sense of direction is given (Locke and Latham, 1990);
workers are induced to strive for that goal. In Heath et al. (1999), it is shown through a
questionnaire of hypothetical scenarios that external goals serve as reference values that separate
positive and negative evaluations of performance with respect to the goal. This means that when
workers are committed to the goal, they will evaluate their performance with respect to the goals
assigned. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that workers are committed to their goal when it is
realistic, assigned by a recognized authority and they believe positive outcomes can be derived
from achieving the goal (Locke and Latham, 1990).
Definition 2 We define a performance preference function, P (s) : R+ −→ R as a strictly
increasing continuous function that assigns to cumulative work s(t) ≥ 0 at time t ∈ [0, D] a
utility level such that given two work levels s2 and s2, s2 is preferred over s1 if P (s2) > P (s1).
We then consider that a worker derives utility by comparing his actual performance s(t) at
time t ∈ [0, D] with the assigned goal G. The utility measure is of a cardinal type such that
for any two possible performance levels s1, s2 ∈ [0,+∞), P (s2) ≤ P (s1,+∞), if and only if
s1 is preferred over s2 (i.e. s2  s1). Borrowing from Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory
(see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 and Tversky and Kahneman,
1992), we posit basic properties that a typical progress S-shaped evaluation function P (s) should
have if the goal G is assigned:
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Assumption 5 The assigned goal G > 0, behaves as a reference point such that P (G) = 0,
dividing the set of possible performance into successes and failures. This means that if for
t ∈ [0, D], s(t) > G, then the progress of the work is evaluated positively P (s) > 0. Likewise,
if the cumulative work achieved at a certain time t ∈ [0, D] is smaller than the goal s(t) < G,
then the progress of the work is evaluated negatively P (s) < 0.
Assumption 6 P (s) exhibits the loss aversion property such that P (G + δ) ≤ −P (G − δ) for
δ ≥ 0. Further, P (s) exhibits the strong loss aversion property: P ′(G + h) < −P ′(G − h) for
h > 0. In goal setting terms this implies that workers evaluate at a certain time t ∈ [0, D] that
underachieving a goal is so undesirable, that over-achieving a goal by a similar magnitude δ will
not offset such undesirability.
Assumption 7 P (s) exhibits diminishing sensitivity of returns such that P
′′
(s) ≥ 0 for s ≤ G
and P
′′
(s) < 0 for s > G. The increased desirability (undesirability) of producing more (less)
than the goal is reduced the more distant the cumulative performance is from the goal.
In Behavioral Economics, the validity of the basic properties of the value function has been
extensively examined through experiments that evaluate the decisions of people (see Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). The application to the domain of goals has not been entirely validated.
Nonetheless, Heath (1999) and See et al. (2006) provide evidence for the applicability of the use
of the prospect theory value curve in describing the way how people evaluate their performance
with respect to a goal. Heath et al. (1999) present individuals with hypothetical scenarios of
performance and goals which they need to compare in terms of their desirability. See et al.
(2006) provide indirect evidence of the S–shaped curve as they show that running extra meters
or persisting longer in a wall-sit study is more valuable the closer the subjects are to the goal.
In Figure 3.2, we show how a typical evaluation curve P (s) may look if Assumptions 5, 6 and 7
hold.
In addition, we include an assumption concerning extreme values of performance, where
the goal meaningfulness is lost and thus we assume that no further utility can be derived from
increasing performances that are “far beyond” what the goal requires:
Assumption 8 For a finite goal G, lims→∞ P
′
(s) = 0
Finally, to characterize the effect of changing goals in extrinsic motivation we require an
additional assumption. Since the goal serves as the reference point, if the goal shifts, we may
assume that the reference point also shifts. If in addition, for the sake of parsimony we as-
sume that the characteristic extrinsic motivation utility curve remains unchanged, we can then
formulate the following assumption which has also been used in See et al. (2006) and Heath
et al. (1999); note that we introduce the sub-index to denote the membership of the extrinsic
motivation function at a given goal level:
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Assumption 9 Given two goals G1 and G2 such that, G2 = G1 + δ where δ ≥ 0,then
the corresponding utility - performance functions, PG1(s) and PG2(s), are related as follows:
PG2(s) = PG1(s− δ).
3.5 Myopic model
We propose two modeling approaches, based on two alternative assumptions, to select the work
pace. In the first approach, the worker is assumed to be myopic and only considers the utility
he can derive on the spot to select his work pace and therefore continuously re-evaluates his
decision until the deadline D. In the second approach, the worker is assumed to be a time-
consistent planner (Pollak, 1968) and hence selects how he is going to regulate his work pace
until the deadline D at the start of the working period at time t = 0. We note that although
both assumptions are simplistic and extreme, this has been done to derive stylized patterns of
behavior and later compare them to actual ones given the results reported in Chapter 4.
To engender logical flow, we first derive those hypotheses that pertain to myopic work pace
regulation and individual performance in this section and then in Section 3.6 derive those that
pertain to planned work pace regulation and individual performance. The derived hypotheses of
both models (i.e. myopic and planning models) are then organized per stated research question
in Section 3.2.
When we assume that the worker is myopic, basing his decision of work pace on the instan-
taneous utility derived at time t ∈ [0, D], we also assume that his decision needs to be revised
continuously for the whole period [0, D]. The worker considers dynamically both the intrinsic
utility rate that a given work pace provides R(s˙) and the instantaneous change in utility derived
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Table 3.1: Overview of assumptions for models and support from literature
Assumptions Supporting literature
Intrinsic motivation function R(s˙)
A1 R(s) is concave. Yerkes’s and Dobson’s Law (1908)
A2 R(s) reaches a maximum at the natural work pace of the worker de-
noted by s˙ = n; i.e. R′(s˙) > 0 if s < n and R′(s˙) < 0 if s˙ > n.
Gunnarsson and Osberg (1977);
Yerkes’s and Dobson’s Law (1908)
A3 limsL R(s˙) = −∞. Dul, (1994); Hancock and Warm
(1989).
A4 Given two skill levels L2 and L1 such that L2 = L1+φ and φ > 0, the
corresponding work pace functions result in RL2 (s) = RL2 (s + φ).
Bendoly and Prietula (2008)
Extrinsic motivation function P (s)
A5 Reference point P (G) = 0: If the workers achieve the goal they achieve
their expectations. If the cumulative work achieved at a certain time
t ∈ [0, D] is less than the goal s(t) < G, then the progress of the work is
evaluated negatively P (s) < 0 otherwise is evaluated non-negatively.
Heath (1999); See et al. (2006);
Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect
theory (1979)
A6 Loss aversion P (G+δ) = −P (G−δ) for δ = 0 and strong loss aversion
P ′(G + δ) = P ′(G− δ): Workers evaluate at a certain time t ∈ [0, D]
that underachieving a goal as being so undesirable, that overachieving
a goal by a similar magnitude d will not offset the undesirability of
the underachievement.
Heath (1999); See et al. (2006);
Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect
theory (1979)
A7 Diminishing sensitivity P ′′(s) = 0 for s = G and P ′′(s) < 0 for
s > G: The increased desirability (undesirability) of producing further
more (less) than the goal is reduced the more distant the cumulative
performance is from the goal. It is because of this property that utility
functions of prospect theory are S-shaped.
Heath (1999); See et al. (2006);
Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect
theory (1979)
A8 For a finite goal G, lims→∞ P ′(s) = 0. Original assumption
A9 Given two goals G1 and G2 such that, G2 = G1 + δ where δ = 0,then
PG2 (s) = PG1 (s− δ).
See et al. (2008) and Heath et al.
(1999)
from making progress evaluated with the function P (s). If we assume that the total utility rate
derived at time instant t ∈ [0, D] is additive separable in the utility derived from achieving a
given level of performance and at a given work pace, we define the dynamic problem of selecting
the most preferred work pace s˙(t) by a myopic worker as follows:
maxs˙(t)[P
′
(s(t))s˙(t) +R(s˙(t))] ∀t ∈ [0, D] (3.1)
with initial conditions:
s(0) = 0 (3.2)
Note that P (s(t)) is in utility units whereas R(s˙(t)) is in utility rate units, so to combine
both sources of motivation, the unit consistency is maintained by applying the chain rule as
follows:
dP (s)
dt
=
dP (s)
ds
ds
dt
= P
′
(s)s˙ (3.3)
76 Behavioral goal setting models for OM: Theory
Maximum work pace 
achieved when 
goal reached
Time
Work pace
)(ts
D
Deadline
goalNo
Goal
Goal
Goal
Goal
4
3
2
1
G
G
G
G
*t ],0[ Dt
Shift effect
4321 GGGG 
Figure 3.3: Work pace regulation myopic model hypothesis
With the decision problem given with Equations 3.1 and 3.2, we now derive hypotheses for
myopic workers.
3.5.1 Myopic model work pace regulation
In this sub-section we start our analysis by addressing the question “How is the work pace regu-
lated under the influence of a given goal and deadline?” (Question 4). For this, we characterize
the work pace of a worker regulated by a myopic assumption with the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Given a myopic worker under influence of an assigned goal and deadline, we
hypothesize that a worker will accelerate towards the assigned goal, reaching its maximum work
pace when he reaches the goal and then decelerate converging to the natural work pace if enough
time is allowed (see Figure 3.3).
The intuitive reason for this acceleration towards the goal is that as the goal becomes closer,
the worker derives more excitement from making progress — as the utility performance function
suggests. This hypothesis is then consistent with that of Hull’s (1932) goal gradient hypothesis.
For a myopic worker we denote s˙∗(t), ∀t ∈ [0, D] as the optimal work pace control policy
such that s˙∗(t) = arg(maxs˙(t)[P
′
(s(t))s˙(t) + R(s˙(t))]). Consequently, we define s¨∗(t) such that
s¨∗(t) = ds˙
∗(t)
dt and s
∗(t), such that s∗(t) = limx→t−
∫ x
0 s˙
∗(u)du. Moreover, if we denote the time
where the maximum work pace is achieved as t∗ such that t∗ = arg(maxt∈[0,D] s˙∗(t)), Hypothesis
1 is equivalent to the following theorem:
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Figure 3.4: Work pace selection in the myopic model
Theorem 1 For a myopic worker, s∗(t∗) = G iff t∗ < D, otherwise t∗ = D. Further, s¨∗(t) > 0
iff s∗(t) < G and s¨∗(t) < 0 iff s∗(t) > G. Finally, in the absence of a deadline limt→∞ s∗(t) = n.
Proof To prove this theorem we first solve the satisfaction maximization problem faced by a
myopic worker described in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. Next, we verify that feasible unique solutions
of s˙∗(t) can be obtained for t ∈ [0, D]. Knowing how s˙∗(t) evolves for t ∈ [0, D], we then analyze
when s˙∗(t) reaches a maximum. Finally, we prove the limiting behavior of work pace.
Step 1 To solve the decision-making problem, it is key to observe that at a given time
t ∈ [0, D], the cumulative work s(t) is independent of the instantaneous work pace s˙(t), and
thus dsds˙ = 0. Hence, applying first order conditions the following result is obtained:
P
′
(s(t)) = −R′(s˙(t)) ∀t ∈ [0, D] (3.4)
Second order conditions confirm that a local minimum exists, because R
′′
(s˙) < 0. There is
also only one possible solution to Equation 3.4 as P
′
(s) > 0 (see Definition 2) and −R′(s˙) < 0
iff s˙ > n. The result in Equation 3.4 implies that the optimum work pace at any time t ∈ [0, D]
is obtained when the marginal utility of the goal induced preference function is equal to the
marginal disutility rate of the work pace preference function. This result is, in fact, the dynamic
equivalent to the result obtained in Wu et al. (2004) where an extra task is to be executed until
the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefits of executing the extra task. We do remark here
that for a given t =t˜∈ [0, D], P ′(s∗(t)) is constant, remaining to define s˙∗(t) for Equation 3.4 to
hold as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Step 2 To verify that the myopic model indeed provides feasible solutions we need to show
that s∗ is an increasing function of t ∈ [0, D]. If we show that s˙∗(t) ≥ n for t ∈ [0, D], we will
solutions because s∗(0) = 0.
We can show that s˙∗(t) ≥ n for t ∈ [0, D] as follows. If s˙∗(t) < n Equation 3.4 will not hold
because on one hand, the utility performance function is strictly increasing (i.e. P
′
(s∗) > 0) and
on the other, it is known from the concavity of the utility rate work pace function Assumption 1
that −R′(s˙∗) < 0, making the equality impossible. If, on the other hand, s˙∗(t) ≥ n for t ∈ [0, D]
then −R′(s∗) > 0 and thus, Equation 3.4 may hold.
If we further impose that neither P
′
(s) > −R′(s˙) nor P ′(s) < −R′(s˙) (that follows from
Assumptions 1, 2, 6 and 7) holds for all (s, s˙) pairs (in other words there is a switching point)
such that s ≥ 0 and s˙ > n, it is possible to guarantee that Equation 3.4 holds and that a feasible
finite work pace exists.
Step 3 To show that s∗(t∗) = G iff t∗ ≤ D we first show that P ′(s∗) attains a maximum at
s∗(t) = G provided t ≤ D and then use this result in Equation 3.4.
Step 3a To identify when P
′
(s) attains a maximum we first must note that because of
Assumption 6 a discontinuity of P
′
(s) may occur at s(t) = G. Hence, to prove when P
′
(s)
achieves a maximum we first identify when P
′
(s) achieves a maximum if s ≤ G and if s > G
separately. Finally, we compare both maxima obtained for each distinct segment to establish
when P
′
(s) a maximum.
From Assumption 7, P
′
(s) increases as s(t) increases (and t increases–verified in Step 2)
reaching P
′
(s) a maximum value at s = G as long as s ≤ G. Next, when s > G, by Assumption
7, P
′
(s), decreases s(t) increases (and t increases-verified in Step 2). Thus, for s > G, a maximum
will be attained at s = limh→0 G+ h where h > 0.
To combine the result of both segments of P
′
(s) we use the strong loss aversion property
(A6): P ′(G + h) < −P ′(G − h) for h > 0. This results in maxs1 P
′
(s1) > maxs2 P
′
(s2) where
s1 ≤ G and s2 > G, as G = arg(maxs1 P
′
(s1)). Hence, P
′
(s) attains a maximum at s(t) = G.
Step 3b For finding the maximum work pace, we first define g(.) as the inverse function of
R
′
(s˙), valid only for s˙ ≥ n, such that s˙ = g(R′(s˙)). Thus, because of Assumption 2 and Equation
3.4 it follows that s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗)) is an increasing function in P ′(s∗). Combining the facts that
P
′
(s∗) attains a maximum at s∗(t) = G iff t∗ < D and that s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗)) is an increasing
function in P
′
(s∗), the desired result is proven: s(t∗) = G iff t∗ < D.
Furthermore, we note that because s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗)) is an increasing function in P ′(s∗)
and because from Assumption 7, P
′′
(s∗) > 0 for s∗ < G, we can conclude that the work pace,
increases until the goal is reached. Similarly, because s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗)) is an increasing function
in P
′
(s∗) and because from Assumption 7, P
′′
(s∗) < 0 for s∗ < G, we can conclude that the
work pace, increases until the goal is reached. Hence, if s∗(D) ≤ G, the maximum work pace is
reached at t∗ = D.
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Step 4 In finding limiting work pace we show that limt→∞ s˙∗(t) = n, or equivalently that
limt→∞(arg(maxs˙(t)[P
′
(s)s˙+R(s˙)])) = n. Given that from Equation 3.4, R
′
(s˙) = −P ′(s), taking
the limit at both sides of the equation and using Assumption 8 we obtain, lims→∞R
′
(s) = 0
Next, since we know that from Assumption 2, R(s) reaches a maximum at s∗ = n with R′(s∗)
= 0, the desired results follows: limt→∞ s˙∗(t) = n. 
3.5.2 Effects of varying goals on work pace regulation
Continuing with the analysis of the work pace regulation of a myopic worker, we address the
question “What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty (level) is increased?”
(Question 5). The answer to this question is given in two hypotheses (2 and 3) that complement
each other by the former indicating a shift effect in work pace regulation and the latter a different
initial work pace. We state Hypothesis 2 as follows:
Hypothesis 2 For a myopic worker, the effect of increasing the assigned goal is to shift the
work pace selected for the whole period by a constant lapse in time (see Figure 3.4).
This hypothesis assures consistency with acceleration towards the goal effect, first posited
by Hull (1932). It does so by acknowledging that when the goal is increased, the maximum work
pace will be attained at a later time. The basis for this hypothesis is that we assume that the
shape of the utility performance function remains unchanged and is only shifted. This means
that when a new goal is assigned, the same utility measure is derived from a level of performance
that is equal to the former one plus the difference between the new and old assigned goal.
If s˙∗G2(t) and s˙
∗
G1
(t) indicate the selected work pace for each assigned goal at time t ∈ [0, D]
respectively (with s∗G2(t) and s
∗
G1
(t) as cumulative work), Hypothesis 2 is equivalent to the
following mathematical theorem:
Theorem 2 Given a δ > 0 and two assigned goals G2, G1 ∈ R+, such that G2 = G1 + δ, the
following will hold for a myopic worker: s˙∗G2(τ) = s˙
∗
G1
(τ − θ), where θ is a time-invariant shift
and τ is a free parameter of time that is allowed to vary such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ D − θ.
Proof To prove that s˙∗G2(τ) = s˙
∗
G1
(τ−θ), we first define an equivalent relationship to be proven.
Next, we prove the equivalent relationship.
Step 1 We first provide an equivalent definition of θ, such that θ is also the fixed time required
to achieve a total work of δ for an individual assigned to goal G1 such that δ =
∫ θ
0 s˙
∗
G2
(t)dt.
Then we also define ω(τ) as a time shift that allows the following relationship to hold such that
0 ≤ τ ≤ D − θ:
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∫ τ+ω
0
s˙∗G2(t)dt =
∫ τ
0
s˙∗G2(t)dt+ δ (3.5)
Note then that as s˙∗G2(τ + ω(τ)) (in the left hand side of the equation) and s˙
∗
G1
(τ)+ δ (the
right hand side of the equation) are both increasing functions on τ , the equality will hold for
some positive ω(τ) as δ > 0. As, a priori ω(τ) is a time shift that is not necessarily time-
invariant, if we show that θ = ω(τ), it means that ω(τ) is also time-invariant as θ is a fixed time
independent of τ . Thus, we want to then show that θ = ω(τ), because this is equivalent to show
that s˙∗G2(τ) = s˙
∗
G1
(τ − θ) for a given δ > 0.
Step 2 To show that θ = ω(τ), we first take derivatives at both sides of the equation in
Assumption 9 and then apply inverse function g(−x) to both sides for t ∈ [0, D] obtaining:
g(−P ′G2(s∗G2(t+ ω(τ))) = g(−P ′G1(s∗G2(t+ ω)− δ)) (3.6)
Noting that in Equation 3.5 it holds that s∗G2(t+ ω) = s
∗
G1
(t) + δ, from the right hand side
of Equation 3.6 we have that for t ∈ [0, D]:
g(−P ′G1(s∗G2(t+ ω(τ))− δ)) = g(−P ′G1(s∗G1(t))) (3.7)
Using the fact that s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗)) we obtain from the right hand side of Equation 3.7 that
for t ∈ [0, D]:
g(−P ′G1(s∗G1(t))) = s∗G1(t) (3.8)
Next, noting that the left hand side of Equation 3.5 is g(−P ′G2(s∗G2(t+ω)) = s˙∗G2(t+ω), and
combining it with the result in Equation 3.8, we find that for t ∈ [0, D] the following holds:
s˙∗G1(t) = s˙
∗
G2(t+ ω(τ)) (3.9)
Next, we substitute s˙∗G1(t) in Equation 3.5 using Equation 3.9 obtaining the following:
∫ τ+ω(τ)
0
s˙∗G2(t)dt =
∫ τ
0
s˙∗G2(t+ ω(τ))dt+ δ (3.10)
Integrating we obtain:
s∗G2(τ + ω(τ)) = s
∗
G2(τ + ω(τ))− s∗G2(ω(τ)) + s∗G2(θ) (3.11)
Rearranging we prove the desired result, θ = ω(τ) such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ D − θ. 
Simultaneous to the effect of shifting the work pace over time, increasing the goal difficulty
may also have the somewhat counter-intuitive effect of decreasing the starting work pace.
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Hypothesis 3 When a higher goal is assigned, myopic workers will start working at a lower
work pace.
Although this hypothesis may, at first glance, seem counter-intuitive, its underlying justifi-
cation is that the lower goals are assigned, the closer the worker is to achieving these right from
the start of the working period. As we assume in Assumption 7 that the closer the worker is to
accomplish goal, the greater the marginal returns on making progress are, it then follows that
the worker is more motivated to perform at a higher work pace at the start of work when the
assigned goal is lower.
Formally, Hypothesis 3 can be re-written as the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Given a δ > 0 and two assigned goals G2, G1 ∈ R+, such that G2 = G1 + δ, it
holds that at t = 0, s˙∗G2(0) < s˙
∗
G1
(0).
Proof For proving that s˙∗G2(0) < s˙
∗
G1
(0), we first note the fact that P ′G2(s
∗
G2
(0)) < P ′G2(s
∗
G2
(0)+
δ) for δ > 0 holds, because of the assumption of diminishing returns, Assumption 7 for s∗(0) < G.
Next, we apply assumption Assumption 9, noting that P ′G2(s
∗
G2
(0) + δ) = P ′G1(s
∗
G1
(0)). From
this, it follows that P ′G2(s
∗
G2
(0)) < P ′G1(s
∗
G1
(0)). Using the fact that the function s˙∗ = g(−P ′(s∗))
is increasing on P
′
(s∗), we can then show the desired result: s˙∗G2(0) < s˙
∗
G1
(0). 
3.5.3 Effects of varying skills on work pace regulation
In this section we start our analysis by addressing the question “What are the effects on work pace
regulation if the skill level is increased under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline?”
(Question 6). For a worker assumed to be myopic, the possible effects of skill levels on work pace
regulation are intuitive in terms of the work pace achieved at a given time and the maximum
work pace attainable. For characterizing these effects we propose Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis
5.
Hypothesis 4 Under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline, if a myopic worker has a
higher skill level than another myopic worker, the selected work pace of the worker with a higher
skill level is higher as long as the goal has not yet been achieved.
We formalize Hypothesis 4 by introducing the following notation. We denote s˙∗L1(t) and
s˙∗L2(t) as the work pace (with s
∗
G2
(t) and s∗G1(t) as cumulative work) obtained by workers of skill
level L1 and L2 at t ∈ [0, D] such that L2 = L1 + φ and φ > 0. Furthermore, we define tˆL1
and tˆL1such that s
∗
L1
(tˆL1) = G and s
∗
L2
(tˆL2) = G. Similarly, we define t
∗
L1
and t∗L2 such that
t∗L1 = arg(maxt∈[0,D] s˙
∗
L1
(t)) and t∗L2 = arg(maxt∈[0,D] s˙
∗
L2
(t)). Given this notation, Hypothesis 4
can be formally re-written as follows.
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Theorem 4 Given two myopic workers with skill levels L1 and L2 such that L2 = L1 + φ and
φ > 0, it holds that s˙∗L2(t) > s˙
∗
L1
(t) and tˆL2 < tˆL1, for t ∈ [0, tˆL2 ]. It also holds that s˙∗L2(t) >
s˙∗L1(t) for t ∈ [0, D], if s∗L1(t∗L1) < G and s∗L2(t∗L2) < G.
Proof The proof is organized as follows, first we show that at t = 0, s˙∗L2(0) > s˙
∗
L1
(0). Next,
we show by approximation, that for an arbitrarily small h > 0 it holds that s˙∗L2(h) > s˙
∗
L1
(h).
Finally, we show that for r = 1, 2, ...k such that s∗(kh) ≤ G < s∗((k + 1)h), it holds that
s˙∗L2(rh) > s˙
∗
L1
(rh).
Step 1 To prove that s˙∗L2(0) > s˙
∗
L1
(0), we first note that by Assumption 4 R′L2(s˙) =
R′L1(s˙ − φ). Next, because R′′(s˙) < 0 by Assumption 1 it holds that R′L1(s˙ − φ) < R′L1(s˙)
and thus R′L2(s˙) < R
′
L1
(s˙).This implies that two inverse functions gL2 , gL1 defined such that
s˙L1 = gL1 (R
′
L1
(s˙)) and s˙L2 = gL2 (R
′
L2
(s˙)) are related as follows: gL2(x) > gL1(x), where x ∈ R.
Thus, we can show that at t = 0, gL2(−P
′
(s∗(0))) > gL1(−P
′
(s∗(0))) and thus by Equation 3.4,
s˙∗L2(0) > s˙
∗
L1
(0).
Step 2 To prove that s˙∗L2(h) > s˙
∗
L1
(h), we first use Euler’s approximation, for an ar-
bitrarily small h > 0 for estimating s∗L1(t + h) and s
∗
L2
(t + h), obtaining: s∗L1(t + h) ≈
s∗L1(t) + hg(−P
′
(s∗L1(t))) and s
∗
L2
(t + h) ≈ s∗L2(t) + hg(−P
′
(s∗L2(t))). We then note that by
initial conditions at t = 0, s∗L1(0) = s
∗
L2(0) = 0 and P
′
(s∗L2(0)) = P
′
(s∗L2(0)). The initial condi-
tions combined with Euler’ approximation imply then that at time t = h, s∗L2(h) > s
∗
L1
(h). From
this, it then follows that −P ′(s∗L2(h)) < −P
′
(s∗L1(h)). As gL2(x) > gL1(x) for x ∈ R and both,
gL1 and gL2 , are decreasing functions on x ∈ R, we may then conclude that gL2(−P
′
(s∗L2(h))) <
gL1(−P
′
(s∗L1(h))), showing that s˙
∗
L2
(h) > s˙∗L1(h).
Step 3 Here we show that s˙∗L2(rh) > s˙
∗
L1
(rh) for r = 1, 2, ...k such that s∗(kh) ≤ G <
s∗((k + 1)h). In a similar way, we can then construct an approximation for an arbitrarily small
step h as follows: s∗L1(t+2h) ≈ s∗L1(t+h)+hg(−P
′
(s∗L1(t+h))) and s
∗
L2
(t+2h) ≈ s∗L2(t+h)+
hg(−P ′(s∗L2(t+h))). At time t = 2h, we use the facts established in Step 2 that s∗L2(h) > s∗L1(h)
and that −P ′(s∗L2(h)) < −P
′
(s∗L1(h)), implying then that s
∗
L2
(t + h) > s∗L1(t + 2h). Applying
again inverse the function g(x) to the last expression and noting that is decreasing on x ∈ R
and that −P ′(s∗L2(2h)) < −P
′
(s∗L1(2h)) we obtain that s˙
∗
L2
(h) > s˙∗L1(h).It is then easy to see
that the argument (Step 3 ) can be repeated for t = 3h, 4h, ...kh where k is a positive integer
such that s∗L2(kh) ≤ G < s∗L2((k + 1)h), thus proving the desired result. From s∗L2(t) > s∗L1(t)
for t ∈ [0, tˆL2 ], it also follows directly that tˆL2 < tˆL1as both, s∗L1(tˆL1) and s∗L2(tˆL2) are increasing
functions in tˆL1 , tˆL1 ∈ [0, D].
Note also, that in case the goal cannot be achieved within the allowed time t ∈ [0, D], Step
3 of the proof may be repeated for t = 3h, 4h, ...ph, where p is a positive integer such that
ph ≤ t < (p + 1). This can be done because Assumption 7, P ′′(s) > 0 holds if s < G. Thus,
s˙∗L2(t) > s˙
∗
L1
(t) also follows for t ∈ [0, D] if s∗L1(t∗L1) < G and s∗L2(t∗L2) < G (i.e. the goal can not
be achieved by a worker of either L1 and L2 skill levels). 
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Further, as a consequence of Hypothesis 4, we can also hypothesize what will happen with
the maximum work pace as follows.
Hypothesis 5 Under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline, the maximum observed
work pace increases when the skill level is increased.
Theorem 5 Give two myopic workers with skill levels L1 and L2 such that L2 = L1 + φ
and φ > 0, it holds that s˙∗L2(t
∗
L2
) > s˙∗L1(t
∗
L1
) where t∗L1 = arg(maxt∈[0,D] s˙L1(t)) and t
∗
L2
=
arg(maxt∈[0,D] s˙L2(t)) .
Proof To proof s˙∗L2(t
∗
L2
) > s˙∗L1(t
∗
L1
) we identify three possible cases.
Case I: s∗L2(t
∗
L2
) = s∗L1(t
∗
L1
) = G. This means the goal can be achieved by workers at both
skill levels within t ∈ [0, D]. From the proof of Theorem 4 it holds then for this case that
gL2(x) > gL1(x) for x ∈ R and hence it also holds that gL2 (−P
′
(G)) > gL1 (−P
′
(G)). This
implies that s˙∗L2(t
∗
L2
) > s˙∗L1(t
∗
L1
).
Case II : s∗L1(t
∗
L1
) < G and s∗L2(t
∗
L2
) = G. This means the goal can be achieved by the worker
of skill level L2, but not by the worker of skill level L1 within t ∈ [0, D]. To proof s˙∗L2(t∗L2) >
s˙∗L1(t
∗
L1
), we first relax the assigned deadline, D for a worker of skill level L1 defining a new
time at which the maximum work pace is obtained trL1 = arg(maxt∈[0,∞) s˙L1(t)). From this, we
obtain that s˙L1(t
r
L1
) > s˙L1(t
∗
L1
), as a finite goal G will at some time be achieved. However,
because gL2 (−P
′
(G)) > gL1 (−P
′
(G)), it holds that s˙L2(t
∗
L2
) > s˙L1(t
r
L1
) > s˙L1(t
∗
L1
).
Case III : sL1(t
∗
L1
) < G and sL2(t
∗
L2
) < G. This means the goal cannot be achieved by
workers at both skill levels within t ∈ [0, D]. The desired result follows directly from applying
Theorem 1 at t = D where it is known that the maximum work pace occurs, giving s˙L2(D) >
s˙L1(D).
We also note that because gL2(s˙(t)) > gL1(s˙(t)) and s˙L2(t) > s˙L1(t), for sL1(t) < G, it is
not possible to have a case where sL1(t
∗
L1
) < G and sL2(t
∗
L2
) = G. Note also that by Theorem
1 under no circumstance, can the maximum work pace be achieved after achieving the goal. As
cases I, II and III, are exhaustive, this proves the desired result. 
3.5.4 Effects of varying goals on total work
Once the effect of varying goals in work pace regulation has been identified, the effects on
total work can be identified under the myopic assumption. We therefore address the following
question, “What are the effects on individual performance (i.e. cumulative performance of an
individual measure at the end of the assigned period) if the goal difficulty (level) increases?”
(Question 1):
Hypothesis 6 The goal difficulty-total performance relation for a myopic worker is unimodal,
increasing and then decreasing on the assigned goal level.
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This goal difficulty-total performance relationship is consistent with the result of Erez and
Zidon (1984). However, unlike Erez and Zidon (1984) it does not require a lack of commitment
towards the goal as an explanation for why the total performance decreases if the goal exceeds
a certain threshold. In the case of a myopic worker, a possible explanation for a drop in total
performance when the goal exceeds a certain threshold is that a work pace regulation shift occurs
when a goal is increased. When the goal cannot be attained in the allocated period, increasing
the goal further results in a further shift of the work pace regulation curve. As motivation
increases the closer the worker is to achieving the goal, if the goal is still far enough away when
the deadline has been reached, these motivation gains will be diminished. For this reason, a
“clipping effect” exists, where the benefits of enhanced motivation by reaching the goal are
simply “clipped” if the goal cannot be attained before the assigned deadline (see Figure 3.3).
The following theorem describes Hypothesis 6 mathematically:
Theorem 6 Given an initial goal G1, increasing such a goal by δ > 0 such that G1 + δ, may
increase total individual performance such that ds
∗(D)
dδ > 0 iff sG1(D) < G, being the relationship
between goal increase and goal increase unimodal, such that d
2s∗(D)
dδ2
> 0. Otherwise if sG1(D) <
G an increase in the goal, decreases total individual performance such that ds
∗(D)
dδ < 0.
Proof To show this, we first formulate the problem of setting an optimal increment of a goal
for maximizing performance as follows:
max
δ≥0
∫ D
0
s˙∗G1+δ(t)dt (3.12)
Next, we use Theorem 2, s˙∗G2(τ) = s˙
∗
G1
(τ+θ) when G2 = G1+δ, to re-formulate the problem
of setting an optimal increase in the goal as setting an optimal shift θ as follows:
max
δ≥0
∫ D
0
s˙∗G1+δ(t)dt = maxθ≥0
∫ D
0
s˙∗G1(t+ θ)dt (3.13)
Evaluating the integrals yields the following problem:
max
θ
(s∗G1(D + θ)− s∗G1(θ)) (3.14)
Applying first order conditions and noting that dsdθ =
ds
dt · dtdθ and dtdθ = 1 we obtain the
following relationship:
s˙∗G1(D + θ) = s˙
∗
G1(θ) (3.15)
In order to analyze the second order conditions, we identify two cases. In the first case,
the initial goal G1 is achieved before the deadline, s∗G1(D) < G1. If this is the case, then
s¨∗G1(θ) > 0 and s¨
∗
G1
(G + θ) < 0, hence s¨∗G1(D + θ) − s¨∗G1(θ) < 0, showing the existence of a
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single maximum for 0 < θ < D. However, if s∗G1(D) > G1, then s¨
∗
G(D + θ) > s¨
∗
G(θ) > 0, hence
s¨∗G1(D + θ)− s¨∗G1(θ) > 0, implying that a positive shift with θ > 0 only decreases performance
and the minimum does not exist as the first order conditions will not hold. As θ increases, δ
also increases, thus proving the desired result. 
3.5.5 Effects of varying skills on total work
In this sub-section we address the question: “What are the effects on individual performance if
the skill level increases under influence of an assigned goal and deadline?” (Question 2). For a
myopic worker we propose an intuitive hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7 Under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline, if the skill of a myopic
worker increases, the total work (performance) will increase.
Although this hypothesis in this respect is intuitive, it’s proof is non-trivial. Moreover,
it is instructive to formulate a theorem and identify different cases where the gains in total
individual performance are obtained when skill levels are increased. We formulate Hypothesis 7
as the following formal theorem:
Theorem 7 Given two skill levels L1 and L2 such that L2 = L1+φ and φ > 0, the corresponding
cumulative work for each skill level at the deadline, s∗L2(D) and s
∗
L1
(D), are related as follows:
s∗L2(D) > s
∗
L1
(D).
Proof For proving Theorem 7, we follow a similar argumentation as in the proof of Theorem
5. The same cases apply as in the proof of Theorem 5 as follows:
Case I: s∗L2(t
∗
L2
) = s∗L1(t
∗
L1
) = G. This means the goal can be achieved by workers at both
skill levels within t ∈ [0, D]. To prove the relationship for this case, we use Euler’s approximation
to derive the behavior of s∗L2(D) and s
∗
L1
(D) for t ∈ (tˆL1 , D] and t ∈ (tˆL1 , D] respectively. Thus,
for an arbitrarily small h > 0, we obtain: s∗L1(tˆL1+h) ≈ s∗L1(t)+hgL1(−P
′
(G)) and s∗L2(tˆL2+h) ≈
s∗L2(t) + hgL2(−P
′
(G)). We first make two observations, s∗L1(tˆL1) = s˙
∗
L2
(tˆL2) = G and from the
proof of Theorem 4 it holds that gL2(x) > gL1(x) for x ∈ R. From these observations it then
follows that s∗L2(tˆL2 + h) > s
∗
L1
(tˆL1 + h). The approximation can then be continued for further
steps of h such that t = tˆL1 + 2h, tˆL1 + 3h...tˆL1 + mh and t = tˆL2 + 2h, tˆL2 + 3h...tˆL2 + mh
such that for a positive integer m it holds that tˆL1 + mh < D < tˆL1 + (m + 1)h. As limh→0
tˆL1 +mh = D, we then proved that s
∗
L2
(tˆL2 + (D − tˆL1) > s∗L1(D).
We also note that as tˆL2 < tˆL1 , it holds tˆL2+(D− tˆL1) < D. Since s∗L2(t) is increasing in time
t ∈ [0, D] (from the proof of Theorem 1), it follows that s∗L2(tˆL2+(D−tˆL1) > s∗L2(tˆL2+(D−tˆL1) >
s∗L1(D), thus proving the desired result.
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Case II: s∗L1(t
∗
L1
) < G and s∗L2(t
∗
L2
) = G. This means the goal can be achieved by the worker
of skill level L2, but not by the worker of skill level L1 within t ∈ [0, D]. Hence, by definition
s∗L2(D) > s
∗
L1
(D).
Case III: s∗L1(t
∗
L1
) < G and s∗L2(t
∗
L2
) < G. This means the goal cannot be achieved by
workers at both skill levels within t ∈ [0, D]. We then use the fact that s∗L2(t) > s˙∗L1(t) for
t ∈ [0, D] if s∗L1(t∗L1) < G and s∗L2(t∗L2) < G from theorem Theorem 4 and integrate, obtaining:∫ D
0 s˙
∗
L2
(t)dt >
∫ D
0 s˙
∗
L1
(t)dt, thus proving the desired result. 
3.6 Planner model
When we view workers as perfect planners, workers select their work pace taking into account
the utility gain to be accumulated within the time interval [0, D]. This is opposed to the view of
the worker exhibiting myopic behavior, where the selected work pace is based on the utility rate
gained at a given instant. We refer to the planners as “perfect” in the sense that they exhibit
time consistency in their preferences (Pollak, 1968) and therefore do not require a change in their
plan at any later point within the interval [0, D]. This is of course a simplifying assumption that
can later be contrasted with the work pace adjustments observed in subjects in the experiments
of Chapter 4. The sources of motivation are the same as the one used in the myopic model: work
pace related and goal related. As a result, we formulate the work pace selection (or equivalently,
the cumulative work progress) problem faced by a planner during the interval [0, D] as the
following calculus of variation problem:
max
s(t)
∫ D
0
[R(s˙(t)) + P
′
(s(t))s˙(t)]dt (3.16)
s.t.
s(0) = 0 (3.17)
3.6.1 Planner model work pace regulation
For the planner model, we ask again the first question: “How is the work pace regulated under
the influence of a given goal and deadline?” (Question 3). As the planner worker problem differs
from the myopic worker problem in the way decisions are made in the time horizon it is then
expected that the work pace regulation patterns would be different. In particular, we posit the
following hypothesis to characterize the work pace regulation of a planner worker:
Hypothesis 8 Under the influence of a goal and deadline, a planner worker will regulate his work
pace by selecting a time invariant work pace for the whole period that allows him to maximize
his total satisfaction for the period.
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This hypothesis may intuitively be interpreted as the scenario in which a worker works at
a constant work pace because when they consider the total desirability of performing for the
whole time horizon, there is no attractive reason to vary the work pace. Moreover, working at
two different work pace rates during the allowed time is undesirable as the derived utility is
lower than the total utility derived from working at a single work pace that is in-between those
selected. This is true due to the concavity of the utility-rate work pace function, R(s).
This hypothesis is consistent with that of Parkinson’s Law (1962) and Bryan and Locke
(1967) where individuals adjust their work pace to a certain level in order to be able to obtain
their goal, evidencing certain planning and anticipation of what work pace regulation policy
is preferred for the whole assigned period. Simultaneously, the result does not include the
acceleration effect towards the goal as in Hull (1932).
Hypothesis 8 can be re-written as the following theorem:
Theorem 8 Under the influence of a goal and deadline, a planner worker will work at a time
invariant work pace such that s¨∗(t) = 0 and s˙∗(t) = g(−P ′(Ds(D))for t = [0, D] where s˙∗(t) =
g(R
′
(s˙(t))).
Proof We prove this theorem by solving the calculus of variation model presented in Equations
3.16 and 3.17. We first remark that in solving this problem, the Euler equation can not be
applied because of a possible discontinuity of the function P ′(s) at s = G given Assumptions 6
and 7 (see Kamien and Schwartz (1991)). For this reason, we take an indirect approach. First,
we observe that the second, extrinsic motivation function, related term, can be integrated by
substitution, yielding the following:
∫ D
0
[P ′(s(t))s˙(t)]dt = P (s(t))|t=Dt=0 = P (s(D))− P (0) (3.18)
Equation 3.18 implies that the value of the second term in Equation 3.16 is only dependent
on the total work done at t = D. This means also that Equation 3.18 is independent of the
specific choice of work pace s˙(t) at each instant t ∈ [0, T ] as long as the cumulative work at
t = D remains constant. As a result, the variation of the work pace over the interval [0, D] is
fully determined by the first term in Equation 3.18, namely the work pace preference function
term:
max
s(t)
[∫ D
0
R(s˙(t))dt+ P (
∫ D
0
s˙(t)dt)
]
(3.19)
As R(s˙) and its derivative R′(s˙) are continuous, Euler’s equation may be applied to obtain
a maximum as follows.
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∂(R(s˙(t)))
∂s
=
d
(
∂(R(s˙(t)))
∂s˙
)
dt
(3.20)
Thus, applying the chain rule, it follows that:
0 =
dR′(s˙)
dt
= R(s˙)s¨ (3.21)
From Assumption 1, it is known that R(s˙) is concave, hence from Equation 3.21 it follows that
the work pace is constant as s¨∗(t) = 0, in the interval t ∈ [0, D] in order to maximize total
utility.
As the work pace is constant, the intrinsic motivation function R(s˙) is also a constant for
the entire interval t ∈ [0, D]. Hence, substituting in Equation 3.16 the dynamic optimization
problem of the planner model can be reduced into a static one at t = D (or any other arbitrary
time in the interval t ∈ [0, D]):
max
s˙(D)
R(s˙(D))D + P (Ds˙(D))− P (0) (3.22)
Applying first order conditions we obtain:
R′(s˙(D)) = −P ′(Ds˙(D)) (3.23)
Note that Equation 3.23 is similar to the marginal expression for the myopic model in
Equation 3.4, with the difference that the work pace and the cumulative work are evaluated
at the deadline (see Figure 3.5). Furthermore, using the same definition of g(.) such that
s˙(t) = g(R
′
(s˙(t))), the desired result, follows: s˙∗(t) = g(−P ′(Ds(D))for t = [0, D]. 
3.6.2 Effects of varying goals on work pace regulation and total
work
Acknowledging that the work pace is constant according to the worker planner model, conclu-
sions that apply to effects on work pace regulation also apply to total work. Only the following
simple conversion: s˙∗(t) = S
∗(D)
D , ∀t ∈ [0, D] needs to be done. Therefore, in this sub-section
we address the effects of varying goals on both, work pace regulation and total performance,
via the following questions: “What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty
(level) is increased?” (Question 5) and “What are the effects on total performance if the goal
difficulty (level) is increased?” (Question 1).
In evaluating the consequence of having a constant work pace when the worker is assumed
to plan, we propose two alternative hypotheses (i.e. Hypotheses 9 and 10) to answer Questions
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Figure 3.5: Work pace selection in the planner model
1 and 5 assuming planning behavior from the worker. Hypothesis 9 is equivalent to Hypothesis
6 for the myopic model:
Hypothesis 9 The goal difficulty–total performance (and constant work pace) relation for a
planningworker is unimodal, increasing and then decreasing on the assigned goal level. When an
assigned goal can be achieved during the allocated period, increasing the goal may increase total
performance (and constant work pace). Otherwise, when an assigned goal can not be achieved,
if such a goal is further increased, the goal may decrease total performance (and constant work
pace).
This hypothesis is again consistent with the relationship proposed by Erez and Zidon (1984).
The intuition behind Hypothesis 9 is nonetheless different. For sufficiently high work pace levels,
there is a decreasing intrinsic motivation for a higher work pace level (i.e. modeled with R(s˙)).
This implies that once the maximum performance is achieved, if the goal is further increased,
the selected work pace will be reduced to the point where the marginal decrements in the utility
rate derived from the work pace match those of the marginal increments in the utility derived
from performing with respect to the goal.
To formulate the theorem equivalent to Hypothesis 9, we then explicitly make the selected
cumulative work at time t = D dependent on the assigned goal G as follows: s∗(D,G). We can
now formulate the theorem as follows:
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Theorem 9 The individual total work function that depends on the goal is concave such that
if Ds˙∗(D,G) − G < 0, ds˙∗(D,G)dG > 0, ds
∗(D,G)
dG > 0 and if Ds˙
∗(D) − G > 0, then ds˙∗(D,G)dG >
0,ds
∗(D,G)
dG > 0.
Proof To prove a non-monotonic goal level-performance relationship, we follow a similar proce-
dure as the one found at Wu et al. (2004). First, we transform the utility performance function
so that it is explicitly a function of the assigned goal G, by defining a function V that makes
use of property Assumption 8 as follows:
V (s−G) = P (s) (3.24)
Next, using Equation 3.24 we differentiate Equation 3.23 implicitly with respect to the
assigned goal G:
R
′′
(s˙∗(D,G))
ds˙∗(D,G)
dG
= −V ′′(Ds˙∗(D,G)−G)
[
Dds˙∗(D,G)
dG
− 1
]
(3.25)
Rearranging, Equation 3.25 yields:
ds˙∗(D,G)
dG
=
V
′′
(Ds˙∗(D,G)−G)
R′′(s˙∗(D,G)) +DV ′′(Ds˙∗(D,G)−G) (3.26)
Replacing Equation 3.24 in Equation 3.23, we have that:
V ′(Ds˙∗(D,G)−G) = −P ′(Ds˙∗(D,G)) (3.27)
Notice now that if s˙∗(D,G) is decremented by an arbitrarily small h > 0, it holds from
Equation 3.27 that:
V ′(Ds˙(D)−G−Dh) > −R′(s˙(D)− h) (3.28)
From Equation 3.28, we note DV ′′(Ds˙∗(D) − G) < −R′′(s˙∗(D)) and DV ′′(Ds˙∗(D) − G) +
R
′′
(s˙∗(D)) < 0. This implies that iff V ′′(Ds˙∗(D) − G) > 0 (i.e. which occurs according to
Assumption 7 when Ds˙(D) − G < 0), then ds˙∗(D,G)dG > 0 and ds
∗(D,G)
dG > 0. This implies that
if a worker is already able to accomplish the goal before the deadline, then increasing the goal
will increase total performance (and average work pace). If, however V ′′(Ds˙∗(D)−G) < 0 (by
Assumption 7 occurs when Ds˙∗(D)−G > 0) then ds˙∗(D,G)dG < 0 and ds
∗(D,G)
dG > 0. In this case,
if a worker is not able to accomplish the goal before the deadline, then increasing the goal will
result in a decrease of total performance, proving the desired result. 
It is possible to formulate another hypothesis regarding the goal level–total individual perfor-
mance relationship which is consistent with the report of Locke and Latham (1982), and indeed
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represents a majoritarian view on the field (Locke and Latham, 1990)(Locke and Latham, 1990),
provided commitment towards the goal exists:
Hypothesis 10 The goal difficulty–total performance relation for a planner worker is strictly
increasing with diminishing returns until converging to a threshold given by the limits of the
worker’s ability.
Theorem 10 If for a planner worker it also holds that maxG s˙∗(D,G) ≈ L, then lims˙∗(D)→L−
ds∗(D,G)
dG = lims˙∗(D)→L+
ds∗(D,G)
dG = 0 and lims˙∗(D)→L−
ds˙∗(D,G)
dG = lims˙∗(D)→L+
ds∗(D,G)
dG = 0.
Proof If we assume that maxG s˙∗(D,G) ≈ L may hold, then we may apply Assumption 3,
lims˙↑L− R′′(s˙) = −∞, and then it follows from Equation 3.26 that lims˙∗(D)→L− ds˙
∗(D,G)
dG =
lims˙∗(D)→L+
ds˙∗(D,G)
dG = 0. 
This proof shows that for cases where workers are relatively insensitive to changes in their
work pace, but at the same time it is extremely undesirable to work near the skill level L (by
Assumption 3), varying the goal may exhibit a quasi non-decreasing pattern, stabilizing at a
threshold near the maximum skill level L (see Figure 3.6). It is also important to observe that
in this case, the planner model becomes more consistent with that of a constraint model, where
performance is simply bounded by the skill level L.
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3.6.3 Effects of varying skills on work pace regulation and total
work
As in the previous sub-section, we simultaneously address the effects of skills on work pace reg-
ulation and total work by providing answers to the questions:“What are the effects on work pace
regulation if the skill level is increased under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline?”
(Question 6) and “What are the effects on individual performance if the skill level increases
under the influence of an assigned goal and deadline?” (Question 2). For this we formulate the
following intuitive hypothesis:
Hypothesis 11 If a planner worker has a higher skill level than another one, the time-invariant
selected work pace of the worker with a higher skill level is higher than the worker with the lower
skill.
Hypothesis 11 may then be formalized with the following theorem:
Theorem 11 Given two myopic workers with skill levels L1 and L2 such that L2 = L1 +φ and
φ > 0, it holds that s˙∗L2(t) > s˙
∗
L1
(t) for t ∈ [0, D] and s∗L2(D) > s∗L1(D) . It also holds that
tˆL2 < tˆL1 if tˆL1 , tˆL2 ∈ [0, D].
Proof The proof follows directly by using the same reasoning as in Step 1 of the proof of
Theorem 4, where it holds that gL2(x) > gL1(x) for x ∈ R. Thus, it holds at t = D that at
t = D, that gL1(P
′
(s(D))) > gL1(P
′
(s(D))) and thus, s˙L2(D) > s˙L1(D) and sL2(D) > sL1(D).

3.7 Overview and discussion
In this cha pter we have developed propositions regarding the possible effects of varying the
goal level (difficulty) and skill level on performance and work pace regulation. Our framework
starts by treating the worker as a decision maker himself who, in the tradition of the Behavioral
Economics field, wishes to maximize his level of a desirability for a given effort level. The decision
models we present here are parsimonious by including only a limited number of assumptions that
are documented in the literature regarding work pace as a stressor and evaluation of performance.
Table 3.1 summarizes the assumptions made in the building blocks of the models: the intrinsic
and extrinsic evaluation and the support from the literature for them.
The propositions are derived under two different views on how the selection of work pace
over time is made. In the first point of view, workers are said to be myopic because workers only
consider the satisfaction obtained in the present to select their work pace. In the second point
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of view, workers are said to be planners because they consider the total satisfaction derived over
the whole available period to reach the goal given an assigned deadline. Tables 3.2 (for total
performance) and 3.3 (for work pace) provide a summary of the propositions presented in this
chapter as possible answers to the research questions presented in Section 3.2. The propositions
are compared to what is known in the existing literature.
Table 3.2: Goal difficulty-performance investigation overview
Evidence
Questions and Answers Literature Decision model
Question 1 What are the effects on individual performance (i.e. cumulative performance of an individual
measured at the end of the assigned period) if the goal difficulty (level) increases?
Possible answer 1
The goal difficulty-total performance relation for a myopic
worker is unimodal, increasing and then decreasing on the
assigned goal level (Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 9).
Erez and Zidon (1984) Theorem 6 (Myopic
model)
Theorem 9 (Planner
model)
Possible answer 2
Total performance increases and then remains constant (levels
off) with goal difficulty (Hypothesis 10).
Locke and Latham
(1982 and 1990)
Theorem 10 (Planner
model)
Question 2 What are the effects on individual performance if the skill level increases under the influence of
an assigned goal and deadline?
Possible answer 1
Performance (total work) increases given a skill increase
(Hypothesis 7 (Myopic model) and Hypothesis 11(Planner
model)).
Erez and Zidon (1984) Theorem 7
Theorem 11
Question 3 What are the interaction effects of increasing goal difficulty (level) and skill level on individual
performance?
Possible answer 1
Possible interactions may exist, although we do not make a-
priori hypothesis.
Erez and Zidon (1984)
These comparisons highlight the advantage of formulating decision making models for theory
building by linking different results on performance and work pace regulation within a single
model. When the derived propositions are compared to reports in the literature, it can be
observed that a myopic model may account for the reported acceleration towards the goal (Hull,
1932; See et al., 2006). In addition, it is seen that a goal level-performance relationship which
levels-off can only be explained in the proposed framework with the additional assumption of
an increase in the work pace over the natural work pace thereby resulting in only marginal
decrements up to the proximity of the skill level. We also see that other propositions can be
derived to which there is no documentation in the literature, in particular what happens if skills
are varied in a goal-setting context. Furthermore, the results are organized by type of model,
whereas a myopic model links the goal gradient hypothesis with a non-monotonic goal level-
performance relationship, the planner model links a steady-state work pace regulation with a
Table 3.3: Work pace regulation investigation overview
Evidence
Questions and Answers Literature Decision model and
justification
Question 4 How is the work pace regulated under the influence of a given goal and deadline?
Possible answer 1
A worker will accelerate towards the goal, reaching its maxi-
mum work-pace when he reaches the goal and then decelerate
converging to the natural work pace if enough time is allowed
(Hypothesis 1).
Goal gradient hypoth-
esis (Hull, 1932; See et
al., 2006 and Kivetz et
al., 2006)
Theorem 1
(Myopic model)
Possible answer 2
A worker will set a time invariant work pace for the whole
period (Hypothesis 8).
The alternative hy-
pothesis, if there is no
acceleration towards
the goal.
Theorem 8
(Planner model)
Question 5 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty (level) is increased?
Possible answer 1
The work pace selected is shifted for the whole period by a
constant lapse in time (Hypothesis 2).
When a higher goal is assigned, workers will start working at
a lower work pace (Hypothesis 3).
Goal gradient hypoth-
esis (Hull, 1932; See et
al., 2006 and Kivetz et
al., 2006).
Theorem 2
(Myopic model)
Theorem 3
(Myopic model)
Possible answer 2
If the goal increases, the constant work pace increases, other-
wise it decreases (Hypothesis 9).
Consistent with
Parkinson Law (1962)
of work pace adjust-
ment according to goal
demands.
Theorem 9
(Planner model)
Question 6 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the skill level is increased when a goal is assigned?
Possible answer 1
If a worker has a higher skill level than another one, the se-
lected work pace of the worker with a higher skill level is higher
as long as the goal has not yet been achieved (when the skill
level is increased (Hypothesis 4).
The maximum observed work pace increases when the skill
level is increased (Hypothesis 5).
The literature has not
investigated this ques-
tion.
Theorem 4
(Myopic model)
Theorem 5
(Myopic model)
Possible answer 2
If a worker has a higher skill level than another one, the time-
invariant selected work pace of the worker with a higher skill
level is higher than the worker with the lower skill (Hypothesis
11).
The literature has not
investigated this ques-
tion.
Theorem 11
Planner model
Question 7 What are the effects on work pace regulation when the skill level assigned goal interact?
Possible answer 1
Possible interactions may exist, although we do not make a-
priori hypothesis.
The literature has not
investigated this ques-
tion.
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non-monotonic relationship that may “appear” as a monotonic one if the maximum work pace
chosen converges to that of the skill level limit.
Given that a priori it is not possible to know which of the propositions presented in this
chapter are correct, the validity of the propositions and models are tested in Chapter 4. It is
expected that more complex behavior is observed in the matter of work pace regulation over
time than the one exposed in this chapter. In particular, work pace adjustment behavior may
exist (or plan revision), where deviations from the ideal work pace trajectory and the actual
work pace trajectory are minimized (Carver and Scheier, 1998). Nonetheless, the fact that the
models proposed in this chapter, stylized with simple properties, allows for comparison of the
basic features of the goal level-performance relationship and work pace regulation found in the
experimental studies of Chapter 4.
Another potential value of the models presented in this chapter is that once one of the
alternative views is validated, modelers and practitioners may have an additional tool to forecast
possible work pace regulation of workers given different assigned goals, deadlines and skill level
scenarios. Furthermore, the results may be aggregated to a number of heterogeneously skilled
workers. The proposed models are also easily extended to include learning and fatigue effects
as part of the utility rate work pace function, creating temporal shifts of maximum and most
comfortable levels of capacity. In sum, all this information may be included in simulation studies
of particular production systems or even decision support systems that consider assigned goals
as a selection variable.

Chapter 4
Behavioral goal setting models for
operations management: An
empirical approach
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we stressed the need for studying the assignment of performance goals and dead-
lines from an operations management perspective. The potential productivity benefits associated
with goal assignment (Locke and Latham, 1990) and the fact goal assignment is an additional
variable at the disposal of production managers that is not considered in most operations man-
agement models (Boudreau et al., 2003), were cited as important reasons for studying goals from
an operations management perspective.
In fact, questions remain from an operations management perspective that will be studied
in this chapter. A primary question is whether the goal-level–performance relationship is non-
monotonic or non-decreasing (converging to a certain threshold). This is a question that needs
to be answered to be able to assign optimal goals in operational contexts. It is also necessary to
validate previous results from the literature on the goal-level-performance relationship for oper-
ational contexts. In particular, we consider the common operational context in which workers
are assigned to shifts and block times and thus are given a fixed deadline to achieve their goal,
which they can also overachieve.
A second question is how the work pace is regulated while workers aim to achieve a goal. From
a modeling perspective, operational models predominantly assume that workers process jobs at
a steady state. It is then relevant to verify if this assumption is justified under the influence of
goals. A proper characterization of work pace regulation is also important for managers who
want to monitor the progress of their workers towards the goal and wish to estimate if these are
attainable. This is particularly true given previous reports that workers accelerate towards a
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goal. This phenomenon, however, occurred in cases where workers could stop when they reached
their goal. These contexts are different from the contexts studied in this chapter, where workers
work for fixed periods. If workers can produce more than the goal, such extra productivity is
desirable for managers and to a certain extent, the workers.
Finally, in studying the goal-level-performance relationship in conjunction with work pace
regulation it is important to understand the effects of varying skill levels (i.e. maximum work
capacity). In any group of people, individuals have different capabilities, some individuals have
a greater capacity to perform than others (Doerr and Arreola-Risa, 2000). Studying the goal-
level-performance relationship while discriminating results across skill levels permits us to further
characterize the relationship and identify which features are governed by the skill level of an
individual. Studying work pace regulation patterns while acknowledging varying skill levels, has
the potential to reveal insights to the key question of whether the assigned goal really forces a
worker to work to the best of his ability.
In this chapter, we test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3 regarding the effects of vary-
ing goals and skills on performance and work pace regulation over time within an operations
management context. These hypotheses are possible answers to the questions posited in Sec-
tion 3.2 of this thesis and summarized in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Chapter 3 provided alternative
hypotheses by deriving two alternative decision making models. In the first model, the workers
where assumed to behave in a myopic manner, selecting their work pace by considering only
the instantaneous desirability of a given work pace. In the second model, the workers where
assumed to behave as planners, selecting their work pace by considering the total desirability
of the selected work pace accumulated until the assigned deadline. Determining which model is
most consistent with empirical evidence, has in itself a theoretical value for goal setting theory
and can serve as a first step in modeling goal setting behavior in workers.
For testing the hypotheses derived from our alternative decision making models of the worker,
we conducted a controlled, repeated-measure lab experiment where difficulty levels were varied
while performance as well as work pace regulation were observed. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to directly test goal setting phenomena from the perspective of work pace
regulation. Not only do we register total performance, but also the instants at which each
job is completed. In addition, the experimental study allows for studying trade-offs between
productivity and quality and assesses how performance is evaluated with respect to the goal
(an indirect measure of frustration) with the purpose of evaluating the limitations of assigning
goals in an operational context. Statistical tests are then used to accept/refute the hypotheses
posited in Chapter 3, analyzing differences across and within individuals.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2, describes the method used for testing the
aforementioned hypotheses in an experimental setting. We start presenting the results of our
experiment in Section 4.3 where we attempt to shed light to the internal process that makes
goals work; i.e. how goals fix expectations. Next, in Section 4.4, we report the results of the
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experiment on the total performance effects seen when varying goals and skills. Similarly, Section
4.5, reports the results of the experiment on the work pace regulation effects seen when varying
goals and skills. In Section 5, we present the results regarding the internal process that makes
goals work; i.e. how goals fix expectations. Section 6, presents results on limitations in assigning
goals, namely, the trade-offs between performance gains and quality levels. Finally, we conclude
this chapter by presenting a discussion of the key findings, limitations and implications for
operations management of the study in Sections 7, 8 and 9 respectively.
4.2 Method
In this section we describe the methodology used for testing the hypothesis summarized in Tables
3.3 and 3.4 of Chapter 3 through a laboratory experiment. A laboratory based experiment is
advantageous over a field study in that it controls goal difficulty in a precise manner where
the influence of unsystematic variation is minimized. Unexpected breakdowns, distractions or
interference between workers that are common in operational contexts are avoided.
4.2.1 Sample
The participants for the experiment were recruited from a participantpool of 1st and 2nd year
bachelor students of business administration. For a pilot study undertaken to set the conditions
of the experiment and check the effectiveness of feedback in the experiment, other, n = 36
students were recruited. A separate set of n = 81 students were recruited for the actual experi-
ment. All participants received two course extra–credits regardless of their performance in the
experiment. Although we acknowledge that differences may exist in simulating working condi-
tions using students as compared to real workers, we note that goal setting experiments have in
general replicated results from the laboratory in the field (Locke and Latham, 1990). Moreover,
the designed experiment remains adequate for the purpose of our study which is to study the
theorized effects of varying goal difficulty in performance as well as in work pace and not to
arrive to conclusions regarding the size of effects which may vary across operational contexts
(Highhouse, 2009).
4.2.2 Experiment design
The experiment conducted has a within-participants design. This means that participants in the
experiment were exposed to all experimental conditions as opposed to a between-participants
design where participants are assigned randomly to only one condition. The three conditions of
the experiment consisted of three varying levels of goal difficulty.
We note here that because repeated measurements were taken to observe work pace regu-
lation patterns, the probability of not observing consistent differences in such patterns across
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different goal conditions increases. For this reason, the experiment had to be designed to ensure
the highest statistical power possible, avoiding individual differences to account for observed
differences in response. Therefore, we selected a within-participants design that ensures that
the source of the response variation is due to the different treatments (i.e. goal levels) and not
due to individual differences across treatment groups as occurs with between-participants ex-
periment designs (Kantowitz et al., 2008). In addition, the within-participants approach allows
for direct comparisons of performance and work pace regulation for given individuals.
A within-participants design does have the drawback of the possibility of carry-over effects.
In our case, those effects may be in the form of fatigue or additional adaptation of the worker’s
performance evaluation given past goals and performance (Mezias et al., 2002). To mitigate the
influence of these effects on the results a number of actions were undertaken.
First, the sequence at which each goal difficulty level was presented was randomized to
average out any goal-anchoring and fatigue effects. Importantly, this is an advantage over the
Erez and Zidon (1984) goal difficulty–performance study, where participants were presented with
increasing goal levels, allowing for the confounding of variables. Next, to minimize fatigue effects
participants were allowed to rest and stretch for 1 minute after each picking round of 8 minutes.
To avoid learning effects a supervised training round of 4 minutes was conducted first, where
the experimenter verified that the exact procedure was followed by the participant. Finally, to
ensure that sequence effects were not present, control variables indicating the sequence by which
an assigned goal was introduced, were included in the subsequent statistical analysis.
4.2.3 Experimental task
Participants were asked to conduct a simple simulated order picking task. In the experiment,
each participants was told to imagine himself as a worker in a warehouse. The task was simple
enough to be learned quickly (in less than 4 minutes) and sufficiently short cycled enough (less
than 12 seconds) for an individual to be able to observe progress towards the goal and judge
his ability with respect to a goal. The experiment layout is shown in Figure 4.1. The simulated
order picking task consisted of the following steps: (1) receiving instructions indicating the bin
to pick from (Bin 1, 2 or 3), (2) walking to the corresponding bin, (3) retrieving a packaged stack
of 200 post-its (acting as a product, 0.3 cm thick) from the corresponding bin, (4) walking back
to the terminal, (5) typing the 4-digit number printed at both sides of the post-it (acting as the
product code), (6) dropping the post-it stack in a drop-bin and (7) confirming the pick pressing
enter at the terminal’s keyboard. The correctness of a pick was evaluated by verifying whether
the 4-digit number corresponded to that of the selected bin. The participants were advised that
only correct picks were counted towards an assigned goal. Therefore, quality, although not a
goal in itself, constrained the work pace as incorrect picks implied unproductive and undesirable
time spent towards the goal. To minimize errors, participants were asked to use only the number
pad of the key-board. Only keys that corresponded to digits were enabled.
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Figure 4.1: Experiment layout and order picking cycle
Feedback was constantly shown on the screen indicating the assigned goal, the time left
remaining until the deadline and the number of picks accomplished (see Figure 4.2 for a screen-
shot of the interface shown to participants). The questions, instructions and interactive screens
were all implemented using Macromedia Authoware 7TM. In a pilot study it was found that
the visual feedback competes in attention with the instructions of which bin to pick as well
as the 4-digit number. Hence, to assure that the participants were aware of their progress,
computerized voice feedback was also given every 2 minutes indicating the number of picks
achieved and the time left. The effectiveness of the auditory feedback was confirmed with
a follow-up question regarding the participants’ awareness of the feedback. When the goal
was achieved, the bold letters on the screen changed color form black to green. In a posterior
debriefing 86% of participants reported being aware when they were proximal to the goal. Follow-
up questions in pilot studies showed that participants were aware of when they achieved their
goal. Lastly, if the pick was incorrect, a message on the screen indicated this and the participant
was asked to pick a new “product” (i.e. another post-it).
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Figure 4.2: Screen-shot during picking rounds
Each participant was presented with three different picking rounds lasting 8 minutes each.
The goal was stated as a number of picks that must be achieved within the time span of the
round. Participants (n = 81) were requested to pick either 47, 59 or 66 products in 8 minutes.
Each goal corresponds to a fixed percentage of participants in the pre-test that were told to “Do
their best” (n = 36) and were able to achieve the goal. In this way for a goal of 47 picks, 90%
of the pre-test participants were able to achieve it, whereas for a goal of 59 picks, 50% were
able to achieve it and finally, for a goal of 66 picks, only 10% were able to achieve it. These
percentages were fixed following the recommendation of Locke and Latham (1990) to observe
significant differences in performance.
As stated in Chapter 3, our study assumes commitment to achieve the goal by assigning a
realistic goal. Indeed, Locke and Latham (1990) have observed from several experiments that
goal commitment is generally the case as long as goals remain realistic. In Erez and Zidon
(1984), participants where committed towards the goal up to the point where only 10% of the
population were able to attain it. This corresponds to our most difficult goal, fixed at the 90th
percentile of ability.
However, to enhance commitment and realism, at the start of the experiment participants
were told that they will be evaluated by comparing their actual performance to the actual goal, by
a hypothetical boss. Moreover, they were told that repeatedly over-achieving (underachieving)
the goal in a working setting will yield desirable (undesirable) consequences for their job such
as paid bonuses, promotions, prizes (penalties, being fired). This ambiguous and long term
link between achieving (underachieving) the goal and positive (negative) consequences is in fact
quite realistic in jobs that do not apply piece-rate systems. In those jobs, it is consistency
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in (not-)achieving the goals assigned that is rewarded (punished), this avoids “speculation” of
performance.
In addition, to measure the workers’ skill level (or maximum capacity to perform, denoted
by L in Chapter 3) and most comfortable work pace level (denoted by n in Chapter 3), two
additional picking rounds were conducted. These picking rounds correspond to the second and
third picking rounds presented to participants (before the three picking rounds with assigned
goal difficulty). The second picking round asked participants to work at their most comfortable
work pace (i.e. n) while the third picking round asked participants to work at their highest work
pace possible (i.e. L).
4.2.4 Measurements
Skill measurement
In Chapter 3, we refer to the skill level L as the maximum work pace an individual can
achieve. We acknowledge that certain participants may not be willing to reach their maximum
work pace for a brief period when told to do their best. Therefore, it is difficult to verify
such willingness by only observing behavior. As a solution, we propose a proxy for the skill of
participants by averaging the corresponding work pace of the 10 fastest cycle times performed in
the “do your best” picking round. For the effect of subsequent analysis, we then identified four
quartiles of performance, classifying the participants according to their skill level (i.e. Skill Level
1, 2, 3 and 4) such that skill Level 4 corresponds to the top 25 % of performers. The validity
of this proxy was checked by the analysis itself, where the skill proxy was able to discriminate
between patterns of work pace regulation and results of total performance.
Performance measurement
To measure production performance, the number of correct picks were tallied for each picking
round. Furthermore, the work pace was measured by registering the time stamp at which a pick
is confirmed (i.e. when the participant presses enter on the keyboard). The incorrect picks were
also registered so as to tally the number of incorrect picks and be able to derive relative quality
measures (i.e. number of correct picks over total number of picks).
Performance evaluation measurement
The extrinsic motivation was studied before every goal picking (47, 59 and 67 picks) round
by asking workers to evaluate their level of satisfaction with their own performance for different
hypothetical levels of performance by using a 0 to 100 scale rating (with a 10 point increment).
The hypothetical levels of performance were 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 and 120% of the assigned goal.
However, it must be noted that only absolute values of performance were given as opposed to
relative values with respect to the goal to avoid any calculating behavior and repetition in the
answers.
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The purpose of this performance evaluation measurement is to validate an “S-shaped” util-
ity function of performance as described in Chapter 3. For this reason, positive and negative
evaluations were not discriminated when participants were asked to report their levels of sat-
isfaction. If a positive and a negative scale of performance evaluation were offered, this may
have resulted in a normalization of reported scores in both scales. For our purposes, a normal-
ization of scores in both scales was undesirable as one of the key characteristics to validate the
“S-shaped” utility–performance function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is that of loss aversion,
and this would not have been verifiable with a normalization of reported scores.
4.2.5 Statistical methods
To test the hypotheses provided in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for answering the corresponding research
questions, we conducted a series of statistical procedures. In this sub-section we detail the
statistical procedures followed in our analysis of total performance (i.e. Questions 1, 2 and 3)
and work pace regulation (i.e. Questions 4, 5, 6 and 7).
Total performance analysis
In this case, the dependent variable is total cumulative performance for a participant mea-
sured at the deadline, denoted in Chapter 3 as s(D). To compare total individual performance
across experimental conditions (i.e. goal levels) an ANOVA repeated measures test was used
because each participant was exposed to all three experimental conditions, making the three
samples for each experimental condition related (Field, 2005). Furthermore, to explore the
differences between particular experimental conditions, contrasts were preferred as opposed to
repeated pairwise t-tests so as to avoid inflation of the total error when repeatedly comparing
means (Field, 2005).
Work pace analysis
As the dependent variable is the work pace over time, we first describe how this measure is
derived from the data obtained. First, the cycle-time for each pick was calculated by subtracting
the time stamp at which the pick was started from the time stamp at which the pick was
completed. Note that the corresponding starting time stamp is either the time stamp of the
previous completed pick or the time stamp of the start of the picking round. Each cycle time
corresponding to a correct pick was then inverted to calculate the corresponding work pace for
each pick. Next, the work pace results of the 8 minute-period picking rounds where divided
in 16 intervals of 30 seconds each. The work pace for each completed pick was assigned to
the corresponding time interval in which the pick was completed. Finally, all the work paces
corresponding to each interval were averaged, obtaining an average for the work pace.
Discretizing time into 16 intervals enabled comparison of work pace regulation across partic-
ipants and also serves the purpose of smoothing out irregularities in performance, allowing for
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an easier identification of trends in work pace regulation. Moreover, by calculating the average
work pace of completed picks per interval, the first and last time interval work pace measures
were not affected by incomplete picks.
Although only correct picks were considered for evaluating the total performance, for the
purpose of work pace analysis, the incorrect picks were also tallied and considered within each
interval of analysis. The reason for this procedure is that the intervals contain on average very
few picks (i.e. only 2.5 – 5 picks per time interval) and considering the time spent in a wrong pick
as unproductive distorts the work pace regulation trends which we are interested in analyzing.
To analyze work pace regulation over time, given certain goals and certain skills, we con-
ducted a linear model analysis. Given the experiment design, the data available has a structure
where a pick is embedded within a picking round which in turn is embedded within a participant
that executes the picks. This structure implies that the independence of violations is violated
by construction of the experiment, where observations in a single picking round for a given
participant are more related to each other than observations from different picking rounds and
different participants. For this reason, the analysis should not be done using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) procedure, as such a procedure assumes independence of observations.
To solve the problem of dependency of observations in a given structure, we conducted a
Multilevel Linear Model (MLM) also referred to as Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM), (Gelman
and Hill, 2007) where the structure of the data can be modeled explicitly such that the intercept
and slope of time are allowed to vary according to the picking round and participant. Moreover,
the effect of the goal level assigned and skill level of the participant were modeled at the corre-
sponding level of analysis; the former at the picking round level (Level 2) and the latter at the
participant level (Level 3).
We then structure, the nested model as follows, where 15 observations, k = 0, 1, ..., 14, of the
30-second intervals are nested within a picking round j = 1, 2, 3 and a picking round is nested
within a participant i = 1, 2, .., 81. It is important to note here that observations of the last time
interval (i.e. 450 − 480 seconds) are dropped from the analysis as Figure 4.7 suggests a break
in trend that we further discuss in analyzing Question 4. With this structure, we introduce the
following notation for variables and indices:
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Additional indexes
mj : Index variable indicating goal assigned at picking round j.
If mj= 1, the goal is 47 picks, if mj= 2, the goal is 59 picks, if mj= 3,
the goal is 66 picks.
ni : Index variable indicating skill level of participant i.
The number ni= 1, 2, 3, 4 indicates the skill level where ni= 4, implies
that participant i belongs to
the top 25% of performers and ni= 1, implies that participant i belongs
to the bottom 25%.
Dependent variable
s˙i,j,k : Average work pace in picks/minute at the kth interval in the jth round
executed by participant i.
Control variables
Hi,j Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant i executing a goal in picking
round j has executed in a
previous picking round a goal of 66 picks (i.e. mj−1= 3 or mj−2= 3); 0
otherwise.
SQ
(o)
i,j Dummy variable indicating the picking round sequence. If the picking
round j of picker i, equals o
then the variable equals 1; 0 otherwise. Note that o = 1, 2 (o = 3 is the
default).
Independent variables
ti,j,k Time instant in minutes at which the average work pace of participant
i was measured for the
jth round at the end of kth measurement interval.
G
(m)
i,j : Dummy variable that equals 1 if goal m is assigned to the jth round to
the ith participant and 0
otherwise. Note that m = 1, 2 (m = 3 is the default).
L
(n)
i : Dummy variable that equals 1 if skill level n is assigned to the ith
participant and 0
otherwise. Note that n = 2, 3, 4 (n = 1 is the default).
The parameters and error terms to be estimated are described as follows:
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Estimation parameters
βa,i,j : Parameter to be estimated for the jth round picked by the ith partici-
pant; a = 0 refers to intercept
estimate, a = 1 refers to slope intercept.
δb,m,i : Parameter to be estimated for the ith participant (if applicable) when
goal m is assigned (if m > 0);
b = 0 refers to intercept estimate, b = 1 refers to slope intercept.
ηo : Parameter for control variables, n = 1 is associated to the first picking
round, n = 2 to the second
picking round and n = 3 to the dummy variable Hi,j .
γc,m,n : Parameter to be estimated for assigned goal m and participant of skill
level n; c = 0 refers to intercept
estimate, c = 1 refers to slope intercept.
Error terms
ei,j,k : Random term in the model associated with the kth interval in the jth
round picked by participant i.
u0,i,j : Random term associated with the intercept of the model that depends
on the jth picking round
and the ith participant.
u1,i,j : Random term associated with the slope of the model (time) that depends
on the jth picking
round and the ith participant.
v0,0,j : Random term associated with the intercept of the model that depends
on the jth participant.
v1,0,j : Random term associated with the slope of the model that depends on
the jth participant when goal
m = 1 is assigned.
v1,1,j : Random term associated with the slope of the model (time) that depends
on the jth participant when
goal m = 2 is assigned.
v1,2,j : Random term associated with the slope of the model (time) that depends
on the jth participant when
goal m = 3 is assigned.
Hence, we define the hierarchical model as follows:
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Level 0: Picking interval k
s˙i,j,k= β0,i,j+β1,i,jti,j,k+ei,j,k
Level 1: Picking round j
β0,i,j= δ0,0,i+δ0,1G
(1)
i,,j+δ0,2G
(2)
i,,j+η1SQ
(1)
i,j + η2SQ
(2)
i,j + η3Hi,j + u0,i,j
β1,i,j= δ1,0,i+δ1,1,iG
(1)
i,,j+δ1,2,iG
(2)
i,,j+u1,i,j
Level 2: Participant i
δ0,0,i= γ0,0,0+γ0,0,1L
(2)
i +γ0,0,2L
(3)
i +γ0,0,3L
(4)
i +v0,0,i
δ1,0,i= γ1,0,0+γ1,0,1L
(2)
i +γ1,0,2L
(3)
i +γ1,0,3L
(4)
i +v1,0,i
δ1,1,i= γ1,1,0+γ1,1,1L
(2)
i +γ1,1,2L
(3)
i +γ1,1,3L
(4)
i +v1,1,i
δ1,2,i= γ1,2,0+γ1,2,1L
(2)
i +γ1,2,2L
(3)
i +γ1,2,2L
(4)
i +v1,2,i
The model can then be summarized in one level, as follows, showing the fixed intercept and
slope effects as well as the random effects of the model:
s˙i,j,k=
(
γ0,0,0 +
∑2
m=1 δ0,mG
(m)
i,j +
∑2
o=1 ηoSQ
(o)
i,j + η3,jHi,j+
∑4
n=2 γ0,0,(n−1)L
(n)
i
)
+
(
γ1,0,0 +
∑2
m=1 γ1,m,0G
(m)
i,j +
∑4
n=2 γ1,0,(n−1)L
(n)
i
+
∑4
n=2
∑2
m=1 γ1,m,(n−1)L
(n)
i G
(m)
i,j
)
ti,j,k
+u0,i,j+v0,0,i+(u1,i,j+
∑2
m=1 v1,m,i)ti,j,k+ei,j,k
The model allows us to evaluate the selection of the initial work pace and its determinants
(i.e. goal level, skill levels and/or an interaction of both) as well as determinants of a linear
tendency in work pace regulation (i.e. goal level, skill levels and/or an interaction of both).
In addition, to control for carry-over effects, a number of variables were introduced. First, to
account for fatigue, the dummy variables SQ(1)i,j and SQ
(2)
i,j indicated the sequence by which the
picking round was presented to the picker (o = 3 was taken as the reference value). The variable
Hi,j was used to see the impact of being exposed to the most difficult goal earlier (i.e. 66 picks).
4.3 Performance evaluation
In Chapter 3, an S-shaped utility performance function, P (s), was proposed as a way by which
workers evaluate their individual performance given an external goal. The proposed function
shared characteristics common to prospect theory utility curves (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
The empirical results shown in Figure 4.3 provides evidence that supports all the main charac-
teristics proposed of a typical prospect theory curve: 1) the goal serves as a reference point, 2)
loss aversion and 3) diminishing sensitivity.
The first property can be verified indirectly as it can be seen that a maximum increase in
satisfaction with performance occurs for performance levels that are proximate to the assigned
goal and also proximate to the point where the concavity of the curve changes. The second
property can be verified by comparing the available score ranges above and below the inflection
point where the goal is attained that serves as a reference point. The negative ranges (below the
satisfaction level obtained at a performance level matching the goal) are 4-times larger than the
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Figure 4.3: Empirical “S-shaped” performance evaluation curve across goals
positive ones (above the satisfaction level obtained at a performance level matching the goal - see
Figure 4.3), thus providing evidence for loss aversion. The third property is also easily verified
by noting a decrease in the gradient of the curve shown in Figure 4.3 when the performance
level is more distant to the assigned goal.
We note, however, that the curve in Figure 4.3 “flattens” only for performance levels larger
than the goal assigned, whereas for performance levels lower than the goal assigned the gradient
of the curve does not flatten completely. This suggests that if a myopic model is applied, as
studied in Chapter 3, an acceleration towards the goal should occur almost from the start of the
activity. As the results show that no such acceleration occurs, this is an additional argument
to support the planning model over the myopic model where any acceleration effects towards
the goal are smoothed out. In addition, this effect, contradicts earlier reports of acceleration
towards the goal (e.g. See et al., 2006) where the acceleration is only observed in proximity of
the goal, but not from the start of the activity.
Furthermore, we also have support for the assumption of our model that the “S-curve” shifts
to the right when the goal is increased. However, the effect is more complex than hypothesized a
priori as not only a shift to the right along the horizontal axis exists, but the reference point also
varies (i.e. “floats”) across goal conditions. Figure 4.3 shows that the desirability obtained at
different goals, i.e. reference points, actually increases, from this we may infer what is common
wisdom: achieving more challenging goals provides higher levels of motivation. In this way, an
effect not reported in the valuation curve of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is
found: the reference points may vary in predictable ways across different contexts, in this case,
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Figure 4.4: Empirical “S-shaped” performance evaluation curve across skill levels
the goals assigned. Thus, although different reference points exist for different contexts (i.e.
goals assigned), these may also be compared one against each other across contexts.
In addition to this, Figure 4.4 shows how the “S-curve” varies with the skill levels of indi-
viduals. The S-shaped function that evaluates performance in the presence of a goal is robust
to variations is skill; the main characteristics of the curve are maintained. Interestingly, Figure
4.4 shows a minor effect from increasing the skill levels, similar to that of increasing the goal
levels, however the effect is smaller. The “S-curve” shifts slightly to the right, implying that
more skilled individuals require higher levels of performance for the same level of satisfaction
with their performance.
4.4 Total performance results
The results concerning total performance at the end of a picking round as the dependent variable
are presented under the headlines of three research questions as shown in Table 4.5, where the
empirical evidence is contrasted with both support from literature as well as the myopic and
planning decision making models presented in Chapter 3. We organize the results of Table 4.5
under the headings of each of the posited questions, testing first the effects of varying goals,
then skills and finally the interaction of the two.
Question 1 What are the effects on individual performance (i.e. cumulative performance of an
individual measured at the end of the assigned period) if the goal difficulty (level) increases?
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Using the entire sample collected, the results show consistency with Locke and Latham
(1990) by indicating a linear effect (see Table 2) between goal difficulty and performance using
a repeated measures ANOVA contrast test (F (1, 80) = 71.44, p < 0.01). Note that this test
fits our case where we have repeated measures of the same variable (i.e. total performance) for
each participant under each of the three experimental conditions and wish to test if performance
increases linearly with the goal level assigned (Field, 2005). Further contrasts of performance
between goal levels confirmed that a goal of 66 picks yields higher performance than a goal of
59 picks, (F (1, 80) = 12.85, p < 0.01) and a goal of 59 picks yields higher performance than a
goal of 47 picks (F (1, 80) = 53.19, p < 0.01) (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Total performance results across goal levels
Assigned goal Performance Standard Error
No. of picks No. of picks No. of picks
47 59.68 0.80
59 64.37 0.83
66 66.62 0.98
The effectiveness of concrete goals is highlighted by comparing the experiment results, where
explicit goals are assigned, to the pre-test results, where participants are urged to “do their
best”. In the pre-test, only 10% of participants obtained 66 picks or more whereas in the actual
experiment when a goal of precisely 66 picks was assigned, 62% were able to obtain the goal (see
Figure 4.5). It, therefore, is possible that the highest goal assigned (66 picks) is not challenging
enough to observe a leveling-off or deterioration of performance.
To test whether performance is first increasing and then decreasing (as stated by Hypotheses
6 and 9 of the myopic and planner model, respectively) or non-decreasing (as stated Hypothesis
10 of the planner model) a repeated measures ANOVA was applied to the lowest skilled quartile
of participants (i.e. Skill level 1), where the higher assigned goals are likely to be challenging.
Applying such a procedure it was found that there is no deterioration of performance (in the
number of picks) when the goal is raised from 59 picks (M = 57.42, SE = 1.262) to 66 picks
(M = 57.86, SE = 1.364), (p > 0.1); whereas a significant difference does exist when the goal is
raised from 47 picks to 59 picks (F (1, 77) = 7.438, p < 0.01). Note further in Figure 4.6 that
the average performance of pickers of Skill Level 1, was already insufficient for the goal of 59
picks and even more so when the goal is higher at 66 picks. This means that participants were
already unable to achieve the goal; thus when the goal is further increased, the performance
did not decrease. This provides support for Locke and Latham’s (1982) finding of performance
leveling off when the limits of ability are reached as well as Hypothesis 10 of the planner model.
This result also provides indirect evidence that individuals are relatively insensitive to varying
work pace up until close to the limits of skill. In the modeling framework of Chapter 3, this will
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative distribution of participants performance across goals assigned
mean a work pace utility function (i.e. R(s˙)) that is relatively “flat” up until the skill level is
reached.
Having established the effects of varying goals on performance, we do the same for varying
skill levels as follows:
Question 2 What are the effects on individual performance if the skill level increases under the
influence of an assigned goal and deadline?
The answer to this question is almost tautological as skill level is defined by performance
itself. However, the main effect is clear, indicating that the proxy for skill, based on a previous
round where participants were asked to “do their best”, is in fact adequate: Pair-wise compar-
isons between skill levels confirm that higher skill levels exhibit higher performance (see Figure
4.4) tested with an ANOVA (F (1, 80) = 90.43, p < 0.01). All of the pair-wise comparisons are
significant except when comparing Skill Level 2 with Skill Level 3, t(80) = 0.545. This indicates
that the performance in the 2nd and 3rd quartiles are similar, implying certain concentration of
performance towards the mean.
Finally, we test whether an interaction exists between varying skill levels and goal difficulties:
Question 3 What are the interaction effects of increasing goal difficulty (level) and skill level
on individual performance?
Further analyzing the effect of worker and performance across skill levels using a 2-way
(required for interactions) repeated measure ANOVA we observe an interaction effect between
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Table 4.2: Total performance results across skill levels
Skill Level Mean Performance Standard Error
No. of picks No. of picks
Skill Level 1 56.43 0.97
Skill Level 2 62.90 0.80
Skill Level 3 64.48 0.75
Skill Level 4 70.77 0.84
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Figure 4.6: Total performance: goals and skill levels interaction
skill level and performance (F (5.33, 136.84) = 2.11, p = 0.064) as well as the expected main
effect of skill level (F (3, 77) = 31.63, p < 0.001) as shown in Figure 4.6. This interaction effect
is confirmed by observing the following. For the two highest quartiles (i.e. the 50% most skilled
participants) there is an increase in performance (M = 4.03, SE = 0.780) when the goal is
raised from 59 to 66 picks that is significant (t(80) = 5.167, p < 0.001). However, for the two
lowest quartiles (i.e. the 50% least skilled participants), when the goal is raised from 59 to 66
picks, such an increase in performance (M = 1.05, SE = 0.790) is only moderate (t(80) = 5.167,
p = 0.091). Thus, the increase in performance at the two highest quartiles is significantly higher
than that at the two lowest quartiles (t(80) = 2.975, p < 0.01). This result provides further
confirmation for Hypothesis 10, where increasing the goal yields an increase in performance
when the maximum capacity to perform has not yet reached (as shown here for the 50% most
skilled participants), but remains approximately constant when the maximum capacity has been
achieved (as shown here for the 50% least skilled participants).
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Figure 4.7: Average work pace regulation over time across goals assigned
4.5 Work pace results
Similar to the previous section, the results concerning work pace regulation as the dependent
variable are presented under the headlines of the four research questions as shown in Table
4.6. In Table 4.6, the empirical evidence is contrasted with support from the literature and the
myopic and planning decision making models presented in Chapter 3.
To answer these research questions, we use the results from the HLM analysis shown in Table
4.3. This analysis was conducted using the lme4 package (Bates and Sarkar, 2006) in the open
source statistical software of R. For convenience in interpreting the results, it is important to
note that the HLM model takes as reference values when the goal level m = 3 (i.e. 66 picks) is
assigned and the Skill Level is n = 1 for convenience in interpreting the results. Note also that
the control factors (i.e. SQ(1)i,j , SQ
(2)
i,j and Hi,j) shown in Table 4.3 appear to be non-significant
(p > 0.1) implying that there are no significant effects present in the experiment as a result of
fatigue or adaptation towards the goal.
For effects of comparisons, we also include the OLS results (including only the fixed effects
of the HLM analysis). However, only the HLM results are used for the analysis, as the others are
deemed to have unreliable standard errors (Gelman and Hill, 2007). The work pace regulation
patterns (across goals) are also illustrated in Figure 4.7, showing the average work pace for the
16 intervals measured for the 81 participants in the study.
Before analyzing the results of the model itself, we first note that the model does explain
the variance in the data beyond the variation attributed to picking rounds and participants in
the experiment. This is evidenced by contrasting the HLM Complete model with a constrained
reference model that only includes an intercept and random effects; the model forces the pa-
rameters of all the explanatory variables equal to zero. Comparing both models (Table 4.3),
Table 4.3: HLM model estimation and fit analysis
1. Fixed effects estimation
OLS HLM
Model Complete model
Fixed Effects Factors Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
Intercept γ0,0,0 7.7827 0.0724∗∗∗ 7.7371 0.1647∗∗∗
Indicator variable - Goal presented 1st η1 0.0135 0.0369 0.0145 0.0836
Indicator variable - Goal presented 2nd η2 -0.0487 0.0362 -0.0440 0.0823
Indicator variable - Goal of 66 picks presented
first
η3 0.1818 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.1499 0.1356
Time γ1,0,0 0.0146 0.0185 0.0092 0.0202
Goal Level 47 Picks γ1,1,0 -0.6913 0.0684∗∗∗ -0.6675 0.0917∗∗∗
Goal Level 59 Picks γ1,2,0 -0.2346 0.0680∗∗∗ -0.2257 0.0899∗
Skill Level 2 γ0,0,1 0.6147 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.6589 0.1982∗∗
Skill Level 3 γ0,0,2 0.9799 0.0784∗∗∗ 1.0068 0.1972∗∗∗
Skill Level 4 γ0,0,3 1.6701 0.0781∗∗∗ 1.7067 0.1969∗∗∗
Time x Goal Level 47 Picks δ1,1 -0.0342 0.0222 -0.0832 0.0287∗∗
Time x Goal Level 59 Picks δ1,2 -0.0243 0.0221 -0.0231 0.0243
Time x Skill Level 2 γ1,0,1 0.0030 0.0237 -0.0083 0.0285
Time x Skill Level 3 γ1,0,2 -0.0007 0.0237 -0.0205 0.0284
Time x Skill Level 4 γ1,0,3 0.0377 0.0237 -0.0133 0.0284
Time x Goal Level 47 Picks x Skill Level 2 γ1,1,1 -0.0438 0.0246† -0.0080 0.0402
Time x Goal Level 47 Picks x Skill Level 3 γ1,1,2 -0.0359 0.0245 0.0044 0.0402
Time x Goal Level 47 Picks x Skill Level 4 γ1,1,3 -0.1033 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0049 0.0402
Time x Goal Level 59 Picks x Skill Level 2 γ1,2,1 0.0446 0.0246† 0.0156 0.0337
Time x Goal Level 59 Picks x Skill Level 3 γ1,2,2 -0.0161 0.0246 -0.0202 0.0336
Time x Goal Level 59 Picks x Skill Level 4 γ1,2,3 -0.0885 0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0670 0.0336†
2. Random effects estimation
Constrained HLM
reference model Complete model
Random Effects Factors Est. S.D. Est. S.D.
Level 0 Residual σ2ei,j,k 0.29484 0.54299 0.24212 0.49206
Level 1 Pick round j within participant i: In-
tercept
σ2u0,i,j 0.50130 0.70802 0.26711 0.514866
Level 1 Pick round j within participant i:
Time (slope)
σ2u1,i,j 0.00342 0.05869
Level 2 Participant: Intercept σ2v0,0,i 0.50214 0.70862 0.28820 0.53127
Level 2 Participant: Time (slope) σ2v1,0,i 0.00227 0.04794
Level 2 Participant: Time x Goal Level 47
Picks (slope)
σ2v1,1,i 0.00547 0.00741
Level 2 Participant: Time x Goal Level 59
Picks (slope)
σ2v1,2,i 0.00055 0.02081
Covariance Level 1 (Intercept-slope) σ(u0,i,j ,u1,i,j) -0.30100
Covariance Level 2 (Intercept-slope) σ(v0,0,i,v1,0,i) -0.25200
Covariance Level 2 (Interaction terms) σ(v1,1,i,v1,2,i) 0.57600
Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) Pick-
ing round level
0.3861 0.3312
Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) Indi-
vidual level
0.3868 0.3510
3. HLM Complete model fit evaluation
Constrained HLM
Criteria reference model Complete model
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 6782 6351
R2 Level 0 Increment 17.88%
R2 Level 1 Increment 49.67%
R2 Level 2 Increment 43.13%
Δχ2 (Δdf=27) 579.17∗∗∗
For HLM and OLS analysis, n = 3631.
In addition, for HLM, the following number of observations were observed per level:
time intervals per round= 15, rounds= 3, participants= 81
Significance levels: p ≤ 0.1(†), p ≤ 0.01(∗∗), p ≤ 0.001(∗∗∗)
The HLM reference model includes only random effects for picking round and participant.
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the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is lower for the HLM Complete model than for the con-
strained reference model, indicating a better fit of the HLM Complete model. Furthermore, a
chi-squared (χ2) test to compare the change in the -2 log likelihood function (i.e. the function
to be minimized in both models) relative to the additional degrees of freedom, confirms a better
fit of the data by the HLM Complete model than the constrained reference model. Moreover,
Table 4.3 shows that for each level analyzed the pseudo-R2 (Kreft and Leuw, 1998), shows an
improvement of the fit due to the additional variables of the HLM Complete model.
Question 4 How is the work pace regulated under the influence of a given goal and deadline?
A first glance at the results shown in Figure 4.7, suggest that no acceleration towards the goal
exists, only towards the deadline and thus does not support Hypothesis 1. However, it is possible
that averaging across individuals may mask acceleration effects towards the goal, particularly
taking into account that individuals with different skill levels reach their goals at different times.
Hence, the data was analyzed from the point of view of progress by constructing intervals based
on a constant length of about 5% in terms of progress towards the goal as opposed to time.
To construct these intervals, take for example the case of 59 picks as a goal. Every 2.95
picks, rounded to the nearest integral number of picks, the time lapsed is measured and then
the corresponding work pace is calculated for that same interval. The exact time between each
unit was measured and then the work pace was calculated knowing the number of picks between
intervals. We then compared the average work pace of the 95−100% progress interval with prior
progress intervals (i.e. 75 − 80%, 80 − 85%) and a posterior progress interval (100 − 105%) by
conducting successive related sample paired t-tests. To avoid confounding acceleration towards
the deadline, only participants that reached 105% of progress towards the goal, before the
deadline where included in the analysis. None of the t-tests provided evidence for significant
acceleration towards the goal or significant deceleration away from the goal (p > 0.10). As a
result, we may then reject Hypothesis 1 derived from the myopic model.
On the other hand, from Figure 4.7, there does appear to be certain acceleration toward
the deadline for the two lowest goals (i.e. 47 and 59 picks) where in the case of a goal of 47
picks, the work pace in the interval 450 − 480 seconds is higher in picks/minute (M = 7.62,
SE = 1.17) than that of the work pace in the interval 420-450 seconds (M = 7.41, SE = 1.15),
(t(80) = 3.17, p < 0.01) and in the case of 59 picks, work pace in the interval 450− 480 seconds
is higher (M = 8.09, SE = 1.00) than that of the work pace in the interval 420− 450 seconds
(M = 8.21, SE = 1.02), (t(80) = 3.167, p = 0.051). Such a difference does not exist however, for
the highest goal of 66 picks where the work pace for the interval 450− 480 seconds (M = 8.64,
SE = 1.13) is non-significant with that of the work pace for the interval 420 − 450 seconds
(M = 8.62, SE = 1.09). A probable explanation for such acceleration towards the deadline for
the highest goal may be that the participants may already be working at the limit of their ability
(skill). More importantly, it is possible that the acceleration previously reported as acceleration
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Figure 4.8: Average work pace regulation over progress towards the goal across goals
assigned
towards the assigned goal (Kivetz, 2006 and See et al., 2006), may have been confused with
acceleration towards the deadline where the end of the task was achieved when the assigned
goal was achieved.
To illustrate this, consider Figure 4.8, that shows how the work pace is regulated over progress
towards the goal. To avoid biasing the work pace average, the sample for each assigned goal
was reduced to the workers achieving at least a certain level of performance (i.e. the maximum
point for each series in the figure). Figure 4.8 shows that the acceleration occurs only after the
goal is achieved and not before (i.e. after 100% of progress), confirming an acceleration towards
the deadline and not towards the assigned goal.
In addition, from the HLM analysis there appears to be no main effects with respect to time
(p > 0.1). This suggests that workers work at a steady state when a challenging goal is assigned
(i.e. 66 picks) and thus provides supporting evidence for Hypothesis 8 derived from the planner
model. We note however, that such support appears to be only valid for challenging goals as
explained when addressing Question 6.
Question 5 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty (level) is increased?
To describe the effects of goals on work pace regulation. We identify two types of effects.
First, the effect on the initial work pace and then the effect on deceleration or acceleration as
time passes. To identify the first effect, first note that the initial work pace refers to the work
pace at t = 0. Therefore, in Table 4.3, the initial work pace is the intercept of the model affected
by skill level and goal factors. In this way, Table 4.3 shows a clear main effect of goal levels in
terms of increasing the initial work pace (p < 0.001) as is also illustrated in Figure 4.7.
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Moreover, these results show that when the highest goal was assigned (i.e. 66 picks) there
was an increase in the initial work pace of about 9.5% with respect to the lowest goal assigned
(i.e. 47 picks). We note that this result is consistent with Hypothesis 9 derived by the planner
model. However, these results are, at the same time, not supportive of Hypotheses 2 and 3
derived from the myopic model. These models predicted an increase in the starting work pace
and a time shift of when the maximum work pace is achieved.
Furthermore, the fact that there is a main effect in the intercepts (starting work pace)
provides evidence that planning does in fact occur, as only in the case of easy goals there is
a correction (downwards) of the selected work pace and individuals actively select different
initial work paces for different goals. It then appears that the act of balancing the intrinsic
motivation derived from working at a certain work pace with the extrinsic motivation derived
from performing at a certain level with respect to the assigned goal is done at the start of the
work considering the whole working period. This is opposed to the myopic model proposed in
Chapter 3, where workers constantly evaluate their motivation towards the goal and accelerate
when they are proximal to the goal due to enhanced motivation.
The second effect of goals in work pace regulation is at the level of time. The results shown
in Table 4.3 indicate a significant and positive interaction effect of lower goal levels (i.e. 59 and
47 picks) with time (p < 0.01). However, such interaction is not present when the highest goal
(i.e. 66 picks) is assigned (p > 0.1). These results suggest that challenging goals induce working
at a steady work pace. To our knowledge, the result that challenging goals induce a steady
work pace has not been documented before and is an additional advantage of challenging goals
for operational settings where steady job processing rates are desirable. These are desirable,
because the estimation of the completion of job batches is more reliable and makes it easier to
balance servers in a productive system.
The panels in Figure 4.9, also provides indirect evidence for a most comfortable work pace,
denoted as n, and introduced in Chapter 3 as the work pace that is naturally most preferred
for a worker in the absence of any external influence. In particular, Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show
that the average work pace (for individuals of Skill Level 1 and 2) is never lower than 6.25
picks/min (47 picks), suggesting the existence of a most comfortable work pace that acts as a
lower threshold.
Question 6 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the skill level is increased under the
influence of an assigned goal and deadline?
As expected, from Table 4.3, there is a positive main effect associated with increasing skill
levels, where higher skill levels increase the initial work pace (p < 0.01), which is consistent with
Hypotheses 4 and 11 of the myopic and planner models. Nonetheless, there does not appear
to be an interaction effect between skill levels and time (p > 0.1), meaning that the skill level
affects the initial work pace, but not any work pace tendencies over time.
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(a) Skill Level 1
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(b) Skill Level 2
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(c) Skill Level 3
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(d) Skill Level 4
Figure 4.9: Work pace regulation across different skill levels and goals assigned
Question 7 What are the effects on work pace regulation when the skill level and assigned goal
interact?
Further investigation appears to reaffirm the idea that when the goal is challenging with
respect to the individual’s skill level, a stationary, constant work pace is induced. This idea is
supported by the moderately significant interaction effect found with the time factor when an
easy goal (i.e. 47 picks) is assigned to a top skilled individual (i.e. Skill Level 4), (p = 0.0558).
Furthermore, the panels of Figure 4.9 illustrate this interaction.
Moreover, Figure 4.9b shows how the work pace regulation of the two higher assigned goals
are very similar in level and in pattern, suggesting that the assigned goal of 66 picks exceeds
the limits of ability of individuals with Skill Level 2. This result provides additional evidence
for the existence of a skill level (i.e. denoted in Chapter 3 by L) that acts as an upper threshold
(i.e. a concept introduced in Chapter 3). At the same time, the fact that the work pace is non-
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decreasing on goal difficulty, provides indirect evidence that workers are relatively insensitive to
increases in the work pace (effort) up until such work pace reaches the limits of their ability.
In other words, there is evidence for a relatively flat utility work pace function as depicted in
Figure 3.2 of Chapter 3.
Heterogeneity of work pace results
One of the advantages of using HLM as a method of analysis is that it allows us to asses the
variation of the estimated parameters across participants. Here, again a new advantage of goal
setting for operations can be found: Challenging goals make work pace regulation significantly
more predictable; the variance of the time-slope estimate for a goal of 47 picks shown in Table
4.3 is σ2v{1,1,i} = 0.00547, almost ten times larger than the variance of the time-slope estimate
for a goal of 59 picks, σ2v{1,2,i} = 0.00055. A possible explanation for this is that challenging
goals force individuals to work at a consistently high speed whereas a not-so challenging goal
provides more freedom as to the strategy used to achieve the goal (certain individuals may opt
for a steady state, others for speeding up later, but the majority may opt for a gradual decrease
in the work-pace as shown in Figure 4.7).
The results also show that considerable residual variance exists at the level of a picking
round and the individual picker. For this, we look at the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC)
that measures the proportion of residual variance at a given level of the model with respect to
the total model (Kreft and Leuw, 1998). The ICC values of 0.3343 and 0.3664 at the picking
round level and at the individual level respectively, highlight the fact that most of the random
effects are accounted by different picking rounds and different participants in the experiment,
thus further justifying the use of HLM in the analysis of the data.
4.6 Quality results
Setting challenging goals may also have its limitations. Hence, we also attempted to confirm a
result from goal setting (Bavelas and Lee, 1978) that states that goals may enhance performance
in the dimensions measured at the expense of other dimensions that are not observed. Table
4.4 weakly confirms this by showing a marginal significant decrease in quality measured in
percentage of errors when comparing errors across increasing goal levels. A repeated measures
ANOVA test does not confirm differences in quality (F (2, 160) = 1.755, p = 0.176). However, a
contrast between the lowest and the highest goal does yield marginal differences (p = 0.067).
The marginal significance may be due to the low power of the test. Even though the within-
participants design of the experiment allows for a direct comparison of individual quality levels,
the fact that errors are seldom observed, decreases the statistical power of the test. Nonetheless,
there is weak evidence that suggests that even though a pick with errors has a negative effect
4.7 Discussion 121
Table 4.4: Quality results across goal levels
Assigned goal Performance Standard Error
No. of picks No. of picks No. of picks
47 1.844 0.199
59 1.945 0.241
66 2.333 0.257
on productivity as time lost, it appears that still, maximizing productivity alone is not perfectly
aligned with minimizing quality errors.
4.7 Discussion
This chapter addressed two research objectives by first validating from an operations manage-
ment perspective previous reports on the goal level-performance relationship and then by study-
ing how workers regulate their work pace under the influence of a goal and a deadline. This
chapter builds on the theory developed in Chapter 3 where specific hypotheses are proposed
regarding the goal level-performance relationship and work pace regulation. These hypotheses
were derived from two alternative decision making models; one that assumed myopic pacing
decisions and another that assumed planned pacing decisions.
The results verified that as long as realistic goals are assigned, the goal level-performance
relationship is increasing and then levels off when individuals reach the limits of their ability.
What distinguishes these results from previous ones is that these were obtained in a context
where a deadline was assigned and where participants were requested to work until the assigned
deadline even if they had already achieved the goal. This then confirms the majoritarian view in
goal-setting for an operational context where deadlines are set. Moreover, the results provided
additional information by distinguishing how performance increases with goal levels across dif-
ferent skill levels. In this way, it was possible to observe how higher goals increased performance
even if increasing performance was not necessary to obtain the goal.
What distinguishes this study from previous studies is that it is the first study, to our
knowledge, that focuses on work pace regulation over time, under the influence of goals. In this
respect, our main finding is that challenging goals induce workers to not only work at a higher
work pace, but at a constant one inducing stationary job processing rates. At the same time,
when workers are assigned to goals that are not challenging enough, the initial work pace tends
to decrease.
Furthermore, when goals and deadlines are both present and assigned goals are not chal-
lenging, we found no evidence to support an acceleration towards the assigned goal, but instead
found evidence supporting an acceleration towards the deadline. Interestingly, an analysis of
variation across individuals, showed that assigning challenging goals, not only induces a steady
Table 4.5: Goal difficulty-performance hypothesis testing overview
Evidence
Questions and Answers Literature Decision model Empirical sup-
port
Question 1 What are the effects on individual performance (i.e. cumulative performance of an individual
measured at the end of the assigned period) if the goal difficulty (level) increases?
Possible answer 1
The goal difficulty-total performance relation for a my-
opic worker is unimodal, increasing and then decreas-
ing on the assigned goal level (Hypothesis 6 and Hy-
pothesis 9).
Erez and Zidon
(1984)
Theorem 6 (My-
opic model)
Theorem 9 (Plan-
ner model)
Unsupported
Possible answer 2
Total performance increases and then remains con-
stant (levels off) with goal difficulty (Hypothesis 10).
Locke and Latham
(1982 and 1990)
Theorem 10 (Plan-
ner model)
Supported
Question 2 What are the effects on individual performance if the skill level increases under the influence of an
assigned goal and deadline?
Possible answer 1
Performance (total work) increases given a skill in-
crease (Hypothesis 7 (Myopic model) and Hypothesis
11 (Planner model)).
Erez and Zidon
(1984)
Theorem 7
Theorem 11
Supported
Question 3 What are the interaction effects of increasing goal difficulty (level) and skill level on individual
performance?
Possible answer 1
Interactions exist. Difference in performance increases
between workers of different skill levels as the lower
skill workers reach their maximum performance.
Erez and Zidon
(1984)
Supported
Table 4.6: Work pace regulation investigation overview
Evidence
Questions and Answers Literature Decision model
and justification
Empirical sup-
port
Question 4 How is the work pace regulated under the influence of a given goal and deadline?
Possible answer 1
A worker will accelerate towards the goal, reaching
its maximum work-pace when he reaches the goal and
then decelerate converging to the natural work pace if
enough time is allowed (Hypothesis 1).
Goal gradient
hypothesis (Hull,
1932; See et al.,
2006 and Kivetz et
al., 2006)
Theorem 1
(Myopic model)
Unsupported
Acceleration
towards deadline
instead
Possible answer 2
A worker will set a time invariant work pace for the
whole period (Hypothesis 8).
The alternative hy-
pothesis, if there is
no acceleration to-
wards the goal.
Theorem 8
(Planner model)
Supported for chal-
lenging goals.
Question 5 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the goal difficulty (level) is increased?
Possible answer 1
The work pace selected is shifted for the whole period
by a constant lapse in time (Hypothesis 2).
When a higher goal is assigned, workers will start
working at a lower work pace (Hypothesis 3).
Goal gradient
hypothesis (Hull,
1932; See et al.,
2006 and Kivetz et
al., 2006).
Theorem 2
(Myopic model)
Theorem 3
(Myopic model)
Unsupported
Possible answer 2
If the goal increases, the constant work pace increases,
otherwise it decreases (Hypothesis 9).
Consistent with
Parkinson Law
(1962) of work
pace adjustment
according to goal
demands.
Theorem 9
(Planner model)
Supported
Question 6 What are the effects on work pace regulation if the skill level is increased?
Possible answer 1
If a worker has a higher skill level than another one,
the selected work pace of the worker with a higher skill
level is higher as long as the goal has not yet been
achieved (when the skill level is increased (Hypothesis
4).
The maximum observed work pace increases when the
skill level is increased (Hypothesis 5).
The literature has
not investigated
this question.
Theorem 4
(Myopic model)
Theorem 5
(Myopic model)
Supported, but
more parsimo-
nious hypothesis
supported (see
bellow).
Possible answer 2
If a worker has a higher skill level than another one,
the time-invariant selected work pace of the worker
with a higher skill level is higher than the worker with
the lower skill (Hypothesis 11).
The literature has
not investigated
this question.
Theorem 11
Planner model
Supported
Question 7 What are the effects on work pace regulation when the skill level assigned goal interact?
Possible answer 1
Interactions exist, challenging goals induce steady
work pace and eliminate any acceleration towards the
deadline.
The literature has
not investigated
this question.
Supported.
124 Behavioral Goal Setting Models for OM: Empirical study
work pace, but also more predictable work pace regulation patterns. In this way, we found larger
deviations from the average deceleration pattern observed for non-challenging goals than from
the average steady work pace pattern observed for challenging goals. Hence, operations work
flow models, including queuing models and simulation models, should consider this behavior
when modeling work flow under the influence of goals.
Taken together, the results show a general consistency with the planner model introduced
in Chapter 3, as workers select a higher initial work pace when a higher goal is assigned and
challenging goals induce a steady work pace. Both facts suggest that an initial plan is devised
for the whole working period.
The results do, however, suggest that the initial plan may be subject to a control mechanism.
The fact that only challenging goals induce a planning behavior may be explained by the fact
that challenging goals may require workers working consistently to the best of their ability, close
to their highest work pace. In agreement with Carver and Shreier (1998), when a goal is difficult
to attain, the only possible strategy is to stay on course and frequently (or continuously) control
that the work pace is adequate to achieve the goal on time. If a goal is then deemed, by an
individual, not to be too challenging, it is possible that the individual makes the decision to
not control his actual effort with respect to his planned effort and thus drifts towards his most
comfortable work pace. This explanation is also consistent with the findings reported by Deci et
al. (1999) stating that goals enhance attention, and thus activate mechanisms of control. This
explanation, however, is a hypothesis that needs further confirmation.
Moreover, the results show evidence that suggests the existence of an internal evaluation of
the work pace itself and performance with respect to a goal as described by the utility functions
proposed in Chapter 3. In particular, the results support the existence of a work pace-utility
rate function as described in Chapter 3 with a most comfortable work pace (n) and a maximum
work pace (L) as well as the existence of a performance utility function as described in Chapter
3 with a characteristic “S” shape and goals acting as reference points.
Interestingly, the empirically obtained utility performance function valuation, suggest a de-
sirable effect of goal setting: Goals normalize expectations on the desirability of attaining certain
performance levels, even in the presence of differently skilled individuals. This normalization
effect provides an explanation for the robustness of goal effects in total performance, in spite of
individuals with different skill levels and personality traits. This fact can be used later to the
advantage of operations managers by assigning different goals according to different production
requirements over time.
The results also note the limitations of goal setting, where there is weak evidence for an
increase in quality errors when participants are urged to increase their work pace. Although,
a goal in productivity performance may distract the worker from, at the same time, striving
towards quality. If, indeed, these two dimensions are related, as was the case in this experiment,
such a trade-off may be moderated. The trade-off may be further moderated by the work
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station layout design as well as other mechanisms for error reduction such as enabling/disabling
the relevant/non-relevant keys on a keyboard (as was done in this experiment).
4.8 Limitations
The study conducted here has a number of limitations. The first limitation is the time frame
of a picking round which was fixed to 8 minutes. Longer times may make it more difficult for
workers to sustain a steady work pace even in the presence of a challenging goal. For sufficiently
long periods the incidence of fatigue may start to influence work pace regulation patterns as
well. A second limitation is that feedback frequency remained constant across experimental
conditions. Feedback frequency may also play a role in sustaining a steady work pace. Hence,
the roles of period length and feedback frequency in work pace regulation are worth studying in
future research.
Another limitation of this study is that it did not address the phenomenon in the literature
known as adaptation towards the goal (Lant, 1992). Although we have found that goals robustly
fix reference points for performance, it is possible that previous performance and observed
performance of other co-workers may influence the performance at which reference points are
fixed. Repeatedly failing to achieve a goal may affect the self-efficacy of individuals (i.e. the
individual belief that a goal is attainable) and hence affect commitment towards the goal (Locke
et al., 1988). Likewise, Schultz et al. (1998) have shown that in social contexts, workers adjust
the work pace to match those of their peers. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate the
interaction between assigned goals and peer performance in how workers evaluate their own
performance.
4.9 Conclusions
In this chapter we tested hypotheses derived from the decision models of Chapter 3. We con-
firmed that performance increases with goal difficulty and then levels-off for operational contexts
were a deadline is present. More importantly, we identified that challenging goals induce steady
work pace regulation as opposed to non-challenging goals were the work pace decreases from an
initial higher work pace.
From a managerial perspective, the results on the goal level-performance relationship val-
idates the advice of Locke and Latham (2006) of setting challenging and realistic goals for
operational contexts where deadlines exist. As long as there is commitment to achieve the goal,
an increase in the goal will not reduce total individual performance. In deciding which goal to
assign to a group of heterogeneously skilled individuals a manager should try to balance maxi-
mum production while minimizing frustration for failing to achieve the goal. The performance
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evaluation “S” curve introduced in Chapter 3 and validated in this chapter may be used to
quantify the impact in terms of dissatisfaction in failing to achieve the goal.
The work pace regulation study has specific implications for operations management. Specif-
ically, challenging goals induce a steady work pace with lower variation in work pace regulation
patterns. This is a previously unreported advantage for challenging goals in operations man-
agement contexts where stationary job processing rates and predictability are desirable. More
stationary and predictable job processing rates make planning easier in operational manage-
ment contexts and make service times more reliable. Furthermore, reducing variability in work
pace and steady job processing rates, increase effective capacity when several work stations are
interconnected.
In addition, the results in work pace regulation have implications for operations management
practices. In particular, consider the question of a manager that wants to verify if a goal is
demanding workers to work at the best of their ability. Based on our results of work pace
regulation, a manager may verify whether the worker is working at steady state and from that
infer if the worker is working to the best of his ability. Moreover, if the goal is increased and
the same steady work pace is observed it can be confirmed that the worker is indeed working
to the best of his ability. In the case a manager wants to verify in real time whether a worker
would be able to meet the deadline on time the insights from this study show that he should
extrapolate the current work pace and not expect an acceleration towards the goal.
Finally, the study presented in this chapter provides additional information for work flow
models as identifiable work pace regulation patterns exist for different skill level assigned goal
combinations. Moreover, the heterogeneity of work pace regulation patterns can also be modeled
and predicted where there is lower heterogeneity when challenging goals are assigned. Queuing
and simulation models may also be enriched by the insights of this study, especially when
specific goals and deadlines are set. Already, queuing and simulation models assume stationary
job processing rates, these models may be model the effects of goals by incorporating non-
stationary if the goal is not perceived as challenging and stationary behavior otherwise.
Chapter 5
Managing Warehouse Efficiency and
Worker Discomfort Through
Enhanced Storage Assignment
Decisions
5.1 Introduction
In the context of supply chain optimization, the optimization of material handling operations
within a warehouse has received considerable attention in the literature with a particular focus
on order picking operations (for a review, see De Koster et al., (2007))). Such a focus is hardly
surprising as it has been reported that in a typical warehouse 55% of the operational costs
(Frazelle, 1996) and 12% of the total supplier-retailer logistics costs (Van der Vlist, 2007) are
due to order picking activities. To maximize the efficiency of order picking operations, five
approaches have been proposed. The first approach consists of assigning items to different
storage locations based on their popularity (Heskett, 1963). The second approach considers the
batching of orderlines in a single picking route (Gademann and Van de Velde, 2005), while the
third approach concerns devising order picking routes within the storage area (Roodbergen and
de Koster, 2001). The fourth approach consists of organizing picking activities into zones (Yu
and De Koster 2008). Lastly, the fifth approach is the redesign of layout structure in terms
of the number of pick aisles, number of blocks and length of the pick aisle (Roodbergen et al.,
2008). All five approaches maximize efficiency by minimizing travel distance.
The reason why most order picking optimization models focus on minimizing walking dis-
tances is that travel is estimated to be responsible for about 55% of the total picking time per
order (Frazelle, 1996). Warehouse designs such as sequential zone picking and forward-reserve
storage are examples of design efforts to reduce walking distances. In a sequential zone picking
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system, the walking distances are reduced by transferring partial orders between zones using
mechanical devices such as conveyors. In the case of forward-reserve configurations, walking
distances are reduced by concentrating most of the picking activities in a small “forward” area
that is replenished from a larger “reserve” storage area (Bartholdi and Hackman, 2008).
As walking distances decrease by various means, the relative importance of other activities
increases. Specifically, in the literature, most of the storage location assignment models disregard
the time spent on retrieving and searching for items, although Tompkins et al.’s (2003) report
that these activities account for 35% of total picking time. Most papers explicitly or implicitly
assume that a pick always requires the same amount of time, regardless of the level (height) at
which it is picked, the quantity picked and the size and weight of the item to be picked.
Only a few papers have recognized the importance of retrieving and searching actions, by
acknowledging the influence of a third dimension (height) on order picking times present in
shelf picking contexts (Saccomano, 1996; Jones and Battieste, 2004; Petersen et al., 2005).
These articles define a strategy where items that are picked more often should be located in
picking locations that lie within the so-called “Golden Zone”, the area between the waist and
the shoulders of “average” pickers (Jones and Battieste, 2004).
The economic justification for this allocation strategy is that items within the “Golden
Zone” are expected to take less time to identify and retrieve than items outside this zone.
Nonetheless, the precise effect of height on searching and retrieving times is unknown, let alone
any interaction effects between heights and product characteristics (e.g., weight of the product or
volume). Moreover, the extent to which the “golden zone” allocation strategy actually minimizes
cycle time remains to be determined. After all, time savings due to picking at “Golden Zone”
positions must be weighted against time savings from picking at positions closer (in the 2D
sense) to the starting point of the route.
The “Golden Zone” allocation strategy also has a social justification when considering the
well-being of order pickers. Working in the “Golden Zone” may prevent working in extreme
postures (Jones and Battieste, 2004). These extreme postures occur when picking at locations
outside the “Golden Zone” and may be uncomfortable for the picker even if he deals with
light products (Kruizinga et al., 1998). Discomfort felt by employees is a pervasive problem in
warehouses and has been found to be a predictor for future long-term muscular pain (Hamberg-
van Reenen et al., 2008) as well as occupational disorders such as the so-called Low Back
Disorders (LBDs). The importance of LBD’s is highlighted by reports of an American insurer
that LBD-related claims account for 16% of the total worker claims and 33% of total worker
claim costs (Snook, 1982 and Webster and Snook, 1994).
Reducing discomfort is then directly related to the well-being of workers and may also yield
long-term economic benefits through higher productivity (Kuijt-Evers et al., 2007), reduced
worker health-related costs, absenteeism and drop-out rates, which are particularly important in
countries with a deficit of blue-collar employees. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that discomfort
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itself has been recognized by the European Union Machinery Directive as a condition that
should be minimized along with other factors that affect worker well-being, including fatigue
and psychological stress, by taking ergonomic principles into account (ECD 2006).
The efforts to reduce discomfort are in-line with Corporate Social Responsibility practices.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an umbrella term used to address the concern with
the well-being of the stakeholders of the firm, including its employees as one of the main stake-
holders (Maignan and Ralston, 2008). In a context where CSR is perceived as relevant for the
sustainability of the firm, any efforts for increasing the well-being of employees in the workplace
at reasonable financial costs are well received. Already, Maignan & Raltson (2002) report that
53% of American firms explicitly mention CSR on their website.
Hence, we define the social goal of product location assignment for order picking activities
as that of minimizing discomfort. The well being of an employee depends on other factors as
well, but we focus on the human factor that is directly affected by storage allocation decisions.
In this chapter we seek to make better tactical storage location decisions with respect to
two criteria: 1) a short-term economic criterion (i.e. minimizing total order picking time, but
excluding long-term health savings that are more difficult to quantify) and 2) a social criterion
(i.e. minimizing average discomfort). We propose a methodology to combine both economic and
social goals in tactical storage location decisions; by proposing a methodology that considers
both types of goals we provide an interface between insights of operations management and
insights from human sciences. In a sense, this chapter can be considered a response to the
challenge posited by Boudreau et al. (2003) and Gino and Pisano (2008) to include human
aspects in conventional operations decisions. Further, our research as presented in this chapter
goes beyond conceptual papers on the application of CSR in operations, such as the one by
McAdam (2003), by providing empirical evidence for possible improvements of the well-being of
employees via enhanced operational decisions.
It must be noted that the proposed combination of goals may be non-trivial as has been
often claimed in practice and in the scientific literature. Peacock (2002) suggests that a tension
between human centered criteria and operational performance criteria exists, in particular if the
operational performance is only short-termed. On the other hand, Dul et al. (2004) show that
social goals expressed in ergonomic standards may yield economic benefits, which suggests a cer-
tain degree of alignment between social and economic goals. This chapter aims to illustrate the
debate between the existence of conflict or alignment in social and economic goals by considering
the specific context of storage location decisions for order picking activities and quantifying the
extent to which there is a trade-off between both goals.
Although we acknowledge that practitioners and industrial engineers often combine both
economic and social criteria in their design criteria, this is typically done in an ad-hoc manner.
Our results will inform practitioners and industrial engineers by quantifying the “economic” and
“ergonomic” costs involved in pursuing an ergonomic or an economic-friendly solution. Further,
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based on the trade-off results, we will give recommendations on how to obtain near-efficient
solutions that balance both economic and social goals with the use of simple decision rules (i.e.
heuristics).
We restrict our study to a particular setting of order picking, where retrieval activities are
likely to contribute significantly to the total cycle time, and thus influence the efficiency of order
picking systems and increase the exposure of workers to discomfort. The particular setting that
we consider is picker-to-part order picking systems (for an overview of order picking systems see
Tompkins et al., 2003) where workers walk and retrieve items from shelves. These systems are
usually organized into zones, where orders are partially picked in one zone and then transferred,
via conveyors, to be completed in other zones; these are typically referred to as “pick and pass”
configurations. These systems are used by the majority of warehouses in the Western world (De
Koster et al., 2007) and are characterized by typically many picks per time unit with a relatively
limited amount of walking. Furthermore, each picker only picks one or a few items per order
from multi-leveled shelves, since the remainder of the order is picked by other people in other
zones. It is also worth noting that there is only one picker assigned per zone, thus avoiding
congestion issues (Gue et al., 2006).
Our approach differs from storage location models in the literature (such as that of Petersen
et al. (2005)), in that we formulate expressions using empirical data collected at two warehouses,
thus providing empirical evidence for considering differences in picking heights. We then use
these empirical expressions in a bi-objective assignment model that takes both the cycle time
and the picker’s discomfort into account.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we conduct an empirical study to in-
vestigate the effects of different heights on retrieving times and on discomfort levels. Next, in
Section 5.3, we propose a multi-objective model (with an economic and a social goal) to identify
non-dominated solutions and possible trade-offs between economic and social goals. Finally, in
Section 5.4, we give conclusions and insights for further research.
5.2 Empirical study of order picking activities
We conducted our empirical studies in two distinct warehouses that share two common charac-
teristics in line with the scope of this chapter. When selecting the warehouses for our empirical
study we required that these had certain similarities and dissimilarities. On one hand, the ware-
houses must be similar in that the order picking activities must be organized in zones sequentially
so that the walking distances are limited, and the retrieving times must be an important com-
ponent of the total picking cycle times. Furthermore, to enable analysis of the influence of the
picking height, the items of both warehouses should be stored in totes at multiple levels. In
addition, we require that both warehouses have a significant proportion of picking tours that
only visit one location, which makes the results easier to compare between warehouses. On the
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other hand, we also allowed for differences in order profiles, particularly in product characteris-
tics (see Section 5.3.4) and differences in layouts for selecting the warehouses to obtain insights
in the potential generalizability of the empirical findings.
The first warehouse is the main distribution center of Yamaha Motor for motorized vehicles’
spare parts in Europe. The warehouse has a large assortment of over 150,000 Stock Keeping
Units (SKUs). The order picking activities are organized in areas and zones. We conducted a
study in the main area for fast moving items of small and medium size that is sub-divided into
32 zones. Within this area, in each pick route, exactly one location is visited. Each zone has a
computer terminal next to the depot, where the picker scans the item picked, confirms the pick,
and views the next orderline to pick. In addition, a pick-to-light system with a red blinking
display is used to indicate the location from which an item must be retrieved.
The second warehouse is that of Sorbo Distribution Center (DC), a main importer and
distributor in The Netherlands of non-food products for supermarkets. Given that the Sorbo
DC deals with fast-moving items with a relatively low unitary value, the primary concern for
Sorbo DC is cost efficiency in order picking operations. Similar to the Yamaha Distribution
Center (DC), Sorbo’s warehouse is organized in 24 zones where one picker is responsible for
picking items per zone. Sorbo also works with a pick-to-light system, however, picked products
need not be scanned at the depot. Confirmation of the picks is achieved by indicating the number
of units picked at the picking locations themselves. Another important feature is that the stored
products are re-arranged before the start of every shift using a dynamic picking system concept
where the picking positions constitute a forward area and storage positions behind the picking
positions constitute a reserve area. This system allows for the handling of a large assortment in
a small area at high picking rates (De Koster et al. 2007, Yu and De Koster, 2008). Most of the
routes, about 85%, visit only a single location.
In both warehouses there are three equally spaced picking levels at heights ranging from
0.25 m to 1.90 m in the case of Yamaha DC and 0.20 m to 1.40 m in the case of Sorbo DC.
See Figure 5.1 for a simplified layout of a typical zone for the Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC.
While the Yamaha DC has 145 product locations available per zone, the Sorbo DC has 120
locations available per zone and a simpler layout. The Yamaha DC has typically heavier and
less voluminous items than the Sorbo DC as the items of the Yamaha DC are mostly made of
metal while the Sorbo DC items are usually made of plastic.
5.2.1 Empirical study of picking cycle time
We define the picking cycle time as the time lapse from the receipt of an orderline at the picker’s
terminal until dropping the products in a bin at the depot. The picking cycle can be broken
down into the following activities: receipt of a new orderline, walking to the picking location,
searching the specific location and retrieving the units of a product from such a location, walking
back with the units to the depot, dropping off the picked products at the depot, and finally
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Figure 5.1: Simplified layout of a typical Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC picking zone.
confirming the pick at the depot. A number of drivers can influence each of the order picking
activities. We classify these drivers as either location factors, or product factors. Our choice for
selecting explanatory variables for cycle time is driven by our goal of enhancing tactical storage
location decisions. Hence, we include location factors as well as interaction effects of location
with product factors, but we do not include other factors (such as salaries or motivational
incentives) that are out of the scope of storage location decisions, even though such factors may
still influence cycle time indirectly. Further, for the cases studied there was not any variation in
these factors in order to estimate their influence. Salaries and incentive schemes are the same
for all the personnel within the order picking area of a warehouse. Individual differences are
also irrelevant for the analysis due to the tactical nature of storage decisions: storage decisions
can not be changed too frequently to adapt specifically for a given individual. Thus, storage
decisions need to be designed for a given population.
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Table 5.1: Picking time breakdown analysis.
Main effects Interaction effects
Picking sub-activities Location factors Product factors
MA CA CN L(k) LB M V Q M ∗ L(k) V ∗ L(k) Q ∗ L(k)
New orderline receipt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Walk from depot + + + ? ? n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Retrieve & search item n/a n/a n/a +/- + + + + ? ? ?
Return to depot + + + n/a ? ? ? ? n/a n/a n/a
Drop picked item(s) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ? ? ? n/a n/a n/a
Confirm orderline n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ? ? + n/a n/a n/a
Location factors
MA : Section number in the main aisle.
CA : Section number in the cross aisle (valid only for Yamaha DC).
CN : Cross aisle number (valid only for Yamaha DC).
K : Picking levels set K = {1, 2, 3} where 1 is the lowest level
and 3 the highest.
L(k) : 1 if picked at level k ∈ K; 0 otherwise.
LB : 1 if picked from a large bin; 0 otherwise (valid only for Yamaha DC).
Product factors
Q : Quantity picked.
M : Unit mass of the product.
V : Unit volume of the product.
It is logical to assume that while 2D location factors (i.e. MA, CA and CN) positively
influence walking times, the different picking levels only influence retrieving and searching times.
In the case of the Yamaha DC, we also include picking from locations with large bins (LB). This
may influence the retrieving times because large bins require the arms to be stretched slightly
further to reach the products.
Intuitively, the product factors mainly influence retrieving times and possibly walking times
due to greater difficulty in carrying items. It may be possible, though, that product factors also
influence the time it takes to drop off products, the time to return to the depot or even the time
to confirm an order. In particular, the quantity picked may influence the time to confirm an
order as items are counted in this activity.
Finally, in the case of retrieving times there are possible interaction effects between the
pick level and the product factors. For example, it may well be that it is additionally difficult
to manipulate heavy and/or voluminous items at a top storage level than at an intermediate,
“Golden Zone” level, however this is to be verified empirically. We summarize our hypotheses
in Table 5.1 marking almost certain effects with an “+” or a “+/-” (all of which are positive
effects, except for the case of height which we hypothesize has a curvilinear effect “+/-”),
potential effects with a “?” and no effects with a “n/a” (i.e. not applicable).
Using the table, we can formulate the picking cycle time CT Y at the Yamaha DC in terms
of the hypothesized effects. We detail how our model is built as follows. As the 2D location
factors directly influence the walking distances, it is logical to assume that these factors (MA,
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CA and CN) linearly influence cycle times considering a constant walking speed, where b1,
b2 and b3 are the corresponding linear coefficients to be estimated. The different levels L(k)
are modeled as dummy variables with the medium level k∗ = 2 as the reference level to avoid
perfect multicollinearity with α(k) corresponding to the additional time required to retrieve an
item at k. For simplicity, the quantity to be picked is also assumed to influence the retrieving
times and dropping-off activities linearly. This is actually an approximation of a more complex
relationship as certain items may be grabbed in batches. Note that the incremental pick quantity
(incremental over 1) is used in the model and not the quantity picked itself. This is done because
most often one piece of each product is needed. We can interpret coefficient b4 as the additional
time required to pick one additional item. The main effects are completed by not making a
priori assumptions on the effects of volume and mass, using general functions f(M) and g(V ) as
these are unknown and several functional forms must be tested. Further, to account for possible
interaction effects of quantity, mass and volume effects with heights k ∈ K, we introduce β(k),
γ(k) and λ(k) linear coefficients respectively. The formulation of cycle time for the Yamaha DC
where k∗ = 2 is thus:
CT Y = b0+b1MA+ b2CA+ b3CN+
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
α(k)L(k)
= +b4(Q− 1) + b5f(M) + b6g(V ) + b7LB + IN + ε, (5.1)
where IN contains the interaction effects given by the following relationship:
IN = (Q− 1)
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
β(k)L(k)+f(M)
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
γ(k)L(k)+g(V )
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
λ(k)L(k) (5.2)
For the Sorbo DC, the factors CA, CN and LB do not apply and therefore the predicted
relationship for its cycle time CTS simplifies to:
CTS= b0+b1MA+
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
α(k)L(k)+b4(Q− 1) + b5f(M) + b6g(V ) + IN + ε. (5.3)
Data collection
To analyze the effects of location and product characteristics on cycle times, we obtained real
operational data at both warehouses from their warehouse management systems. The warehouse
management systems provided detailed information about the location of each pick (i.e. level,
aisle number, section number) and characteristics of the product to be picked (i.e. mass, volume,
length, width and height). The use of the warehouse management systems’ data provides several
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advantages over traditional time studies (Barnes, 1968) for estimating cycle times given different
location and product related products. The main advantage is the possibility to obtain a large
set of observations with little effort as the day to day operational data is automatically stored
in the system and the impact of several cycle time drivers can be quantified simultaneously.
For traditional time studies, separate measurements would be required for every combination
of factors: height, 2D location, product weight and volume, rendering it a very time-consuming
and impractical method for most applications in which a large number of combinations exist.
Further, unlike typical assembly tasks with pre-defined and standardized micro-movements,
order picking operations involve a large array of distinct micro-movements depending on the
product and location characteristics.
Another advantage of using data directly from warehouse management systems is that obser-
vations are taken under normal operating conditions without any interference of a video camera
or a researcher, hence possible distortions on the data set are minimized. Finally, as information
about the regressors are obtained electronically, the possibility of measurement errors is very
low compared to time studies.
However, using data directly from a warehouse management system also has certain limi-
tations. One of the limitations of field data is the inability to control variables. However, the
significant variability in the picks (different product sizes, masses, pick locations) over several
days of operation mitigates this potential limitation. In the case of the Yamaha DC, we obtained
19,380 observations from a period of three picking days with two shifts per day and 20 order
pickers working simultaneously. In the case of the Sorbo DC, we obtained 24,260 observations
in a period of two days with 24 pickers working simultaneously in a single shift.
Another limitation is the fact that cycle times are not measured directly in the warehouses;
only the instants at which the orderlines are confirmed and registered. Thus, only the time
lapse between two consecutive picks is known, but not the actual time required for each pick.
It is important to note that the practice of only registering confirmation times is a common
practice in warehouse management systems. In that sense, the warehouses in our study are
quite representative of what can be found in other warehouses. In the next section we show how
to minimize the effect of this limitation.
Dealing with multiple outliers
As mentioned, the main challenge in analyzing the data sets of both warehouses is that there
is a difference between the data we can get and the data we need. The warehouse management
systems at the Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC provide the times at which picks are confirmed (that
is, finished), but not the times at which a pick was started by an employee. When subtracting
consecutive confirmation times, we obtain in most cases the desired cycle time. However, some-
times the difference between two confirmation times may also include an unobservable waiting
time that is the time between the completion of one pick and the start of the next. A preliminary
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time study with 150 observations in each warehouse showed that about 25% (20%) of the picks
at the Yamaha DC (Sorbo DC) have waiting times.
The picks with waiting times are of two types. The first type relates to picks interrupted
by disruption events such as system breakdowns and breaks (including workers going to the
restrooms or that take time to talk with their colleagues or supervisor) and makes up 10% (8%)
of the total picks at the Yamaha DC (Sorbo DC). The second type relates to idle time due to the
excess capacity of the picking system and involves 15% (12%) of the total picks at the Yamaha
DC (Sorbo DC).
As a result, the data sets have multiple outliers that are dealt with in two stages. In a first
stage, cut-off times are set to eliminate “obvious” outliers from the preliminary study. These
cut-off times are based on the maximum observed cycle times in the preliminary study that did
not have any waiting times. For the Yamaha DC it was determined that main aisle picks do
not exceed 52 seconds and that cross aisle picks do not exceed 55 seconds. In the case of the
Sorbo DC, the cutoff time was established at 26 seconds. With this procedure 13% (9%) of the
observations obtained at Yamaha DC (Sorbo DC) where deleted from the sample. This meant
that most of the picks with waiting times caused by disruptions where deleted from the sample
given that 80% of these exceeded twice the cut-off time established. Once the more “obvious”
outliers were removed from the sample, the number of observations remaining for the Yamaha
DC and Sorbo DC are 13, 216 and 19, 898, respectively.
For the second stage, a statistical treatment to deal with outliers is performed on both
samples. Classical identification techniques for outliers that use common distance measures
such as Mahalanobis or Cook’s fail in our study because the computed distance measures are
based on the covariance matrix of the observations which may be already biased towards the
outliers (Wisnowsky, 1999). As a result, these techniques suffer from a phenomenon called
“masking” where outliers are falsely classified as inliers. In addition, these techniques may also
suffer from “swamping” errors where inliers are classified falsely as outliers.
To reduce the influence of multiple outliers, several techniques to classify outliers have been
proposed. Wisnowsky (1999) gives a comprehensive review. However, each technique has its
advantages and drawbacks and no specific multiple-outlier analysis technique has been deemed
superior under all circumstances. For our analysis, we first explore the data using quantile re-
gression which has been suggested in the literature for cases where relevant unobserved variables
exist (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) as in the case of unobserved waiting times. The technique
involves calculating an unbiased estimator of the quantile τ of dependent variable y conditioning
on n regressors: QY (τ | X), where X is the |T | × n observed variables matrix. As a result, the
array of coefficients b is the solution to the following minimization problem where T is the set
of observations:
min
b∈ n
[
∑
t∈{T :yt≥xt′b}
τ
∣∣yt − xt′b∣∣+ ∑
t∈{T :yt<xt′b}
(1− τ) ∣∣yt − xt′b∣∣]. (5.4)
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When using quantile regression we can, for example, perform a regression on the median by
using a value of τ = 0.5. Such a regression has the advantage that it is typically less sensitive to
extreme values than the average used in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) because data is ranked
instead of averaged out. Moreover, quantile regression provides additional information as it
allows us to explore the behavior of the sample by showing how different segments (quantiles)
of the observed data are influenced by the regressors. The technique has been used successfully
in ecology where differences in the population are acknowledged. In the case of the data sets
available, we expect that a quantile τ < 0.5 will have the best model fit. This is due to the
fact that most of the outliers lie in the upper quantiles since additional waiting times will only
increase the values of the observations.
Once we are able to explore the data using different quantiles and compare the resulting
model fits we are then able to explore which empirical relationships are more representative
of the data. As the relationships obtained are only explorative in nature, we then apply an
M-robust regression to confirm the exploratory findings. M-robust regression (Huber, 1964)
is a technique recommended for dealing with multiple outliers and addresses the problem by
assigning less weight to probable outliers in an iterative procedure. The algorithm starts by
running a simple OLS regression and then reduces the weight of the observations with greater
residuals. Thus, the weighted standard errors are minimized as shown in equation (5.5). The
procedure is repeated until the change in the regression coefficients is negligible.
min
b∈ n
∑
t∈T
wt(yt − xt′b). (5.5)
There are several functions available to determine the weights wt. In particular we use the
method of (Huber, 1964). In this case, the weights are given by the following relationship where
c is a constant set to c = 1.345σ and et is the residual of the t-th observation obtained from the
previously applied weighted regression.
wt =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if |et| ≤ c,
c/ |et| if |et| > c.
(5.6)
Statistical analysis
Using relationships (5.1) and (5.3) corresponding to the Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC, we tested
for main location effects, main product effects, as well as interaction effects. We used piecewise
linear regression to explore possible non-linearities of mass and volume, i.e. for f(M) and g(V ).
However, interaction effects with different segments of the piecewise relations appeared not to
add significantly to the quality of the fit, while increasing the complexity of the model to a
large extent. The most parsimonious solution for both data sets was to include only volume
as a potential factor, thus excluding mass. Apparently, volume is a better proxy than mass to
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handle complexities such as easiness to grab a product or easiness to retrieve a product from
its location. This is confirmed by the fact that we did not find significant results when mass
categories were included, not even at a 0.1 significance level. As a result, the final relationship
tested for both data sets is given as follows:
CT Y = b0+b1MA+ b2CA+ b3CN+
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
α(k)L(k)
+b4(Q− 1) + b5LV + b6HV + IN + ε, (5.7)
where:
LV : Low volume item (1 if V ≤ 0.05 dm3; 0 otherwise)
HV : High volume item (1 if V > 5 dm3; 0 otherwise)
IN = (Q− 1)
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
β(k)L(k)+LV
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
γ(k)L(K) +HV
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
λ(k)L(k) (5.8)
Note that for the Sorbo DC, the relationship is similar to the one shown in (5.7) with the
difference that two 2D location factors are excluded (CA and CN).
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 show the results of the empirical cycle time model for the Yamaha
and Sorbo DC respectively. Results have been obtained using the open-source statistical anal-
ysis software “R” with the “Quantreg” (Koenker, 2008) add-on package for quantile regression
analysis. For comparison purposes, the empirical model is built using three distinct procedures:
that of ordinary least squares regression, quantile regression (Q) for different τ quantiles and
the built-in MASS package for M-robust regression (M-R.R.) analysis.
The results of both data sets show that the different methods agree in the direction of
the main effects, and to a certain extent in the magnitude. This implies that the results are
moderately robust, which in turn suggests that the impact of the outliers is limited. In addition,
it is also interesting to compare across the quantile regression models using the R1 parameters.
This parameter is a measure of fit analogous but not comparable to R2. See (Koenker and
Basset, 1999) for details. It appears that lower quantiles provide better fits although this effect
reduces as the quantiles get lower. The variation in the R1 seems to confirm that the model
suffers from some “inflated” observations located mainly at the upper quantiles (τ > 0.9).
The application of the M-robust regression method does appear to increase the overall fit of
the model by yielding a 30.6% R2 for the Yamaha DC and 40.4% R2 for the Sorbo DC (using the
OLS procedure 20.2% and 22.4% of model fit was obtained for each warehouse, respectively).
The coefficients estimated with the M-robust procedure are used as input in the next section for
a trade-off analysis between economic and cycle time objectives.
We note that because the data came from normal operational conditions it was influenced
by several unobserved effects, such as employees taking micro-pauses to talk to colleagues, em-
Table 5.2: Yamaha DC, empirical cycle time model.
Variables OLS Q τ = 0.2 Q τ = 0.4 Q τ = 0.5 Q τ = 0.6 Q τ = 0.8 M-R.R.
(Intercept) 18.105∗∗∗ 11.873∗∗∗ 15.123∗∗∗ 16.706∗∗∗ 18.564 24.095∗∗∗ 17.378∗∗∗
MA 0.762∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
CA 1.257∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗ 1.541 1.478∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗
CN 1.401∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗
L(1) 1.084∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 1.286∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗
L(3) 0.272 0.207 0.392∗ 0.403 0.354 0.323 0.303∗
Q− 1 0.748∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗
LV -0.391∗ -0.259 -0.568∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗ -0.696∗∗ -0.753∗ -0.537∗∗∗
HV 0.182 0.380 0.880∗ 0.627 0.761 0.444 0.522
LB 0.860∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(Q− 1) ∗ L(1) 0.623∗∗ 0.761∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.339 0.215 0.566∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(Q− 1) ∗ L(3) 0.045 0.094 0.106 0.128 -0.003 0.134 0.036
LV ∗ L(1) 0.169 0.083 0.481 0.602 0.471 -0.004 0.265
LV ∗ L(3) 1.368∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗ 1.335∗∗∗
HV ∗ L(1) 1.299 0.593 0.169 0.684 0.798 1.308∗ 0.824
HV ∗ L(3) -0.016 -0.044 -0.753 -0.023 -0.061 -0.047 -0.105
R1 -.- 0.182 0.188 0.179 0.162 0.097 -.-
R2 0.202 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.306
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares,Q τ quantile regression at quantile τ
M-R.R.: M-Robust regression method.
Significance levels: p ≤ 0.05(∗), p ≤ 0.01(∗∗), p ≤ 0.001(∗∗∗). Time given in seconds.
nCTY =13,316
Table 5.3: Sorbo DC, empirical cycle time model.
Variables OLS Q τ = 0.2 Q τ = 0.4 Q τ = 0.5 Q τ = 0.6 Q τ = 0.8 M-R.R.
(Intercept) 8.310∗∗∗ 5.333∗∗∗ 6.333∗∗∗ 7.000∗∗∗ 7.818∗∗∗ 10.400∗∗∗ 7.556∗∗∗
MA 0.590∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
L(1) -0.131 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.055
L(3) 0.068 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.182∗ -0.200 0.172∗
Q− 1 1.083∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗
LV -0.094 -0.333∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗ 0.000 -0.368∗∗
HV 1.031∗∗∗ 0.237 0.667∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(Q− 1) ∗ L(1) 0.007 -0.111 -0.117 -0.028 -0.091 -0.079 -0.103∗
(Q− 1) ∗ L(3) 0.121 0.000 -0.028 -0.012 -0.023 0.171 0.033
LV ∗ L(1) -0.501∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.167 -0.090 -1.000∗ -0.217
LV ∗ L(3) 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.273 0.800 0.315
HV ∗ L(1) 0.820∗∗∗ 0.667 0.333∗ 0.333 0.818∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
HV ∗ L(3) 1.305∗∗∗ 0.667 0.667∗∗ 0.333 0.909 3.000∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
R1 -.- 0.214 0.198 0.181 0.157 0.102 -.-
R2 0.224 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.404
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares,Q τ quantile regression at quantile τ
M-R.R.: M-Robust regression method.
Significance levels: p ≤ 0.05(∗), p ≤ 0.01(∗∗), p ≤ 0.001(∗∗∗). Time given in seconds.
nCTS =19,898
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ployees correcting small mistakes in the confirmation of picks, or very brief delays in information
processing at the terminals. We verified if fatigue may influence the results by incorporating
dummy variables representing the shift intervals. However, no significant effects were found. To
account for hetereoskedasticity, the errors shown in the table are White, hetereoskedasticity-
consistent errors.
Besides comparing the different techniques, a more noteworthy comparison is that across the
data sets of the two companies. The main location and product factors have significant effects
on cycle times that point in the same direction for both warehouses. Furthermore, standardizing
the coefficients of the results shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, there is a clear ranking of the
strength and relevance of the factors. We mention them in descending order: (1) 2D location
factors (i.e. MA, CA, CN), (2) quantity to be picked, (3) height level of location. The main
effects found for pick height confirm our hypothesis that different heights do require different
retrieving and searching times. However, the effects are more evident in the Yamaha DC than
the Sorbo DC because the Yamaha DC has a larger range of heights than the Sorbo DC.
In fourth place in the rankings are the interaction effects found in the picking levels. As
for the interaction effects, these generally point in the same direction for all methods tried.
However, in the Yamaha DC small items located at upper levels take more picking time, while
in the Sorbo DC large items take more time when located at the lowest and highest levels. It
is possible that the effect of large items in the Yamaha DC was not confirmed due to a lack of
observations of large items. In addition, it is possible that in the Yamaha DC, the higher level
of the racks may have accounted for pickers taking more time in retrieving small items which
need to be searched for before grabbing. Finally, it is worth noting that although the quantity
is important in estimating cycle time, it is not very relevant for location decisions as only a
moderate interaction effect was found in the case of the Sorbo DC.
5.2.2 Discomfort rating prediction model
Data collection
In this section we provide a measure for overall discomfort based on Borg’s CR-10 scale (Borg,
1982; Dul et al., 1994). The scale combines desirable ratio and categorical properties by assigning
labels for values from 0 to 10. In this way, 0 stands for no discomfort at all, 2 for weak discomfort,
3 for moderate discomfort, 5 for strong discomfort and 10 for the maximum discomfort, which
requires the person to immediately stop the work activity. Values can be obtained from direct
feedback of the workers on the job.
Data were collected during two days in each warehouse, observing each employee for only
one day. In the case of the Yamaha DC, data for 5 employees were collected. In the case of the
Sorbo DC, data for 7 employees were collected. For each employee a minimum of 40 observations
were obtained. The randomly selected pickers were asked to rate their discomfort for each pick
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by telling their Borg scale rating directly to an evaluator who records the rating. This procedure
has several advantages. First, the picker can concentrate fully on his task without having to
write down the ratings himself which would interfere with a normal workflow. Second, the picker
is urged to state his rating immediately, thus avoiding any ex-post rationalizations of his rating
and enhancing the recall his physical picking experience.
The evaluator recording the ratings also recorded a number of other aspects. First, he
recorded the level at which the item was picked. Second, the evaluator estimated if the item was
of moderately high-volume (MV ) or high-volume (HV ). Products are considered of moderately
high-volume if the volume is between 1 dm3 and 5 dm3 and of high-volume if the volume is
greater than 5 dm3. Thirdly, it was recorded whether more than 3 units (MQ) or 7 units (HQ)
were picked in a single orderline. Heavy products (HM), having a mass over 3 kg, were identified
by the pickers themselves and communicated to the evaluator who checks the actual weight of
the pick. The reason why only ordinal data is collected, is because of the lack of time between
picks to allow registration of precise characteristics of the items.
To control for differences in evaluating ratings, due to personal traits (including mood,
sensitivity to discomfort), we also controlled for individual differences. We included a number of
dummy variables (the number of participants minus one) to account for individual differences.
These dummy variables are denoted by E(r) where r is the identifier of the employee such that
r ∈ R, and r∗ is the individual employee taken as reference.
To predict the discomfort rating for a product picked at a certain location, we use a similar
formulation as was used for predicting the cycle time, assuming parsimony, we estimate a linear
relationship with main effects where b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 and b6 are the linear coefficients to be
estimated. This information is the same for both warehouses.
DY = b0 +
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
α(k)L(k) + b1HM + b2MV + b3HV + b4MQ+ b5HQ+
∑
r∈R,r 
=R∗
b6E
(r)
+ IND + ε (5.9)
The term IND allows for possible interaction effects with picking at different levels and
assumes that the nature of such interactions is linear with coefficients β(k), γ(k), λ(k), η(k) and
ζ(k) to be estimated. The term IND is given by:
IND = HM
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
β(k)L(k) +MV
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
γ(k)L(k) +HV
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
λ(k)L(k)
+MQ
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
η(k)L(k) +HQ
∑
k∈K,k 
=k∗
ζ(k)L(k) (5.10)
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Table 5.4: Empirical discomfort model for Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC.
Yamaha DC Sorbo DC
Variables b Std. error. b Std. error.
(Intercept) 1.595∗∗∗ 0.167 1.880∗∗∗ 0.150
L(1) 1.274∗∗∗ 0.338 0.722∗∗∗ 0.169
L(3) 1.176∗∗ 0.336 0.842∗∗∗ 0.176
HM 2.965∗ 1.427 1.171∗∗ 0.390
MV 0.335 0.348 1.046∗∗∗ 0.365
HV -0.175 0.802 3.286∗∗∗ 0.390
MQ 2.008∗∗∗ 0.533 1.161∗∗∗ 0.189
HQ 1.773∗∗ 0.550 2.143∗∗∗ 0.333
HM ∗ L(1) 2.059 2.332 1.075∗ 0.476
HM ∗ L(3) -0.974 1.758 0.395 0.443
n 235 -.- 749 -.-
R2 0.279 -.- 0.311 -.-
Significance levels: p ≤ 0.05(∗), p ≤ 0.01(∗∗), p ≤ 0.001(∗∗∗).
Time given in seconds.
Statistical analysis
The analysis of discomfort ratings using ordinary least squares is given in Table 5.4. Picking
from different levels, picking heavy items and picking several units of the same item have a
significant effect on discomfort levels. The magnitude of the effect is different though for both
warehouses. Only for the Sorbo DC do the data confirm that the size of the product has an
effect on discomfort. One possible reason why we do not find this for the Yamaha DC may be
that we only have relatively few observations (49) in which we observe picks of medium or high
volume. Similarly, for the interaction effects, we only find significant effects between picking
levels and heavy masses and only in the case of the Sorbo DC.
The dummy variables we introduced for controlling individual differences do not influence
the results significantly. For this reason and for the sake of conciseness, we report the results
omitting the dummy variables of individuals even though these variables were included in the
model. Besides, there appears to be a certain consistency among pickers concerning discomfort
as evidenced by the high significance of the effects. All these facts suggest that pickers rec-
ognize differences in discomfort given different picking levels and masses, and are conscious of
uncomfortable positions if asked directly.
In addition, it is interesting to note that the main effects point in the same direction for
the estimation of discomfort ratings and cycle times. This suggests that improvements in one
of the objectives may coincide with improvements in the other objective. However, given the
different magnitude of the results a trade-off between objectives may also be possible. This will
be investigated through the use of a multi-objective optimization model presented in the next
section.
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5.3 Storage assignment multi-objective model
5.3.1 Model formulation
The proposed model is a multi-objective optimization model with two objectives. The first
objective is economical and concerns the minimization of the expected cycle time of picking
operations. The second objective is social and entails the minimization of the expected average
discomfort rating for retrieving actions. We are interested in obtaining a set of non-dominated
solutions that can provide an idea about the trade-offs that a decision maker faces when deter-
mining storage locations for items within a particular zone in a warehouse.
To formulate the model we first define the following:
Sets
I : the set of all items to be stored.
J : the set of all possible storage locations.
Variables
xij : 1, if item i is stored at location j; 0 otherwise.
Model parameters
Dij : is a function that assigns for each possible combination of items and storage locations
(i, j) ∈ I × J , an expected discomfort measure such that Dij ∈ [0, 10].
CT ij : is a function that assigns for each possible combination of items and
locations (i, j) ∈ I × J an expected cycle time.
pi : probability that whenever there is a pick, the item picked is i ∈ I.
We can now formulate the problem as follows:
z1 = min
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
CTijxijpi (5.11)
z2 = min
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
Dijxijpi (5.12)
s.t.∑
i∈I
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (5.13)
∑
j∈J
xij = 1 ∀i ∈ I (5.14)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J (5.15)
The economic objective (5.11) minimizes the expected cycle time by multiplying the respec-
tive cycle times of a given item in a given location by the probability that such item is picked. To
obtain the cycle time CTij for the specific cases of the Yamaha DC and the Sorbo DC we used
equations (5.7) and (5.9) with the corresponding coefficients estimated using the M-robust esti-
mation method found in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 for the Yamaha DC and the Sorbo DC respectively.
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Analogously, the social objective (5.12) minimizes the expected average discomfort rating by
multiplying the respective discomfort rating of a given location-item combination by the proba-
bility that such an item is picked. To obtain the discomfort rating Dij for each product-location
combination we used expression (5.9) with the coefficients found via the ordinary least-squares
regression method displayed in Table 5.4.
Constraints (5.13) require that at most one type of item can be stored in a single storage
position. Constraints (5.14) require that every item be assigned to only one location. From both
constraints it can be inferred that we implicitly assume that there must be at least as many
locations as items to be located, |I| = ∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
xij ≤ |J |, otherwise the model would be infeasible.
5.3.2 Model solution approach
The bi-objective assignment problem is known to be NP-complete (Ehrgott 2000). However,
when considering only one objective, the problem reduces to a classical assignment problem
which can be solved in polynomial time using the well-known Kuhn-Munkres algorithm (Munkres
1957). We are interested in the existence of any trade-offs between both objectives. We therefore
use several convex combinations of both objectives to obtain supported non-dominated solutions
(Ehrgott 2000), which are representative of the efficient frontier. We summarize our approach
in the following steps.
1. Obtain an estimate for the cycle time and discomfort rating for every location-product
pair by means of the formulas presented in Section 5.2.
2. Standardize the cycle times and discomfort ratings obtained in step 1 by subtracting the
average of the estimated cycle times and discomfort rating from each estimated value and
dividing this result by the standard deviation of the estimated values.
3. Choose a value of α in the range α ∈ [0, 1] to combine both goals z =αz1 + (1− α)z2 and
assign a single penalty for every location-product pair as a result of the combination of
both objectives.
4. Avoid negative assignment cost values by adding the minimum of the standardized cycle
times and discomfort ratings obtained to all standardized values.
5. Solve the resulting single-assignment problem.
6. Track back the selected assignments to obtain the actual average cycle time and average
discomfort time of the non-dominated result obtained in Step 5.
Note that we apply, in step 2, a standardization procedure to bring the scales for the two
goals to the same order of magnitude. This step is just to facilitate the selection of values for
α while exploring the efficient frontier. We also apply step 4 to avoid negative assignment cost
values not allowed when solving the Kuhn-Murkes algorithm.
5.3 Storage assignment multi-objective model 145
18.8
19
19.2
19.4
19.6
19.8
20
20.2
20.4
1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Discomfort (CR-10 Borg Scale)
C
yc
le
 t
im
e 
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
Real efficient frontier
Heuristic solution
10%
21%
W
H
WH
2%
3%
Figure 5.2: Efficient frontier of economic and social goals at Yamaha DC.
5.3.3 Model results
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the efficient frontier for zones at the Yamaha DC and Sorbo DC in
the bi-objective assignment problem. As the total number of SKUs is larger than the number
of locations in one zone, we preselected the SKUs randomly from the assortment list of each
warehouse. The random selection was repeated six times for each warehouse, each time we solved
the resulting bi-objective problem. Note that also in practice, when determining which SKUs
should be allocated to each zone, random assignments are used to balance the stations’ workload.
Six trade-off curves were constructed for each warehouse and then these were summarized by
averaging the six non-dominated solutions obtained for each selected α value. Figures 5.2 and
5.3 show the average efficient curve for each typical zone of a warehouse. It must be noted that
the shape of each of the six curves was similar, displaying only shifting effects between them.
Each figure shows two dominated solutions indicated by a “W” that correspond to the worst
case of solving a single objective assignment problem by considering only the economic or the
social criterion. In addition, we also included a hierarchical solution approach marked with an
“H” in which we first optimize for one criterion and then we choose, among the obtained optimal
solutions, the one yielding the best performance for the other criterion.
The first important observation is that significant improvements can be made by optimizing
hierarchically. Using this approach, between 2 to 5% in picking time can be saved for both ware-
houses by choosing the solution that yields the minimum cycle time from among the solutions
that yield the lowest possible average discomfort. When we use the hierarchical approach, but
optimize for cycle time first, we obtain a 4% improvement in terms of discomfort for the Sorbo
DC, while for the Yamaha DC only a less than 0.5% improvement can be obtained.
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Figure 5.3: Efficient frontier of economic and social goals at Sorbo DC.
This shows to some extent that improvements in the second criterion can be obtained while
keeping the first criterion at its optimal value. This implies that discomfort improvements are
possible at no economic cost. Conversely, when giving priority to employees’ well-being, efficiency
improvements are possible while maintaining a maximum quality of working conditions. This
also implies that optimizing only for the discomfort of employees is not advisable as the worst
case scenario can yield results with significantly higher economical costs.
A decision maker may also decide to select an intermediate non-dominated solution. As can
be easily seen in Figure 2, for the case of the Yamaha DC the trade-offs between discomfort and
cycle time are only slight; 21% of improvement in discomfort costs only 3% of cycle time. This
means that better values for discomfort can be obtained at fairly low costs with regard to cycle
time. At the Sorbo DC a potential improvement of 5% in picking cycle time has to be traded
off against an improvement of 16% in terms of discomfort ratings. It must be noted that these
numbers reflect the shape of the efficient frontier. In many cases a warehouse may actually be
operating at a point above and to the right of the curve. Starting from such a situation, initially
large savings are possible for both goals simultaneously. Only once the efficient frontier has been
reached, will trade-offs between cycle time and discomfort arise. Our model can aid in reaching
the efficient frontier in the first place. Then after identifying the frontier, the model can be used
to give insights about the trade-offs, which can be minor, as we found for the Yamaha DC, or
moderately significant, as we found for the Sorbo DC. Without the model, a warehouse may be
able to measure the current status of discomfort and cycle times, but it would not be possible
to predict the effects of a reconfiguration on both aspects simultaneously.
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Table 5.5: Empirical studies summary: a comparison of relative importance of location
factors.
Yamaha DC Sorbo DC
Factor Factor Cycle Time Discomfort Cycle Time Discomfort
Category Std. Coef. Imp. Std. Coef. Imp. Std. Coef. Imp. Std. Coef. Imp.
2D location MA 0.134∗∗∗ P -.- n.a. 0.423∗∗∗ P -.- n.a.
2D location CA 0.435∗∗∗ P -.- n.a. -.- n.a. -.- n.a.
2D location CN 0.198∗∗∗ P -.- n.a. -.- n.a. -.- n.a.
Level L(1) 0.058∗∗∗ S 0.225∗∗∗ P 0.006 n.s. 0.176∗∗∗ P
Level L(3) 0.019∗∗∗ S 0.211∗∗ P 0.008∗ S 0.197∗∗∗ P
Interaction LV ∗ L(1) 0.007 n.s. -.- n.s. -0.008 n.s. -.- n.s.
Interaction LV ∗ L(3) 0.072∗∗∗ S -.- n.s. 0.013 n.s. -.- n.s.
Interaction HV ∗ L(1) 0.012 n.s. -.- n.s. 0.029∗∗∗ S -.- n.s.
Interaction HV ∗ L(3) -0.016 n.s. -.- n.s. 0.028∗∗∗ S -.- n.s.
Interaction (Q− 1) ∗ L(1) 0.022∗∗∗ -.- n.s. -0.019∗ S -.- n.s.
Interaction (Q− 1) ∗ L(3) 0.005 n.s. -.- n.s. 0.004 n.s. -.- n.s.
Interaction HM ∗ L(1) -.- n.s. 0.061 n.s. -.- n.s. 0.123∗ P
Interaction HM ∗ L(3) -.- n.s. -0.064 n.s. -.- n.s. 0.037 n.s.
Importance: P: Primary, S: Secondary, n.a.: not applicable. n.s.: not significant
Significance levels: p ≤ 0.05(∗), p ≤ 0.01(∗∗), p ≤ 0.001(∗∗∗). Time given in seconds.
5.3.4 Model validation
The empirical results of Section 5.2 show that many factors work similarly for cycle time and
discomfort at both Yamaha DC and the Sorbo DC. In Table 5.5 we summarize the findings
of Section 2 classifying the relative importance of each location factor category by using the
standardized coefficients obtained in the empirical investigations (the robust regressions for cycle
time estimation models) and comparing their order of magnitude. The standardized coefficients
are obtained by estimating the same model as in Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 over the standardized values
of the observations from the data sets. Note that for the cycle time, we again use the robust
regression estimation method. The relative importance of the location and product factors
for explaining cycle time and discomfort is consistent across the warehouses studied. This is
surprising as these cases were selected for differences in product characteristics (see Section 5.2).
Hence, we hypothesize that the location factors’ relative importance hierarchy may hold more
generally.
To test the robustness of the empirical relationships we used the Yamaha DC empirical
Equation (5.7) and (5.9) to estimate cycle times and discomfort for the Sorbo DC for each item-
location combination. We then plugged these values into the bi-objective function and solved
the corresponding assignment problem. The resulting non-dominated solutions are presented
in Figure 5.3 with a dotted line. It is apparent that the result is very close to the actual
efficient frontier. This similarity strongly suggests that the relative importance of the cycle
time and discomfort determinants is similar for both warehouses. We then hypothesize that
for conventional warehouses with picker-to-part systems, our results may be generalizable as we
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expect a similar relative importance between walking and retrieving activities (in terms of cycle
time). We note that we applied the Yamaha DC empirical relationships for analyzing the Sorbo
DC and not the reverse as the Yamaha DC has a more general layout than the Sorbo DC.
One of the possible drawbacks of the proposed methodology is that it is a data intensive
approach. Given that there is a potential for generalization, we propose a simpler heuristic
procedure based on the empirical relationships obtained and the trade-off analysis results. The
procedure only requires basic knowledge about the items and locations at hand. To construct
such a procedure we use the ranking of the relative importance of the location factors obtained
as given in Table 5.5. For simplicity and generalizability, we select only those factors that
have been rated of primary importance either for cycle time or discomfort for both warehouses.
Interaction factors were found to be of only secondary importance. As a result we propose the
following simple heuristic that combines the two criteria and the popularity of a SKU:
1. Rank every location according to its 2D distance. Allow for ties in the case of locations
in the same section (i.e. a whole column of locations).
2. Assign locations in the “Golden Zone” a rank of 1 and locations outside the “Golden
Zone” a rank of 2.
3. For every rank at steps 1 and 2, divide the rank by the maximum rank obtained for each
step. Next, sum both ratios (for steps 1 and 2) to obtain a location score.
4. Sort the location scores in ascending order. Then, sort items in descending order popu-
larity and then assign the most popular items to the locations with the lowest scores.
The heuristic is constructed on the rationale that locationfactors are the most important and
that relative walking distance and height should have equal weight in order to balance economic
and discomfort considerations. This is because for reducing cycle time purposes, walking distance
is the dominant factor, while for reducing discomfort, picking heights is the dominant factor.
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show the dominated solution that this proposed heuristic yields, indicated
by the label “Heuristic Solution”. Although the heuristic solutions are dominated, these are close
to the set of non-dominated solutions for practical purposes. Hence, for the cases studied we find
that the proposed method resulted in “adequate” cycle time and discomfort levels. We caution
that this method is designed based on the cases studied and therefore is particularly tailored
to picking from shelves in environments where most of the picks involve only one orderline. We
expect that for multiple orderlines per pick the trade-off between minimizing cycle times and
discomfort would be less significant as pickers are forced to travel to further picking locations
and hence there are more “Golden Zone” positions available at still relatively good 2D locations.
It is clear that the trade-off analysis and the proposed allocation procedure should be further
tested in similar and different order picking contexts.
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5.4 Conclusions
This chapter presents a method for storage allocation decisions in the context of order picking
from shelves. In particular, this method goes further than current storage allocation decision
models in two main respects. First, we explicitly model the effect of location factors on cycle time
using actual data. Second, we introduce the new criterion of improving the workers’ well-being
by minimizing their discomfort. Our method highlights the value of data stored in warehouse
management systems. Furthermore, it shows that direct inquiry to pickers about their level of
discomfort is an effective way of determining their preferences.
From the empirical studies, we find that the empirical relations obtained in both warehouses
are similar in terms of the relative importance of each factor in predicting cycle times and dis-
comfort. Such similarity, suggests that the relationships for predicting cycle time and discomfort
are robust. Moreover, we find a certain degree of commonality between the determinants of cy-
cle time and discomfort. As a result, only moderate trade-offs between the economic goal of
minimizing cycle time and the well-being goal of minimizing discomfort were found.
From the trade-off analysis we conclude that optimizing only for discomfort may be a costly
option in terms of increased cycle time and is thus not advisable. We also observe that the
decision maker can improve both goals simultaneously until the solution reaches the efficient
frontier where he is forced to make a decision whether or not to sacrifice some cycle time for the
sake of decreasing discomfort. Hence, it is quite possible that a majority of firms that are not
in the efficient frontier may gain economic benefits and be able at the same time to care more
for the well-being of their employees when making storage assignment decisions.
Finally, based on the robustness of the empirical results we propose a heuristic procedure
which has the advantage that it does not require knowledge of the specific empirical relationships
to estimate cycle time and discomfort in a picking area. The procedure proved to be competitive
in the cases studied by identifying points in the efficient frontier. However, more testing is
recommended in similar and other contexts.

Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
In an article celebrating five decades of operations management, it was noted that “no good
manager would ignore the social dimension of the operating system” (Chopra et al, 2004). By
extension, the field of operations management requires to continuously study relevant behavior
of the people within an operating system. Acknowledging that fact, this thesis has addressed the
problem of how to incorporate insights from the behavioral and ergonomic sciences in operational
management models whenever workers are involved. Although, the scope of this thesis was
restricted to routine, repetitive work, this scope alone proved to be more than ample for one
thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis has served to initiate a systematic treatment of this subject,
acknowledging previous work and exploring new ways in which operations management models
may account for relevant human factors.
6.2 Key findings
To address the incorporation of relevant knowledge about workers in operations management
models, this thesis has taken both a general and a specific perspective. Both perspectives have
been necessary to the study of workers’ involvement in operations management models. The
general perspective served the purpose of providing an overview of the current state of the art,
limitations and opportunities at the interface of human factors and operations management.
The specific perspective on the other hand, allowed an in-depth study of specific human factors
that can be influenced by operations management variables and that can simultaneously impact
individual performance and job satisfaction.
This thesis started with the general perspective of Chapter 2, we found that there is value in
integrating dispersed knowledge from the behavioral and ergonomic sciences within a framework
for the purpose of making better informed operations management decisions regarding workers.
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In this way, Chapter 2 identified and documented relationships between human factors and
individual performance as well as job satisfaction. These relationships were evaluated in terms
of how specific these are characterized and how much consensus there is among them. In
particular, we found that relationships linking skill learning, skill forgetting, goal setting and
fatigue with individual performance can be described in a mathematical way, albeit, with certain
limitations. However, other factors including the use of incentives, peer pressure and feedback,
are linked to individual performance, but are not characterized in sufficient detail to be able
to transfer it into mathematical descriptions. Moreover, although contributing factors to job
satisfaction have been identified, their relationships and interactions remain unclear. The need
for more long-term longitudinal studies on contributing factors of job satisfaction is evident.
Chapter 2, however, shows that only a sub-set of these contributing factors are important for
operations management (see Figure 2.3).
Chapters 3 and 4, dealt, in-depth, with the subject of assigning production goals as an
operations management tool to boost performance. We sought answers to two main questions
in operations management contexts where workers are assigned a quantitative production goal to
accomplish within a given period. First, we verified how performance varies with goal difficulty
in operations management contexts. Second, we asked how do workers regulate their work pace
under the influence of goals. In addition, in contrast to most studies of goal setting, workers
are expected to work for the full assigned period with the desirable possibility of overreaching
the goal. Furthermore, we review both questions considering the heterogeneity of results in
work pace regulation and performance, such that individuals have different skill levels (i.e. a
maximum capacity to perform the task).
In Chapter 3, we show that modeling work pace as a decision process is feasible and useful for
generating testable hypotheses to answer the two questions presented above. Moreover, a frame-
work of hypotheses, organized by assumptions, is created. In this way, we deduce that workers
assumed to act myopically (i.e. considering only instantaneous desirability) behave differently
than workers assumed to act after planning their work pace (i.e. considering the cumulative
desirability for the whole period).
The laboratory study presented in Chapter 4, revealed evidence to support the assumption
that individuals plan their effort. The laboratory study also verified one of the main results from
the theory of goal setting by which performance increases with goal difficulty (level), but then
levels-off constrained by the skill level. More importantly, a new result was obtained in work
pace regulation. Challenging goals relative to the individual’s ability induce steady-state work
pace whereas non-challenging goals result in a decrease of the starting work pace with a slight
acceleration towards the deadline and not the goal. In the cases of a non-challenging goal an
acceleration towards the deadline was found instead of towards the goal as it has been previously
reported in the literature. Furthermore, it was found that challenging goals also make work pace
regulation patterns more predictable.
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Finally, in Chapter 5 we conducted an empirical field study for the estimation of order picking
cycle times and discomfort related to a given product and retrieval location. The empirical
investigation was then followed up with a bi-objective assignment model where it is possible to
estimate trade-off curves depicting non-dominated assignments for real warehouse cases. The
empirical investigation showed a general agreement in both warehouses as to which location
and product factors are important for estimating cycle times and discomfort. We also highlight
the fact that the vertical position of the retrieval location was important for both, cycle time
estimation and discomfort. As a result of such commonality, the analytical results showed a
moderate trade-off between improving discomfort and improving cycle times. The results were
also found to be robust and generalizable in similar order picking settings.
6.3 Contributions and implications for science
The studies presented in this thesis have direct implications at the interface of human factors and
operations management. Although the vantage point of this thesis is from the field of operations
management, the results of the studies in this thesis also have implications on the human factors
fields. Overall, however, it is worth noting the diversity of research methodologies that this
thesis makes use of in advancing knowledge at the interface of human factors and operations
management: literature reviews studies, theoretical decision-making studies, laboratory studies,
field studies and analytical trade-off studies. Such diversity in methodologies becomes a necessity
to study complex of phenomena on the boundary of two fields. In the following lines we discuss
the main implications for both academic fields of study.
Chapter 2’s main contribution lies in integrating dispersed knowledge of worker specific
factors and showing how such knowledge can be incorporated in operations management models.
By centering the discussion on relationships that link operation management models with human
factors, individual performance and job satisfaction, real progress can be made towards the
inclusion of such considerations in operations management models. We do, however, limit our
study to the inclusion of human factors that can be operationalized and that have an impact
either on the feasibility or the optimality of operations management models. Applying such
a relevance criterion is significant as it reduces the number of human factors that should be
modeled.
In addition, Chapter 2 suggests that it is essential to advance empirical research on hu-
man factors relationships to incorporate worker specific relationships in operations management
models. As empirical research defines relationships between human factors and operations, care
should be taken that the operations management models are formulated in ways that are ro-
bust in changes of the relationships. For example, general functions that can be adapted for
subsequent robustness analysis may be appropriate in handling uncertainties within the human
factors relationships. An example of this strategy is given in Chapter 3 where a general assign-
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ment matrix assigning discomfort ratings to different product-locations pairs has the advantage
that it can be adjusted with different estimation models.
From the results of goal setting studies in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, our contribution is
to challenge the assumption of operations management models that individual performance
is independent of external factors (Boudreau, 2003)(Boudreau et al., 2003). For operations
management models, our contribution is also to recognize that the assumption that workers
work at stationary rates is only valid under the influence of goals if these are challenging enough.
The findings described in the previous section regarding work pace regulation can be included
within simulation models or even queuing models that commonly assume stationary work rates,
reflecting more realistic dynamics under the influence of goals. Using these and other studies,
goals may be included as new decision variables in operations models.
Another important contribution of the studies in Chapter 3 and 4 is that these are, to our
knowledge, among the first studies that explicitly address the time dimension in goal setting.
Most studies of industrial psychology in goal setting (Locke and Latham, 2005) test moderators
together with goals, but have as the outcome total performance or overall satisfaction, ignoring
any variation over time in terms of effort levels. The patterns of work pace regulation found in
Chapter 3 and 4 show the value of longitudinal studies in discovering what the processes are
involved when goals and deadlines are assigned. Time has indeed been recognized as one of the
main dimensions in the field of motivation that still needs to be explored (Latham, 2006). The
results of the studies in Chapter 3 and 4 should encourage further work on the dimension of
time to gain a complete understanding of the dynamics of work regulation under an array of
different circumstances (e.g. incentive pay, deadlines, feedback given).
Moreover, methodologically, the theoretical models in Chapter 3 show that developing de-
cision making models have an unconventional value for theory building. The derivation of the
properties of these models can provide testable hypotheses for further empirical work. More-
over, as decision models provide an internal logic with a set of assumptions, falsifying any of the
hypotheses implies falsifying the entire decision model.
The study of storage location assignments presented in Chapter 5 contribute to a wider
debate in the operations management field: Is the objective of well-being aligned with that
of operational performance in operations management decisions? The methodology used in
Chapter 5 to build an empirical model to serves as input for a trade-off model may be replicated
to other operations management decisions where considerations of well-being and operational
performance are important. An example of the application of this methodology may be in shift
scheduling where the goal of cost effective schedules may not be completely aligned with that of
cost-efficient schedules. An empirical investigation may identify the commonality of contributing
factors related to work efficiency (performance measure) and fatigue (well-being measure). Such
commonality is the basis for any alignment or conflict in both objectives. Next, an analytical
model that uses the empirical study information can asses the commonality between both factors.
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6.4 Implications for practice
Certain results of the studies of this thesis also have implications for operations management
practitioners. While Chapter 2, is chiefly theoretical, it addresses a very pressing practical issue.
Several operations management decision models have been dismissed by operations managers
and planners on the basis that they are too unrealistic, dismissing important human factors.
Such criticism can be unfounded. It is only when an interaction exists between the decision
variables of a model and a worker-specific factor that the concern may be justified as shown
in Chapter 2. Thus, the frameworks provided to interface the two distinct fields (i.e. human
factors and operations management) helps to make operations management more applicable in
real settings where the participation of workers is fundamental.
The results of the goal setting studies from Chapter 3 and 4 provide managers with con-
firmation that assigning goals are useful for boosting performance. Furthermore, for managers
it makes sense to set challenging goals, even if these are beyond the skill level of a part of the
population given that performance tends to level–off (but not decrease) when the skill level
(capacity limit) is reached. In fact, managers have two extra reasons to assign challenging goals
with deadlines as these induce steady state work rates and more reliable, predictable work rates.
Furthermore, if managers want to identify if a goal is challenging enough to make workers work
to the limits of their skill level, managers can verify the presence of a steady work pace. Ad-
ditionally, in monitoring the progress towards the goal, managers may compare actual progress
with previous patterns to predict if the goal can be attained or not within the deadline. Finally,
in measuring the workers’ satisfaction with their performance in terms of the goal, non-linear
dynamics according to the “S–shape” function should be used, noting the increased sensitivity
of “just missing the goal” by a narrow margin and the weak marginal gain in overreaching the
goal.
For tactical storage location decisions, Chapter 5 provides a simple heuristic that can be
used by warehouse managers and planners to obtain manual order picking systems that balance
efficiency and comfort of their workers. The simple heuristic tested in Chapter 5 provided
satisfactory solutions for economic and ergonomic objectives in the real warehouse cases studied.
In addition, Chapter 5 also proved the value of using data commonly stored in warehouse
management systems to have accurate and realistic (i.e. under normal operating conditions
rather than artificial settings) of cycle time given retrieval locations and product characteristics.
Despite the noisy data that may stem from this approach, the large number of varied observations
and the use of appropriate outlier detection techniques makes such data a reliable source for
cycle time estimation.
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6.5 Future outlook
It is clear that research at the interface of operations management and worker-specific factors is
still incipient. From the limitations and also the results of the studies presented in this thesis
several questions arise. We highlight a few of these questions and end with a brief vision of what
may be the future of operations management models for workers.
The review of worker related relationships present in Chapter 2 is limited to considering
repetitive jobs. An account of the factors that are relevant for performance of more complex
jobs with a lower degree of repetitiveness and more decision latitude of workers is still needed.
Complex productive environments, such as in cell manufacturing or job shop manufacturing as
well as planning and supervisory work, call for a review of other cognitive and social factors
involved. These types of work not only involve simple decision making tasks which have been
reviewed in a number of studies (see Gino and Pisano, 2008), but a broader set of tasks that
need to be addressed. Already, for the example in Johnson et al. (2004) it was noted that
production planning tasks have, in addition to decision making tasks, other types of sub–tasks
(e.g. information gathering, relationship management) that have an important impact on the
productivity of the planners.
The goal settings studies of Chapter 3 and 4 raise several questions in the context of oper-
ations management. One of the important questions is how goal assignments may function in
more complex environments of operations management such as production lines. In production
lines, Schultz et al. (2009) already document dependencies between workers and queue length.
The question of how these dependencies interact with the effects of the individual (probably at
the bottleneck level) and group goals assigned provides interesting research opportunities. For
example, it may be interesting to investigate how the assignment of goals may interact with
peer pressure in production lines. Furthermore, in production contexts where effort to produce
is loosely linked to actual performance other questions emerge. Questions such as what would
be the effectiveness of goals and how would work be regulated if the relationship between effort
and performance is more stochastic or more ambiguous in nature as is the probable case with
a broader set of more complex jobs. In addition, the issue of repeatedly assigning goals for
coping with fluctuations in demand needs to be investigated from an empirical and operations
management modeling perspective.
In addition, a study that explicitly addresses limitations of assigning goals in operations
management contexts is still needed. Goals may induce higher immediate performance and
steady work rates but this may come at the expense of decreasing quality, higher fatigue rates
and possibly frustration for not achieving goals. These limitations of goals have not yet been
explicitly studied in long term operations management contexts. Models may be constructed
to identify what are the trade-offs between positive and negative effects of goals over a time
horizon.
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On the theoretical front, studies of goal setting raise other questions. For example, it is
important to ask which stylized planning and controlling decision making model can parsimo-
niously explain all the work regulation patterns found in the empirical studies of Chapter 4 (i.e.
steady work rate when challenging goals are assigned, selection of different initial work rates for
different goals assigned, acceleration towards the deadline). Such a model will be suggestive of
the mechanisms at play in work pace regulation and may be validated with further empirical
tests, or even be used to predict performance of individuals.
In Chapter 5, the study is limited to specific order picking contexts with one retrieval per
pick cycle. The extension of the study to other picking contexts such as contexts where more
retrievals per cycle time exist as well as other contexts where for example, family grouping
restrictions may apply to storage allocations (i.e. products that belong to certain families need
to be allocated together). Moreover, as mentioned before, similar studies in other contexts where
the aim is to identify the extent of trade-offs between classic operational performance objectives
and well-being/job satisfaction related objectives are needed.
Finally, its is evident from this thesis that there exists several areas of future study at the
interface of operations management and worker-specific factors and that these are important for a
better understanding of the key actors in operations: the workers. However, these investigations
should always consider the limitations of the study. From a theoretical point of view, not
all effects of worker specific factors on performance and job satisfaction can, with the available
knowledge, be sufficiently described for incorporation in operations management decision models.
From a practical point of view, the effort of identifying or measuring the effects of worker specific
factors may at times outweigh the benefits of doing so. Thus, the search for efficient ways of
measuring such effects is a research subject of definite practical relevance.

Summary
Within any added-value operations, for value adding activities to occur, people are required.
Even in the case of automated systems, people act as operators and maintenance personnel.
Operations research serves as support to the operations management field by developing decision-
making models that assist in the choice of variables to optimize operations management perfor-
mance. However, the emphasis of decision making models has traditionally been on the modeling
of material and information flows. These models often consider people as indistinguishable from
other types of resources such as equipment. By doing so, these models often disregard existing
knowledge from behavioral and ergonomic sciences with the consequence that the feasibility and
the objectives of these models may become compromised.
This disregard of results from the behavioral and ergonomic sciences has already been ac-
knowledged in the operations management literature. Hence, the emergence of the field of
behavioral operations; defined by Gino and Pisano (2008) as “the study of human behavior and
cognition and their impacts on operating systems and processes”. Nonetheless, even within such
field there is a greater emphasis on bounded rationality and cognitive biases aspects that affect
managers and planners in operations management functions, rather than on how decisions affect
operational workers that in turn impact operating systems and processes.
In this thesis, we study the impact of operations management decisions on workers and
subsequently on system performance. We refer to this subject as a sub-field in behavioral
operations management: Behavioral Operations for Workers. Given the infancy of the field, this
thesis has a two-fold approach. We first take a general approach where we propose a holistic
framework for articulating both existing and possible future research on the field. Next, we take
a case-specific approach where we investigate particular decisions of operations management
that concern workers.
In Chapter 2, we take a general approach to the field of Behavioral Operations for Workers.
Our goal is to review the existing knowledge that links operations management decisions with
worker performance and worker job satisfaction with the objective of incorporating this in exist-
ing and potential operations management decision models. We propose a framework to identify
relevant relationships between operations management variables and worker performance and
job satisfaction variables. A review of the existing knowledge of worker specific factors that
are prone to be influenced by operations management decisions clearly shows that knowledge is
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available to be incorporated in current operations management models. However, it also shows
that such knowledge is limited in the characterization of certain relationships between opera-
tions management variables with individual performance and job satisfaction. The limitations
are particularly evident when the relationships deal with long-term effects. Thus, we show ex-
isting opportunities for modeling and empirical research in the field of Behavioral Operations
for Workers. Moreover, we provide recommendations about how to incorporate state of the art
knowledge of worker specific factors in operations management decision models, acknowledging
at the same time current limitations of such knowledge.
Using the general modeling framework of Chapter 2, we focus our study in Chapters 3
and 4 on the use of setting specific quantitative production goals with a deadline for enhanced
productivity. Both chapters attempt to answer two key questions for operations management:
1) What is the relationship between performance and goal level in operational contexts? 2) How
do workers regulate their work-pace over time?
Chapter 3 focuses on generating hypotheses regarding possible answers for the aforemen-
tioned questions. The hypotheses are formulated by reviewing existing literature on the matter
and proposing two alternative mathematical models that view workers as decision makers that
select their work pace over time. Using a similar approach than the one used by behavioral
economic models, two models are proposed. One model assumes that the worker is myopic and
maximizes the instantaneous utility derived from a given work pace. The other model assumes
that the worker plans and maximizes the total utility derived from the whole working period.
In both cases, the utility is derived from the intrinsic desirability of a given work pace and by
the extrinsic desirability of attaining a given level of performance with respect to an externally
assigned goal.
The generated hypotheses from these models are then tested in Chapter 4 using a laboratory
study. In the experiment, subjects have to perform a simple order picking task and the time
between pick is recorded. We find from the experiments that a planning model with online
revision of the plan is most consistent with our results. Further, in response to our original
question we find that 1) performance tends to increase and level-off with and 2) challenging
goals relative to the skill of the worker induce steady state work pace and more predictable
work pace patterns. Moreover, only if the goal is perceived as relatively ”easy” there exists
acceleration towards the deadline and not towards the completion of the goal. We also show
implications of these findings to the theory and practice of operations management.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we re-visit a classic operations management decision making problem:
that of deciding on the location of items in a warehouse by including the perspective of the
worker’s well-being. The relevant aspect of well-being studied in this chapter is discomfort, a
facet of job satisfaction identified in Chapter 2. In this study, we first perform an empirical
field study in two existing warehouses to identify and quantify the location and product factors
that impact the cycle time of order picking and also the discomfort felt by workers. The results
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of the empirical studies are then used as inputs for a bi-objective assignment problem that
identifies the trade-off between storage location decisions that shorten cycle time and storage
location decisions that diminish average discomfort of workers in picking. We find moderate
trade-offs between both goals given commonalities in the factors that explain cycle-time and
discomfort. The results imply that simultaneous improvements of both goals are possible in
real-world situations before reaching the efficient frontier.

Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Mensen zijn altijd noodzakelijk voor de voortbrenging van goederen en diensten. Zelfs in het
geval dat automatische systemen worden gebruikt, spelen mensen nog een onmisbare rol bij de
bediening en als onderhoudsmonteurs. Het vakgebied Operations Management richt zich op het
efficie¨nt en effectief maken van het voortbrengingsproces van goederen en diensten door gebruik
te maken van onder andere technieken uit de Operations Research voor het maken van besliss-
ingsmodellen. De nadruk van deze beslissingsmodellen is echter traditioneel gericht op het mod-
elleren van problemen met relatief eenvoudig kwantificeerbare prestatiematen, zoals materiaal-
en informatiestromen, machinecapaciteiten en machineplanning, locatie- en allocatieproblemen.
Deze modellen beschouwen de mens vaak als ononderscheidenlijk van andere typen productiemid-
delen zoals machines. Door deze aanpak wordt bestaande kennis uit de gedragswetenschappen
en ergonomie vaak ter zijde gelegd met als gevolg dat de kwaliteit, oplosbaarheid of de doel-
stellingsfuncties van de modellen wordt aangetast, of dat soms belangrijke aspecten volledig
buiten beschouwing worden gelaten.
Het feit dat resultaten uit de gedragswetenschappen en ergonomie niet worden gebruikt,
is al eerder geconstateerd in de operations management literatuur. Daarom is het vakgebied
”behavioral operationso¨ntstaan, welke gedefinieerd wordt door Gino and Pisano (2008) als het
bestuderen van menselijk gedrag en cognitie en de invloed daarvan op operationele systemen
en processen. Desalniettemin ligt zelfs in dit vakgebied de nadruk op aspecten van begrensde
rationaliteit en cognitieve afwijkingen die van invloed zijn op managers en planners. Veel minder
aandacht is er besteed aan de vraag hoe plannings- en ontwerpbeslissingen van invloed zijn op
arbeiders en hoe dat vervolgens van invloed is op de prestaties van de operationele systemen en
processen.
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we de invloed van karakteristieken van arbeiders op operations
management beslissingen. We evalueren de invloed van operations management beslissingen
op de arbeiders en de daarop volgende prestaties, we tonen aan hoe de karakteristieken van
arbeiders opgenomen kunnen worden in operations management modellen, en laten zien hoe
deze kennis benut kan worden om managementbeslissingen te verbeteren. Wij refereren aan
dit onderwerp, zijnde een deelgebied van behavioral operations management, als Behavioral
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Operations for Workers. Gegeven dat dit vakgebied nog in de kinderschoenen staat, kiezen we in
dit proefschrift voor een tweeledige aanpak. Ten eerste kiezen we een brede aanpak waarin we een
holistisch raamwerk voorstellen waarin zowel bestaand als mogelijk toekomstig onderzoek wordt
benadrukt. Vervolgens volgen we een casus-specifieke aanpak waarin we bepaalde beslissingen
van operations managers onderzoeken die invloed hebben op de arbeiders.
In Hoofdstuk 2 geven we een holistische benadering van het vakgebied Behavioral Operations
for Workers. We geven een overzicht van de bestaande kennis die de operations management
beslissingen verbindt met de prestaties van arbeiders en met de werktevredenheid van de ar-
beiders. Het doel is om veelbelovende mogelijkheden te identificeren voor het opnemen van
deze kennis in bestaande en nieuwe beslissingsmodellen. Hiertoe stellen we een raamwerk voor
dat relevante verbanden legt tussen operations management variabelen enerzijds en variabe-
len voor prestaties en tevredenheid van de arbeiders anderzijds. Deze evaluatie van bestaand
wetenschappelijk onderzoek toont duidelijk dat kennis beschikbaar is van arbeiderspecifieke fac-
toren voor opname in operations management modellen. Het toont echter ook dat deze kennis
beperkt is tot de karakterisering van bepaalde verbanden tussen operations management variabe-
len en individuele prestaties of werktevredenheid. De beperkingen zijn vooral duidelijk wanneer
het verbanden betreft met betrekking tot effecten op de lange termijn. Op deze wijze tonen
we belangrijke kansen voor modelmatig en empirisch onderzoek op het terrein van Behavioral
Operations for Workers. Bovendien voorzien we in aanbevelingen over de manier waarop de
actuele kennis van arbeider-specifieke factoren kan worden opgenomen in operations manage-
ment beslissingsmodellen, waarbij tegelijkertijd aandacht is voor de huidige beperkingen van
deze kennis. Zo raden wij bijvoorbeeld aan om als doelstellingsfuncties in operationele modellen
facetten van werktevredenheid op te nemen, die kunnen dienen als benadering van de feitelijke
werktevredenheid. Deze aanbeveling is gebaseerd op het huidige beperkte empirische onder-
zoek, dat geen verklaring heeft voor de bijdragen van alle facetten van werktevredenheid en hoe
deze samenkomen tot een algehele waardering van werktevredenheid. Gebruik makende van het
algemene modelleerraamwerk van Hoofdstuk 2, richten we ons in Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 op het
gebruik van situatiespecifieke kwantitatieve productiedoelen met een deadline ter bevordering
van de productiviteit. Vanuit een Operations Management perspectief analyseren we ”goal set-
ting theory”; de theorie die analyseert hoe het beste taakdoelen kunnen worden gesteld voor het
bereiken van individuele prestaties. Specifiek staan in beide hoofdstukken twee vragen centraal:
1) Wat is de relatie tussen prestatie en taakdoel in operationele omgevingen? 2) Hoe reguleren
arbeiders hun werktempo door de tijd heen?
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op het genereren van hypotheses met betrekking tot mogelijke antwo-
orden op de voornoemde vragen. De hypotheses zijn geformuleerd op basis van een literatu-
urstudie en door het formuleren van wiskundige modellen waarin arbeiders worden opgevat als
beslissers die door de tijd heen hun eigen werktempo kiezen. Gebruik makend van een vergeli-
jkbare aanpak als in economische gedragsmodellen, cree¨erden we twee modellen. Een model is
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gebaseerd op de aanname dat de arbeider myopisch is en het onmiddellijke nut maximaliseert die
volgt uit het werktempo. Het andere model volgt de aanname dat de arbeider vooruit kijkt en het
totale nut maximaliseert over de gehele werkperiode. In beide gevallen is het nut samengesteld
uit de intrinsieke wenselijkheid van een bepaald werktempo en de extrinsieke wenselijkheid van
het bereiken van een bepaald prestatieniveau afgezet tegen het extern opgelegde taakdoel.
De in Hoofdstuk 3 geformuleerde hypotheses worden vervolgens in Hoofdstuk 4 gevalideerd
door middel van een laboratoriumstudie. Bij dit experiment dienen de proefpersonen een een-
voudige orderverzameltaak uit te voeren waarbij de tijd tussen gepakte producten wordt gereg-
istreerd. We zien in de experimenten dat een planningsmodel met online bijstellingen het meest
overeenkomt met het daadwerkelijke gedrag van de proefpersonen. Bovendien vinden we in
antwoord op onze oorspronkelijke vragen dat 1) de prestatie neigt te stijgen en daarna te stabilis-
eren bij stijgingen in het niveau van het taakdoel en 2) doelen die in verhouding tot de kundigheid
van de arbeider uitdagend zijn, zorgen voor een stabiel werktempo en voor beter voorspelbare
patronen in het werktempo. Bovendien is er uitsluitend bij als relatief e¨envoudig”gepercipieerde
taakdoelen sprake van een toenemend werktempo bij het naderen van de deadline, niet bij het
naderen van het taakdoel. We tonen ook de implicaties van deze uitkomsten voor de theorie en
de praktijk van operations management.
Tenslotte keren we in Hoofdstuk 5 terug naar een klassiek operations management besliss-
ingsprobleem, namelijk het bepalen van opslaglocaties voor producten in een magazijn met
toevoeging van het perspectief van het welbevinden van de arbeiders. Het relevante aspect van
welbevinden dat in dit hoofdstuk wordt bestudeerd, is ”discomfort”, een facet van werktevre-
denheid zoals ge¨ıdentificeerd in Hoofdstuk 2. In deze studie voeren we eerst een veldexperiment
uit in twee bestaande magazijnen om locatie- en producteigenschappen te identificeren en kwan-
tificeren die van invloed zijn op de cyclustijd van het orderverzamelen en ook op de mate van
discomfort zoals gevoeld door de arbeiders. De resultaten van deze empirische studies worden
vervolgens gebruikt als invoer voor een bi-objective toewijzingsprobleem dat de afweging identi-
ficeert tussen de opslaglocatiekeuzes die de cyclustijd verkorten en de opslaglocatiekeuzes die de
gemiddelde discomfort van de arbeiders verminderen. We vinden gematigde belangenafwegin-
gen tussen de twee doelen gegeven overeenkomsten in de factoren die de cyclustijd en discomfort
verklaren. De resultaten impliceren dat gelijktijdige verbeteringen van beide doelen mogelijk
zijn in de praktijk voordat de efficient frontier wordt bereikt.
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de analyse van nieuwe of zeer recente marketing gegevens.
Hiertoe introduceren we een aantal nieuwe econometrische modellen. We presenteren modellen
die nuttig zijn om het volgende te analyseren: (1) het optimale tijdstip voor de lancering van
nieuwe en dominante technologiee¨n, (2) de triggers, snelheid en de timing van een substantie¨le
prijsverlaging voor nieuwe producten, (3) de heterogeniteit in preferenties van consumenten
die leidt tot specifieke substitutiepatronen in geaggregeerde verkoopgegevens, en (4) locaties
die een grote invloed hebben op de verspreiding van nieuwe technologiee¨n. De econometrische
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technieken die we toepassen zijn divers, maar ze zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op Bayesiaanse
methoden. We maken gebruik van Bayesiaanse mixture modellen, Bayesiaanse variabele selectie
technieken, Bayesiaanse spatial modellen en we introduceren een nieuwe Bayesiaanse benadering
voor het random coe¨fficie¨nten logit model. De gegevens die we analyseren bestaan uit unieke en
grote datasets. We bestuderen de prijzen van video-games, de verkopen van video-game consoles,
de totale omzet voor specifieke consumentenproducten en online zoekgegevens van Google.
Resumen en Espan˜ol
(Summary in Spanish)
En el proceso de la creacio´n de bienes y servicios, el involucramiento de las personas es esencial.
Incluso en el caso de sistemas automa´ticos de produccio´n, las personas juegan un rol vital como
operadores y personal de mantenimiento. El objetivo del a´rea de la Administracio´n de Opera-
ciones es asegurar la produccio´n eficiente y efectiva de bienes y servicios. El a´rea utiliza, entre
otras, te´cnicas de Investigacio´n de Operaciones para desarrollar modelos de decisio´n. Sin embar-
go, el e´nfasis de los modelos de decisio´n ha sido tradicionalmente en problemas de modelacio´n
con medidas de rendimiento fa´cilmente cuantificables. Estos problemas fa´cilmente cuantificables
incluyen problemas tales como los de flujo de material, de flujo de informacio´n, de capacidad y
programacio´n de equipos, de ubicacio´n y de asignacio´n de recursos. Estos modelos a veces con-
sideran a las personas como indistinguibles de otros tipos de recursos como lo son las ma´quinas.
Al hacerlo, algunos modelos existentes pueden ignorar interacciones entre las variables de de-
cisio´n de los modelos y factores espec´ıficos de los trabajadores que son estudiados en las ciencias
del comportamiento humano as´ı como la ergonomı´a.
La no inclusio´n de resultados provenientes de las ciencias de comportamiento y ergonomı´a ya
ha sido reconocida por la literatura de la Administracio´n de Operaciones. Como respuesta a ello,
ha surgido la nueva a´rea de Operaciones del Comportamiento, definido por Gino y Pisano (2008)
como el “estudio del comportamiento humano y sus procesos cognitivos as´ı como sus impactos en
los procesos y sistemas productivos”. Sin embargo, incluso dentro de esta a´rea, existe un e´nfasis
en estudiar aspectos de racionalidad limitada y alteraciones cognitivas que afectan a los gerentes
y personal de planeamiento. Menor atencio´n ha sido prestada a dar respuesta a la pregunta de
si las decisiones de planeamiento y de disen˜o de operaciones afectan a los trabajadores, y co´mo
a su vez ello afecta al rendimiento de los sistemas operacionales y sus procesos.
En la presente tesis, estudiamos el impacto de aspectos relativos a los trabajadores en deci-
siones de administracio´n de operaciones. Evaluamos el impacto de decisiones de la administracio´n
de operaciones en los trabajadores y su desempen˜o en el trabajo. Asimismo, demostramos co´mo
aspectos de los trabajadores pueden ser incluidos en modelos de decisiones de operaciones y
co´mo el conocimiento de aspectos de los trabajadores pueden ser explotados para mejorar las
decisiones en operaciones. Nos referimos al tema de incorporar aspectos relevantes de los traba-
168 Resumen en Espan˜ol (Summary in Spanish)
jadores en modelos de decisio´n de operaciones como un sub-a´rea del a´rea de Administracio´n de
Operaciones como es la Administracio´n de Operaciones Humanas para Trabajadores. Dado el
estado incipiente de este campo acade´mico, esta tesis hace uso de dos estrategias. La primera
estrategia es general y propone un esquema hol´ıstico para articular las investigaciones del pasado
y futuras en este campo. En el Cap´ıtulo 2, damos una visio´n hol´ıstica del a´rea de Administracio´n
de Operaciones Humanas para Trabajadores.
Asimismo, revisamos la literatura existente que conecta decisiones en la administracio´n de
operaciones con el rendimiento del trabajador y su satisfaccio´n con su trabajo. El objetivo
de esta revisio´n es el identificar oportunidades para incorporar este conocimiento en nuevos
y existentes modelos de decisio´n. Para realizar este objetivo, proponemos un esquema que in-
tegra las relaciones que existen entre las variables de la administracio´n de operaciones y las
variables de rendimiento y de satisfaccio´n de los trabajadores. La revisio´n de la literatura clara-
mente demuestra que es posible incorporar conocimientos de factores humanos en los modelos
de administracio´n de operaciones. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, la revisio´n de la literatura de-
muestra que tales conocimientos esta´n limitados en la caracterizacio´n de ciertas relaciones entre
las variables de la Administracio´n de Operaciones y las variables de rendimiento o satisfaccio´n
con el trabajo. Las limitaciones encontradas son particularmente evidentes con las relaciones
que abordan efectos a largo plazo. A consecuencia de ello, identificamos oportunidades para
realizar futuros estudios emp´ıricos y de moldeamiento en el a´rea de Administracio´n de Opera-
ciones Humanas para Trabajadores. Adicionalmente, proporcionamos recomendaciones de co´mo
incorporar conocimiento de factores humanos en modelos de decisio´n de la administracio´n de op-
eraciones considerando adema´s las limitaciones del conocimiento actual. Por ejemplo, recomen-
damos incluir facetas de satisfaccio´n con el trabajo como objetivos en modelos de operaciones ya
que estas facetas pueden servir en reemplazo del concepto mismo de satisfaccio´n con el trabajo.
Esta recomendacio´n esta´ basada en que las actuales investigaciones emp´ıricas esta´n limitadas
por no poder explicar co´mo las facetas de satisfaccio´n con el trabajo contribuyen y se integran en
una sensacio´n general de satisfaccio´n con el trabajo. Utilizando el esquema general para modelar
factores humanos del Cap´ıtulo 2, enfocamos nuestra investigacio´n en los Cap´ıtulos 2 y 3 en estu-
diar la asignacio´n de metas cuantitativas de produccio´n dentro de plazos asignados con el fin de
mejorar la productividad. Analizamos desde la perspectiva de la Administracio´n de Operaciones
la teor´ıa que analiza la mejor manera de asignar metas para incrementar el rendimiento: La
teor´ıa de asignacio´n de metas. En particular, ambos cap´ıtulos abordan dos preguntas relevantes
para la teor´ıa de administracio´n de operaciones: 1) Cua´l es la relacio´n entre el rendimiento y
el nivel de la meta en contextos operacionales? 2) Co´mo los trabajadores regulan su velocidad
de trabajo a trave´s del tiempo. El Cap´ıtulo 3 se enfoca en generar una serie de hipo´tesis con-
cernientes a las preguntas sen˜aladas anteriormente. Las hipo´tesis son formuladas revisando la
literatura existente y creando modelos matema´ticos que abordan a los trabajadores como per-
sonas que toman decisiones seleccionando la velocidad a la cual realizan su trabajo. Usando un
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enfoque similar al utilizado en modelos de comportamiento econo´mico, creamos dos modelos. El
primer modelo asume que los trabajadores son miopes en sus decisiones y maximizan la utilidad
instanta´nea obtenida al seleccionar un ritmo de trabajo. El otro modelo asume que el trabajador
realiza planeamiento y maximiza la utilidad total obtenida de todo el tiempo disponible para
trabajar. En ambos casos, la utilidad esta´ compuesta de la preferencia intr´ınseca de seleccionar
una velocidad de trabajo y la preferencia extr´ınseca de rendir a un cierto nivel con respecto a
la meta asignada.
Las hipo´tesis formuladas en el Cap´ıtulo 3 son a continuacio´n verificadas en el Cap´ıtulo 4
utilizando un estudio de laboratorio. En el laboratorio, los participantes del experimento deben
realizar una tarea simple de consolidacio´n de o´rdenes, t´ıpica de los almacenes y centros de dis-
tribucio´n. Los resultados de los experimentos muestran consistencia con el modelo que asume
planeamiento de parte de los trabajadores. Los resultados del experimento realizado dan re-
spuesta a las interrogantes de investigacio´n planteadas encontrando que: primero, el rendimiento
tiende a incrementarse y luego nivelarse cuando se incrementa la meta asignada; y, segundo que
las metas de produccio´n que son percibidas como exigentes por los trabajadores tienden a inducir
patrones de regulacio´n de velocidad de trabajos constantes y ma´s predecibles. Es ma´s, solo si la
meta de produccio´n es percibida como relativamente “fa´cil”, existe aceleracio´n hacia el te´rmino
del plazo asignado mas no hacia cuando la meta es completada. Adicionalmente, mostramos
implicaciones de estos resultados para la pra´ctica y teor´ıa de la Administracio´n de Operaciones.
Finalmente, en el Cap´ıtulo 5, revisamos un problema de decisio´n cla´sico en la Administracio´n
de Operaciones: el problema de decidir la ubicacio´n de los productos en un almace´n incorporando
adema´s la perspectiva del bienestar de los trabajadores involucrados. El aspecto relevante del
bienestar de los trabajadores en este estudio es el malestar f´ısico. Este aspecto es tambie´n una
de las facetas de satisfaccio´n con el trabajo identificadas en el Cap´ıtulo 2. En este estudio,
primero realizamos un estudio emp´ırico de campo en dos almacenes existentes, para identificar
y cuantificar el impacto que tienen las variables de ubicacio´n de producto y caracter´ısticas del
producto, en el tiempo de ciclo de o´rdenes de distribucio´n as´ı como en la sensacio´n de malestar
en los trabajadores. Los resultados del estudio emp´ırico son luego utilizados en un problema
de asignacio´n con dos objetivos, que identifica el grado de alineamiento que existe entre el
objetivo de minimizar tiempos de ciclo con el objetivo de minimizar la sensacio´n de malestar de
los trabajadores. Los resultados demuestran un grado de conflicto solo moderado entre ambos
objetivos. Ello se debe a que existen factores en comu´n que explican el tiempo de ciclo y el
malestar de los trabajadores. Los resultados implican que es posible obtener mejoras en ambos
objetivos en situaciones reales antes de llegar a la frontera eficiente de posibilidades.
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l)INCORPORATING WORKER-SPECIFIC FACTORS IN OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
MODELS
To add value, manufacturing and service operations require workers to do the job. As a
result, the performance of operations is ultimately dependent on the performance of
individual workers. Simultaneously, workers are major stakeholders of the firm. Workers
spend considerable time of their lives at the job and depend on it to sustain themselves
and their families. As a result, firms that want to satisfy their main stakeholders should
consider workers’ job satisfaction in the design of their operations. Even more so, when
job satisfaction has been associated to other positive outcomes for the firm, including
lower personnel turnover rates and accident frequency.
This thesis addresses the key question of how common operations management decisions
may have an impact on the workers’ individual performance and job satisfaction. In
particular, we first provide a literature survey of psychology and ergonomics that link
operations decision variables with performance and job satisfaction. Next, we study the
effects of assigning goals on performance and work pace regulation. We identified steady
work pace regulation patterns associated with challenging goals. Finally, we studied the
problem of where to store items in a warehouse such that efficiency (cycle time) and well-
being (discomfort) criteria are balanced. We found that both criteria have a certain degree
of alignment and that simultaneous improvements in both criteria are possible.
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